Carlos Barros
Lawrence J. McCrank
Editors

History Under Debate
International Reflection
on the Discipline

Pre-publication
REVIEWS,
COMMENTARIES,
EVALUATIONS...

"In the early 1990s, Carlos Barros
launched a discussion group, Historia a Debate, in Santiago de Compostela (Spain),
concerned with the status of historical inquiry internationally at the turn of the
twenty-first century. A first conference in 1993 was followed by a lively exchange
on the Internet with participants not only from Spain and Ibero-America, but
increasingly also from Western Europe and North America. This book contains
important essays from the second conference held in 1999, many of which
are for the first time in English. The key note is how historians are responding in their
writings to the dramatically changing realities since 1989. All major currents of thought are
treated. The contributors are keenly aware of the challenges created by globalization
and seek a middle road between the objectivism of traditional positivism and
the extreme relativism of postmodernists. This is a book that deserves to be read
by historians and others concerned with contemporary currents of thought."

Georg G. Iggers, PhD
Distinguished Professor Emeritus,
Department of History,
University at Buffalo
(State University of New York)
More pre-publication
REVIEWS, COMMENTARIES, EVALUATIONS . . .

"This work offers scholars in English-speaking countries a valuable and revealing snapshot of the state of historical studies in Spain on the eve of the new century, by presenting selected papers from a major forum for historical and historiographical debate in that country. Although history is subject to sweeping theoretical and perceptual changes on a global scale, including shifts in research emphases, too often the impact of these changes tends to be evaluated and understood by historians within a mostly national context. History Under Debate offers an insightful comparative view for those unfamiliar with the state of historical and historiographical studies in Spain. In addition to the essays specifically on Spanish historiographical issues, readers will find particularly valuable the piece of historical information science by co-editor Lawrence J. McCornick, as well as the essay on globalization and historiography by Juan Manuel Santana Pérez. History Under Debate should be read by every scholar interested in, and concerned about, how global historiographical debates shape and interact with national scholarly traditions in history."

Ronald W. Davis, PhD
Associate Vice President
for Academic Affairs,
Western Michigan University

"A rising from the Historia a Debate forum, this stimulating and highly provocative collection of articles by European and North American historians explores the current state—as well as the future—of the discipline of History, by seeking to (re)define the nature and role of History in the twenty-first century. It represents a coherent opus that ranges from the bold editorial statement of the problem by Carlos Barros and the challenging HaD Manifesto, through a series of essays concerned with History and historiography in contemporary Spain, to a comprehensive selection of more general papers, with special emphasis on the position of the Historian as practitioner and thinker. This book stands as an important contribution to the debate on History in the new millennium and should be read closely by any researcher working within historical studies. Its value will no doubt become increasingly evident as the debate unfolds in the coming years."

David E. Thornton, PhD
Assistant Professor,
Department of History,
Bilkent University, Turkey

NOTES FOR PROFESSIONAL LIBRARIANS
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History Under Debate
International Reflection
on the Discipline
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International Reflection on the Discipline

Carlos Barros
Lawrence J. McCrank
Editors
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Professor Carlos Barros is Senior Lecturer of Medieval History at the University of Santiago de Compostela, and is the Founder and Coordinator of the international net of historians Historia à Debate listserv (www.h-debate.com) and Organizer of the History Under Debate conferences. Professor Barros has made numerous contributions to collective monographs and scientific journals and is the author of three books written in his native tongue. He is an Associated Doctor at the Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas (Instituto Padre Sarmiento). He was the main researcher for “The State of History” and “The Change in Historical Paradigms”—two International Inquiry research projects conducted in collaboration with historians from the universities of Zaragoza, Cádiz, País Vasco, La Laguna, Las Palmas de Gran Canaria, and Murcia.

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Preface

Historiography As a Primary Source

I learned about the international forum Historia à Debate after the July 7-11, 1993, conference in Santiago de Compostela, when its acta were published in 1995. Professor Carlos Barros, the editor and founder of HaD, started a listserv that has attracted more than 1,600 discussants from twenty-five countries who daily debate issues of historiography, historical methods, the philosophy of history, and increasingly the predicaments historians find themselves in, their careers, and the political circumstances of higher education in Europe and developing countries, primarily Latin America. This was an interesting discussion group which attracted my attention partially because of my own interests in Hispanic culture, but more broadly because of its broad scope, international cross-border dialogue, tenor and zeal, commitment to the survival of History in an increasingly ahistorical world, and attempt to recover from post-Postmodernism while not reverting back in overreaction to a totally empirical position or passivity in the name of objectivity.

While I browse the Listserv and read intermittently as time permits in the ongoing electronic dialogue, I perceive myself to be somewhat of a voyeur more than real participant. I do not relate well to the politicization of academe reflected in so many of the communications; I am critical of some positions taken, especially radical revisionism less founded on History than on current events, contemporary reaction, and expediency for self-identity; and I am skeptical of the ambiguity and sweeping generalizations too often made in the discourse across the Internet and even in exchanges at the HaD conferences. Despite my reserve because of the Marxist tones, anticapitalism which often becomes anti-American in Latin American critiques, and the edge in too much of historians' writings that move with self-proclaimed authority into contemporary criticism, I do realize that there is a counterpart in the HaD dialogue to a similar discus-
sion in Anglo-American circles about the future of education and the call for the professorate to commitment and devotion to active learning, student involvement, or what is often styled as "engagement." In the United States, this is commensurate with new forms of quality assessment in higher education, focusing less on inputs and more on outputs or, now, outcomes.

So the old questions in the philosophy of History come full circle: What do we learn from History? Many of the historians wonder if one can learn history without historians, a prominent role of historians in academe, and a public respect for this role. The vocabulary is different between Spanish and English, the tone coming primarily from social history is often more cutting than can be transmitted in translation, and the cultures are different. The Spanish, Portuguese, and Latin American experience of censorship, political intervention into academe, persecution of the professorate for political research not condoned by the powers that be, and other forms of intellectual freedoms lost or never really gained breeds a caution and distrust that sometimes seems misdirected, ex post facto, and overstatement in reaction to past restrictions, limitations, and constant framing of historical thought in the bounds of nationalism or control of the state. But the overall problem of the development of History, especially in the academic establishment, with continuing limitations from lack of funding, too few teaching positions, and questionable public respect or value for History and historical thinking, is shared across English and Spanish, Iberia and Latin America with England and other parts of Europe, and throughout North America.

My personal reticence and reluctance to engage in HaD debates, in light of the current unfolding of History in our own time, were broken, however, by whatever compelled my comment in the wake of the September 11 attack on the World Trade Center towers in New York City. My detachment from History was forgotten, my emotional outrage and intellectual self collided, and for a moment I understood some of the suprarational dialogue I had been reading but not comprehending on a personal level. The idea of commitment and engagement in one's professional work seems to harken back to the concept of vocation (from vocare, i.e., a calling), which is more than teaching as a matter of combining content and technique. If one were dedicated to making the world a better place, that ideal involves comparison of past and present and aims toward a future so that betterment is a continual process. Or rather than simple comparison of two states of being or situations, as if time stood still, such comparison involves not just one locale but many places and, therefore, trajectories and a variety of experiences. How can one sense improvement or benchmark progress without memory? Perspective? Historical sensibility? Indeed, without History? Or without the reconstruction, reminding, synthesis, and reflective critique of historians?

During June 14-18, 1999, I had the opportunity to participate in the second HaD conference in Santiago, both to provide a paper related to my most recent book as well as to chair an international roundtable and to participate in another. My topic was historical information science, or computerized history if one will, more than old-style chronometricals of merely quantification, since I addressed data-, text-, sound-, and image-based historical sources in digital form; their access, analysis, continued reuse, and preservation; and the establishment of electronic archives. My interests were broader than mere text processing or Internet chatting. As such, mine was a minority representation in content and method, but also in philosophy and persuasion. Questions for me probed my empiricism, hint at neo-Positivism and social science orientation in my early socioeconomic history, but also my sense of documentation, evidence, proof, and relevance. Questions focused on my expertise in electronic archives, archives in general, libraries, and, as a dean and university librarian, support of research, not only to take measure of my American persuasions, but because my representation of the information profession in a History conference was a minority of one. My contribution in the roundtable to which I was appointed dealt with the status of the History of Spain and Portugal in American universities, a subject which my colleague Professor Teófilo Ruiz from UCLA explored in another session.

Both of these conferences attracted 300 or more historians each, another couple hundred students and spectators, with the majority from Spain itself and the largest minority from Latin America. Only a few historians from the Anglo-American world have participated, but more may journey to Santiago for the third forthcoming conference. The ethos, makeup, subject orientation, and language use of HaD I-II were all Hispanic and Latin. As the conference went on, I thought that it was a shame that there were not more communication across the north-south and language barriers between the Anglo-American world and the Romance one centering around the Mediterranean and
the Luso-Hispanic extension across the Atlantic. I approached Carlos Barros, therefore, about getting a set of essays from the second conference published in an English outlet, a compilation on the theme Primary Sources and Original Works. “Primary sources” means sources created as firsthand accounts, works in original states, eyewitnesses so to speak, and access to them. Such usage tends to separate first-generation sources from subsequent treatments of them, forming a secondary literature, or synthesis, as in reference tools of a tertiary literature. In HaD discussions, however, the secondary literature is primary, in the same sense that in information science the literature about information is considered the primary literature, distinct from the source or information itself. In historiography, the treatment of History by historians, the discipline of History rather than History itself, is of primary importance.

Throughout the HaD discussions, online and face-to-face, historiography is treated as interactive with History itself. Subject and object are fused intentionally and sometimes confused unintentionally, with a profound consciousness of the historian’s purposeful intervention into History to research it and write about it and potentially, therefore, to change it as it unfolds in a context informed by this discipline. History as action, from past to present and into the future, is different, is it not, when it is self-aware, informed, and questioning? In one sense, historian as change agent is a legitimate issue...in History research, writing, teaching, and other contacts in academe and, as argued by more and more participants in this forum, academe’s interaction with the work around it. History does not exist in a vacuum but instead surrounds us, and a reflexive relationship exists between History as known and the knowing of it. Although History is the study of the past, historical awareness occurs in the present, and one justification for History as a discipline, art, and science, is to influence, positively so it is hoped, the future. The “how, when, and why” we know History as historians forms a meta-history, as does how the general public perceives History through cultural memory and the historian’s work(s), which, so it is argued at HaD, must be studied as rigorously as History itself. The historical and contemporary thus go together. In such thinking historiography, the writing and analysis of historical thought and History writing, along with study of its teaching, reception, and influence, is primary.

In the spirit of HaD, which is intentionally self-reflective and consciously asks historians to see themselves as objects involved in their subjects while researching and writing History, a personal note seems appropriate. My journey to Santiago in 1999, in the jubilee year on the eve of the turn to a new millennium, was a double treat: the HaD conference and my personal travels as a Christian, a medievalist and specialist in the Hispamia of the twelfth century, and combination pilgrim-tourist in the last of the twentieth century with some sensitivity to the new millenarian themes around me (beyond Y2K). So I sought out the old streets in historic Santiago and trekked a few miles over the old road to this famous shrine site; piled one more pilgrim’s stone on the medieval heap; attended High Mass to be incensed by the famous mechanical swinging butifumario (to be blessed assuredly, but in the double purpose of the medieval ritual to be perfumed also, so that the cathedral would not smell of the thousands of bodies pressing into it daily); paid my respects to the relics of St. James, remembering also twelfth-century skepticism of the tradition and marveling at the shrine’s ingenious blessing by a mechanical saint in days of old—a wonder in itself of medieval technology and belief; gawked at the gold and silver altar enriched by reconquest and conquest in the New World, and of the medieval Romanesque structure encased in the later Gothic cathedral with its Baroque facade that protected the monumental structure’s inner layers; sauntered through the museums to view hundreds of medieval artifacts and the delights of a virtual, comical pilgrim welcoming everyone to the tourist center; enjoyed wine with newfound friends, fellow pilgrims, and conference in the open-air restaurant of the medieval hospital or guest house (although willing to sample the local cuisine, I could not take the grilled green peppers my Mexican friends thought went so well with the local beers, but I did enjoy several wonderful meals); listened to Gallego minstrels in the courtyards; and later into one evening I even kicked up my heels to some jigs reeled forth by a visiting Irish band—a thoroughly delightful time. Does this all sound like a promotional advertisement for the forthcoming HaD conferences? So be it, but I wonder if any could capture again the feeling of a medieval pilgrimage on the eve of the new millennium. But the debate goes on, and I, for one, look forward to another journey to Santiago de Compostela.

Professor Carlos Barros has selected a dozen essays for our edi-
cation, most written in French and Spanish, translated into English
drafts, and revised, redrafted, and often retranslated by me to render originals into more fluid and meaningful American English. If the translation from one medium to another, from oral address to written paper, and from one language to another has harmed the author’s communication or misrepresented the author’s intent in any way, I apologize in advance. Professor Barros’s plenary address to the second HaD conference leads these essays, followed by the Manifesto, since the latter sets up both the HaD discussions and this declaration of principles for the modern historian to follow. The essays that follow illustrate the nature of debates in this forum, with a wider selection available in the acta I-II and a separate edition of contributions on medieval History, with more to come in HaD III (2004).

Lawrence J. McCrank
Chapter 1

The Return of History

Carlos Barros

Remember the saying "You can't have your cake and eat it too"? For those of us on the organizational committee of the conference History Under Debate (HaD or Historia à Debate), our efforts have seemed limited to solving logistic problems rather than contributing to the debates themselves. Although not participating fully in this conference, it is only reasonable that we put forward some of the key issues in and strategies for History Under Debate. The conference convener should take a leadership role. Likewise, some of our reflections on the development of these conferences are colored by, not only three days of presentations and discussions, but six months of intense preparations. During this time we had the opportunity to verify your enthusiastic response to this new forum—your attendance and participation are the living proof of this—as well as, of course, some reticence which indicates the challenge to our work so far, which itself suggests work to be done in expanding our debate.

While important roundtable discussions and presentations remain, and debate continues, I would like to comment on some expectations from such an international macro gathering of historians, when a lack of historical perspective during the conference itself could, depending on how you view it, be either a hindrance or a benefit.

Let us first consider our "immediate history," or the evolution of contemporary events when scarcely half a year remains of the twentieth century. Then, let me speak of the immediate History by historians or, in other words, "immediate historiography," and finally to

This is a revised and somewhat expanded transcription, translated, of the fourth plenary lecture at the Second International History Under Debate Conference, Saturday, July 17, 1999, in Santiago de Compostela, held in the city’s Conference Center.
conclude with some proposals regarding a new paradigm gaining some consensus among those who practice in this profession (Barros, 1999b), the construction of which some of us have been involved in, one way or another, for some time (Barros, 1995 [1997]).

HISTORY ACCELERATES

The last decade of the twentieth century has proven to be unexpected, to say the least. In 1989 the Berlin Wall fell, taking us unaware with an occurrence that precipitated what Francis Fukuyama (1992) has called “the end of History” as we have known it. As noted already in 1994 during a roundtable about Chiapas, Mexico, “History recommences for some” (Barros, 1995a). This seems evident when, ten years later in 1999, the first NATO war in fifty years broke out. Just when it seemed that, with the disappearance of military blocks and the end of the cold war, the world under the auspices of the UN (thanks to its “blue helmets”) would be in a position to safeguard a new world order based on peace, a war broke out in Europe with disproportional violence for the first time since World War II, instigated by Western powers. War remains, therefore, in the continuation of politics, regardless of other means, not just for the small countries of the former Soviet bloc or the third world with their internal or border conflicts, but for the great powers of the world as well. What better indication at the threshold of the new millennium that History indeed has not ended?

We have gone from one surprise to the next during the 1990s. The old as well as new contradictions continue to show and push history forward. The teleological predictions that followed the collapse of the so-called socialist regimes in Eastern Europe have not occurred. Obviously, history continues to exist and we historians know only too well that it is hardly possible to “guarantee” any given future on the basis of today’s prevailing interests and mentalities. This leaves room for alternative futures: the Future is open-ended. That is the way it has been in the past. But the words of historians like us, who have not forsaken speaking about the present and of the future, are not enough. Only when immediate history confirms that history continues to exist can social-action agents recover their full capacity to think historically. Historical thought is often blurred by currently biased attitudes caught in the present that paradoxically prevail among some historians.

The acceleration of history we are witnessing—symptom, cause, and effect of globalization in all its aspects, as well as the development of information technologies—is typical of the periods of rapid historical transition. It is resulting in society demanding that History be rewritten. History, therefore, pulls History along. New and old social, cultural, and political subjects seek at the threshold of the new millennium their legitimization in History—ethnic groups and states; ideologies and religions; social and nationalist movements; the local and the regional; the national and the global. The speed of the present expansion and integration processes we call globalization generates confusing tendencies, the full comprehension of which proves unattainable if we ignore the time factor—if we do not relate Past, Present, and Future.

The fast change from 1989 onward compels us to find out where we have come from to understand better who we are, and especially where we are going. Of course, the coming century will not be like Orwell’s 1984. It will probably need History, the Social Sciences, and the Humanities to the same extent, if not more so, than the twentieth century. As globalization advances, it turns everything upside down in all spheres (society, politics, culture, and mentalities), upsetting the identities of ethnic-national communities and social groups at every level, as well as their relationships with the economy, with the state, and, in sum, with History. This process of breaks and discontinuity, reconstruction in time and space, no doubt, will become even more common in the century just beginning.

In this framework, what is the responsibility and role of History? Of historians?

So far, it is not historians who are taking advantage of this growing social demand for History, but novelists and, at some distance after them, journalists. The widespread success of the historical novel, which affects every historical epoch, is apparent in every country on all continents. To a certain extent, the social crisis of History is both a cause and a consequence of the “occupation” by novelists and other nonprofessional historians in the sphere that “belongs” to historians as official intermediaries between the Past, Present, and Future. Such a preoccupation does not solve in the least the fundamental problem; rather it aggravates the situation. The relationship between
the citizens of the global village and History cannot be based on fiction (less so in the case of old states and nationalities, whose identities reemerge and are reshaped with globalization, unless we have learned nothing from History). The invention of a past creates the risk of politically motivated manipulation of History and, consequently, paves the way to totalitarianism.

Rigorous History is needed now more than ever, but it is also more feasible than ever because now we accept more readily the influence of observers upon their object of observation; of the historian upon the issue being researched; and of the community of specialists upon what is and what is not scientific truth. It is now when History can be conceived as a valid science in accord with today's Natural and Social Sciences, which certainly does not compromise their responsibility toward the Present and the Future.7

THE POSITIVIST TURN

In contrast to the great paradigms of the twentieth century, and the pressure by readers, publishers, and the media as a whole in favor of the historical novel, novelists, literature theoreticians, and philosophers, which put History and Literature on an equal plain, professional History is being taken back to its prehistory. This is not a self-serving attack on Literature, or pitting History against Literature, but just recognizes another episode in the everlasting interdisciplinary struggle for knowledge, and the relationship between academe and the reading public. How are professional historians reacting to this?

One track in this conference followed by a large section of the international community of historians combines reflection on and debate about methodology, historiography, and the theory of History in relation to empirical work, academe as a whole, and the social usefulness of our discipline.8 They seek jointly and explicitly to influence the construction of the new paradigm of History without pretending to wield a magic wand or considering themselves in possession of the absolute truth.9

Some colleagues, however, think that the answers to the current historiographic uncertainties are in the "security" of archives; sources and source criticism; and individual work independent of any group, school, or historiographic trend, except to adhere to a proclamation 100 years ago that the role of the historian was to reconstruct the past "as it was."10 In other cases, what could be called a "stand-by" attitude is apparent—one which waits for the historiographic field to be cleared by those in the profession immersed in debate and experimentation, without realizing that the practice of each and every one of us influences, by omission as well as action, the writing of History. Obviously, a mere "return to the archives" is the circumstantial fruit of the crisis, but it makes no sense as a historiographic alternative for the future. Only if we had returned to the society, the culture, and the policy of the nineteenth century would it be possible for History to go back to the nineteenth century, as some seem to suggest without ever really admitting it. We should not, nonetheless, underestimate this "traditional turn" because it could, whether one likes it or not, hamper or distort the opportunity for History to jump ahead as a final conclusion of the turn-of-the-century historiographic transition. Let us not forget that the most notorious failures by "new historians" in the Annales, Marxist, and neo-Positivist traditions originated in underestimating the weight of the negative postulates of nineteenth-century tradition in communities of historians, including their own ranks.

How has this "great return" tendency come about (a minority on the increase), and is it not to be halted?

First, we have had a return to traditional historiographic themes, notably biography and political history. This was discussed by Jacques Le Goff at the First International History Under Debate Conference (1993). He advocated both a theoretical and practical reformulation of such themes along with other classical genres using the approaches of new History to advance into a new/old History synthesis, which in our view should also include narrative history (Le Goff, 1996). However, the substitution of the great socioeconomic research topics for the "great men," and the political and military events in which they were involved, has continued to gain ground, but it has seldom brought about new methodological approaches. The traditional subject matter drags along the old methodology, especially in the case of biographic History. Thus the fatalism, which we do not share, of some historians who specifically affirm that the object of research of the "old History" is inseparable from Positivism and its corresponding ideological conservatism (which are not always the same, given our use of these terms), at least momentarily. Somewhat not usually said is that this has been the case thus far because we have failed to develop sufficiently a historical account or a biographic
History from any advance in methodologies. Are we in time to change this?

The second phase of a return to what some of us continue to call "old History" is more of an epistemological nature: the complex certainties of the 1960s-1970s are sustained by the old reliance on the sources and their criticism as the main foundation, and virtually the only one, of the historical profession. This is a historiographic retreat that distances us from the cultural demands which society imposes. The demand for historical heroes and myths in the old-style historiography (favored by totalitarian regimes and fundamentalist ideologies) is now confined to a minority among cultured circles. Nor is it enough to provide dates and marshal data, refer to names and present bare facts. It is necessary to pre- and re-elaborate documentary information for the cultural background to be understood and to address the inquiries of the average turn-of-the-century reader who is very different from the nineteenth-century Romantic reader of History then written.11

The "great return" to traditional History, with its topics, methods, and theories, hits rock bottom in this new era, but this begins to generate debates and sporadic responses, which should be promoted even further.12 By exposing the looming historical involution at History Under Debate we hope to be in a better position to face the dangers we deplore. This "Positivist turn" is not an organized movement and is not always deliberate on the part of its protagonists. We ask the following question: Why do we not return—since we are dealing with returns—to the definition of the profession made by Jacques Le Goff in the preface to Time, Work, and Culture in Medieval Europe (Sp. trans., 1978, p. 7)? "History is done with documents and ideas, with sources and imagination." No doubt we would be thankful for such History, and we would then be more congruent with our own historiographic trajectory. Actually this may not be enough, however, because the return to History requires a "return to the future," even if it means taking one step backward to take two steps forward . . .

The ongoing "Positivist turn" is not reflected adequately in our second conference. The haste in its organization contributed to its underexposure, but it is represented in contemporary Spanish historiography. This tendency, however, is readily apparent also in French historiography, historically linked to the Annales, and, no doubt, can be found elsewhere.13 We might encourage readers to look around critically, and to join in constructive criticism about this worrisome regression in our historiographic movement. We have noted in the organizational committee that some Spanish colleagues and friends, who in 1993 were willing to debate, reflect, and "struggle" for a new kind of History, are no longer interested in such problems in the discipline but maintain individual research agendas increasingly colored with more classical and less critical tones.14 At the same time, in contrast to the first conference, note in the second HaD gathering regenerated interest by contributors, especially among the Spanish participants (30 percent of attendees), in such debate. This unavoidable cross-generation renewal, which will probably be more evident in 2004, does not automatically confront the challenge that the "Positivist turn" poses for our discipline. Some of the young historians are also historiographically conservative and have no advantage, like the 1968 generation, of having experienced such an innovative stage in both methodology and historical commitment. For this reason, the driving force of some in this generation who staged the historiographic revolution during the last half of the twentieth century is essential for the next generation to keep alive the passion for History and its collective contribution. In any case, let us emphasize again that the new/old dichotomy seems no longer as useful as in the 1960s-1970s to define what is really new or old in blended historiographic approaches: the thin dividing line in historiographic debate today is generation related. The young seem well positioned, with their Internet connectivity and face-to-face contact, to grasp objectively old and new problems, and to seek solutions together.

Neo-Positivist leanings and the conservative turn led by some of the formerly most innovative of historians, the reappearance of other turns prior to the late twentieth-century historiographic renewal, and new recruits of graduates with a conservative conception of History (not from conservative professors, but resulting from the skepticism of so many progressive teachers) are a basic and healthy reaction to Postmodernism and its excessive denial of any historical objectivity. Of course, reactionary resolution can be worse than the problem. The insatiable appetite for responses to the current crisis of the New History and the Social Sciences in an increasingly distant past can take one to the common phenomenon of a convergence of extremes. Postmodernism places Literature and Fiction on an equal footing with History, i.e., History as it were, purely literary, before its aca-
ademic recognition as something more. This is a resurrected prehis-
toric stage arrived at through a “backward” orientation in historical
research investigating the foundations of our discipline. The “Positiv-
ist turn” in its more consistent sense, i.e., the narrative, can converge
with the “Linguistic turn” in a more radical reading. We know of in-
telligent, enterprising, but seemingly confused historians who in re-
action to one extreme have swung between the two HaD conferences
from militant Postmodernism to the vindication of nineteenth-century
classical stands. Our proposition is to transform this latter backward
movement in historiography into a forward impetus; to recapitulate
the history and prehistory of historiography in a timely reassessment
and then move onward. We should not allow ourselves to be carried
away by the current situation and uncertainty, nor should we make a
tabula rasa of the twentieth century and its historiographic swings. In
short, we should refrain from extremism, but instead pursue a synthe-
sis, renewal, and historiographic rationality.

Lawrence Stone heralded in 1979, as is well known, the return to
narrative history. Actually, he was twenty years ahead of his time be-
cause it is only now after 1999 and the turn of the millennium that we
witness the true return of the History-story with its corresponding
theoretical justification. The history versus narrative debate is one of
the innovative discussions in the HaD conferences. In three out of five
plenary lectures during the last conference (requiring a new the-
monic section in the Proceedings, Volume III) have addressed this
subject, which pertains to both the (epistemological) theory and the
practice of History. The novelty of the phenomenon, which might be
understood as the third and last phase of the revival of “old History”
a movement back into literature where it resided before History
grew into a science and a profession) means that narrativists not only
question the contribution of the twentieth century’s most innovative
 historiographic tendencies, but also the tenets of Positivism which
could embrace the story in History, but not as fiction; its founders ad-
vocated a History as Science without inventing data. The demolition
of scientific history in all of its versions is now demanded by novel-
ists and philosophers who have been joined by Postmodern historians
who contend that History should return to its literary origins. They
claim that no fundamental epistemological or methodological differ-
ences exist between Fiction and History. To this they add a peculiar
“reconstruction” of our historiographic past by affirming that this has
always been the case: professional history has been nothing but a lit-
ary genre; it is some kind of poetics, as Greek philosophers de-
scribed it.

This is quite an extremist way of interpreting the current growing
esteem for subjectivity and qualitative judgment in the role of the his-
torian’s processing information and generating historical knowledge.
It is also a radical reaction to counterbalance the philosophical and
historiographic hegemony of the Positivist, Marxist, and Annales’
new History which has put personally involved criticism in History
on the sidelines. Historians are perceived to be more credible as au-
thors and writers than scientists. This perception is related to the ten-
dency to include History among the Humanities rather than the
Sciences, when what distinguishes historians from others writing
about the past is indeed the scientific nature of their work (updat-
ing the older exclusionary definitions of science).

The turn of the millennium, therefore, marks the final “stage” of
the great return, closer to History’s first steps into a “positive” sci-
ce. Whatever the intention of its proponents and originators, such
as Francis Fukuyama and Postmodern radicals, in proclaiming “the
end of history” in two waves, a retreat now would be like a third pro-
clamation of its demise with the onslaught of fiction writers. This latter
case pertains to History’s professional status regarding both its teach-
ing and research because one thing for sure is nobody will pay histori-
ans for teaching history-fiction except, perhaps, as consultants to the
entertainment industry. The proposition that History is yet another
literary genre, and only that, is the ultimate consequence of both rad-
ical Postmodernism and the snowball effect of the “Positivist turn” in
its extreme. Yet there is a positive side to this, as already mentioned:
the epistemological crisis of History, which has been dragging on for
years, should come to an end. To prevent the loss of the professional
status of History, the only path to follow is one History Under Debate
has advocated throughout the 1990s: to reconstruct the historian’s
common paradigm without breaking away from the twentieth cen-
tury. With hindsight, is not the Positivist critique of literary history
without documentation and the Annales’ critique of the Positivist a
tout court? Is not the Marxist critique of History deprived of theory
and commitment more necessary now more than ever? Despite their
flaws, these schools still have meaning for us today. Does it make
sense from a historiographic point of view to “rehabilitate” Positiv-

ism over narrative approaches, or move toward the fictive in History by veiling neo-Positivism, Marxist historiography, and the contributions of the Annales school? Is there not some betrayal in “new” histories that say one thing in public and something else in private? The answer can only be in the affirmation of a logical continuity from a historiographic view, even if justified by a probably blatant politically conservative stance. However, such a backward stance represents a minority in the historiography we advocate that sees continuity as moving forward without denial of the past.

The “return to the past” motive with which some, forgetting that neo-Positivism survived into the second half of the twentieth century through a tacit alliance between the Annales school and Marxism (Barros, 1997), unadvisedly try to fill the gap left by the great paradigms of the twentieth century has a positive side to it (Jacques Revel suggests using the term Positive History instead of the Positivist label; 1995, p. 55): its reaction to the “attack” by Postmodernist thinking in its extreme form—which today is in full retreat. It fails, however, to solve the current problems History faces: its redefinition as a science and its adaptation to the global society of the new millennium. In fact, it rather aggravates these problems with its nostalgia and uncontrollable urge to “return to the past.”

A methodological return to Ranke, Langlois, and Seignobos, facilitated by the thematic returns, is a futile en arrière which, should it take hold, would definitively distance us from both the current Social and Natural Sciences, settled in post-Positivism, and the society of the new century which increasingly demands history of its own. Contextual reasons, which should be easy to understand, do not make the German late-nineteenth-century and the French early-twentieth-century historiographic Positivism a viable historiographic solution. Historians owe more to their own time than they do to the times of their parents. And in the twenty-first century, the scientific naïveté represented in famous quotations like “History is to know the past as it was” or “History is done with documents” only seems completely out of place. Similarly, does it make sense to link the social usefulness of history, like in the nineteenth century, to national states, which are internally questioned by national, regional, and ethnic identities and externally by globalization? For this reason any attempt to reconstruct a history of Spain (or any country for that matter) that follows the model of the nationalist historiography developed in the nine-
teenth century, which prevailed dramatically through so much of the twentieth century, is doomed to failure. A model, to be successful, must inform many histories of the regions and nations that make up Spain.

If what we are attempting is to look for lost certainties in the historiographic past—a typical resource for historians—many would rather return to Bloch, Febvre, Braudel, Le Goff, Carr, Hobsbaum, Thompson, Vicens Vives, Tuñón de Lara, etc., whose critiques of Positivism and traditional, nineteenth-century-like History as well as their innovative contributions are relevant again as the “conservative turn” begins to regain control. However, the paradigms that these great twentieth-century historians represent neither solve the current epistemological and historiographic problems, nor those posed by issues as diverse as oral history, women’s history, ecological history, post-Colonial history, or world history as global history. It is for this reason that we favor constructing new paradigm(s) without breaking with the past, in the pursuit of creative synthesis also between the new and the old histories or between History as science and its literary prehistory, but keeping a critical eye on the present and future.

It is our aspiration that the Second International History Under Debate Conference contributes to a reversal of any backward redirection by the historiography. We historians must find our “third” ways, taking care not to destroy alternatives from the past for the sake of globalization or some universalization of the new paradigm, in the assurance that the twentieth-century paradigms are no longer useful to meet current needs, and certainly so those from the nineteenth century. Let us move beyond the “great return” mentality to the “great synthesis” of History so that the uneasiness in shifting paradigms results in a third historiographic revolution which guarantees renewed prosperity for History.

This is the time of opportunity when the history of events seems to accelerate and society revolutionized again pays attention to History. All that remains is that historians meet the challenge. If we respond well, History in the coming century will become, as it happened at certain moments in some countries during the twentieth century, an inescapable point of reference for Social Sciences and the Humanities as well, for the concerns of citizens regarding educational, cultural, and political action of their time.
In the HA D Conference’s Libro de Abstracts it is argued that in the Modernity/Postmodernity debate, three possible positions may be identified: (1) the postmodern deconstructionists; (2) the neoconservatives; and (3) the reconstructors or reformists (Santana, 1999, citing Klappenbach, 1991). The axis that facilitates our superseding the dialectic Modernity/Postmodernity confrontation, the continuation of which generates a paralyzing “paradigm vacuum” syndrome, is reconstruction and paradigmatic reform. After Postmodernism’s destructive criticism and the neoconservative reaction of returning, a future-oriented reconstruction which has engaged us for several years is the only remaining option in an increasingly global world.

The writing of history in each country more than ever will, in the twenty-first century, be conditioned by international and comparative historiography. The role of such global historiography will be increasingly more important in relation to national historiographies, thanks to new information technologies and the multinational integration processes in the economic, political, cultural, and academic realms. Historiography, like History, can only repeat itself as a comedy or a tragedy. Therefore, the great twentieth-century schools will not return, and less so those from the nineteenth century. The only way out of the current History crisis is for our discipline to move ahead.

We need, therefore, a different concept of the historical profession—one which goes beyond Positivism and does not confine the historian’s job to the ancillary sciences of History. We sincerely respect these because we depend on them, but the role of a historian must go beyond sources alone and source criticism only, or else we would have learned nothing from History and its historiography.

We need, likewise, to adhere to a different, less anachronistic, more updated notion of History as science. Historians must update our notion of science, which today, for the Social Sciences as well as for the Natural Sciences, is less objective and more relativist (Barros, 2000, theses 3–4). The phrase science with a consciousness has been around for almost twenty years. It refers to a science with a subject, not just with an object (Morin, 1982). That such a considerable number of historians have stuck to the nineteenth-century concept of Science remains an unfathomable mystery. It is an inheritance from von Ranke, which traces its ultimate origin to seventeenth-century Natural Sciences. Many colleagues and History students today still believe that operating in Science means knowing reality “as it is,” that is to say, in an “exact” way. While some hold on to this fundamentalistic concept of exactitude purposely to exclude History as a Science, others do not understand the persistence by some in defending the scientific status of History. No Natural Science today maintains such claims, neither Physics or Biology, which are subject to both the internal influence of a community of specialists and external influences by society and politics to the same extent, if not more, than History. From the early twentieth century, with the theory of relativity, the quantum theory, and Heisenberg’s principle of uncertainty, the subject in the process of knowledge development is known to interfere with the object. Likewise, the truths we may know scientifically are more approximate than once suspected. They are conditioned by the investigator and the circumstances surrounding research, the most important of which is opinion prevailing in the community of specialists. Indeed, it is not scientific to separate the subject and the object in the process of knowledge building, or, in this case, to isolate the historian from the process of historical knowledge. Otherwise, we shall indulge in historical fallacy. In other words, historiographic Positivism is no longer really scientific according to the theoretical and practical criteria of modern Science.

Only an attentive look at the Natural Sciences, the Philosophy and the History of Science will persuade us to avoid extremist positions: if a “hard” scientist does not hold on to the ideal of absolute and objective truths, why should historians continue to believe in them? History will only be considered a Science if we do not update our concept of science and broaden our notion of interdisciplinarity. Hence, one should recognize the futility of the “Positivist turn” and its involuntary role in the descientificization of professional History as advocated by radical Narrativism. The return to Ranke, whatever the intention of his conscientious proponents, separates History from Science as it is understood today (i.e., late twentieth-century relativistic Science), and ironically abets its “reintegration” in the realm of Literature.

The reconstruction and reform of the paradigm of History will have to be done with both new and old materials, as well as with all the assets accumulated by our discipline since the mid-nineteenth
century. It will also have to undergo external criticism and internal self-examination and be exposed to the historiographic, social, and technological tendencies born of new History. We are still in the unavoidable reshaping process of this new professional matrix.

We are very much in favor of applying Thomas S. Kuhn’s theories in the History of Science to History itself, thus incorporating changes in our debate that follow his propositions and our own historiographic experience. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Kuhn, 1962) claims that scientific knowledge is not systematically cumulative, but it advances through fits and starts, i.e., through scientific revolutions. In fact, scientific knowledge is simultaneously cumulative and revolutionary. Were not the twentieth-century historiographic revolutions by Annales, Marxism, and neo-positivist cliometrics a continuation of a way, malgré tout, of the late nineteenth-century Positivism? The historiographic revolution under way (which some would want to herald as counterrevolution) to progress, must, whether we like it or not, follow to a certain extent the twentieth-century new histories. The contributions of the twentieth-century historiographic avant-garde movements already belong to an accumulated historiographic heritage. What remains to be seen is the extent to which and in what way they will be incorporated into a new paradigm.

How should we, therefore, combine the old nineteenth-century schools and debates (which seem to be returning) with the new twentieth-century schools (which seem to be retreating), so as to help provide updated responses to the practical and theoretical problems of twenty-first-century History? Surely, not in an eclectic way, by putting together contradictory components, but through a new paradigm or consensus, a compromise between different, albeit compatible approaches within a clearly pluralist disciplinary matrix. Have historical changes usually been little more than a struggle between the old and the new (and the new, once prevailing, imitating the old)? Something similar has happened in historiography with changing paradigms up to the current crisis where we see how the new/old relationship has proven, like so many other things, more complex. The same is true of generations of historians.

One of the drives in historiographic renovation throughout the twentieth century has been this old/new dichotomy. Now, however, the old is presented as new (which may be true to a certain extent), whereas true historiographic innovations have been less and less frequent. What new historiographic approaches have arisen in the 1990s apart from those connected with globalization (e.g., post-Colonial history arising from “subaltern” studies, world history as global history, and our own global approach toward a “new paradigm,” all of which advocate synthesis as renovation)? Some colleagues still hold that the “latest” historiographic innovation is microhistory, promoted by a group of Italian historians back in 1980, who fifteen years later in self-criticism partially reject this approach because, while useful, it is not the solution to the problems of today’s History. What we now need is rather a macrohistory; a “global reinterpretation” and a “resynthesis” (exactly as proposed in Barros, 1995, thesis 7).

Are there no new great historiographic innovations because all subject matters have already been “discovered”? Historiographic advancement can no longer be confined to the thematic contrast of old versus new. A truly innovative line of research must also be able to respond to the serious challenges professional History now faces. For this to be possible, a theoretical and historiographic component is necessary that simple proposals of themes and approaches to research, whether new or old, lack. It is for this reason that we contend that historians of the future “will have to reflect on methodology, historiography and theory of history or else disappear” (Barros, 1995, thesis 13). This does not mean that each and every future historian must be devoted to historiographic reflection, but that a high degree of “other-than-source knowledge” will determine the quality of an empirically based monograph. Are we not witnessing a quantitative increase in academic publication, but a paucity of seminal works—works that truly make a difference? How are we going to do something different if we do not reflect on what we have done and are now doing?

Methodological advances occur through synthesis. But, to prevent this synthesis from proving eclectic and useless, we must fine-tune reflection, which, incidentally, is useless if not related to empirical research. How can History and the Philosophy of History collaborate when the two tend to pay so little attention to each other’s contributions? A good stimulus for historiographic creativity now is the convergence of different lines of research, the “mixing” of historiographic genres. Synthesis and reflection, reconstruction and reform, research and debate—these are some of the essential foundations of a change in paradigms that we advocate through our individual efforts, our ac-
tions, and our omissions as well. They are steps backward and forward, light and shade, that can be seen in the abstracts and contributions to the HaD conferences.

**POSSIBLE DIAGNOSIS**

As could be expected, difficulties arose in designing the conference program because, by giving speakers the freedom to choose a subject and a roundtable, an imbalance occurred between different parts of the conference. It might have been easier to limit subjects for debate and roundtable discussions where each of the participants could intervene, but such controls would have meant renouncing the first principle of open discussion deemed so valuable for a global approach to the intended historiographic endeavor. It is not easy to diagnose the situation while new global historiographic networks, which communicate online, freeing historians of the world’s distances and, thus, from national or disciplinary boundaries. Such cross-border development is the intention of History Under Debate. The conclusions drawn from the international survey “The State of History,” with over 500 responses before the conference by historians from across the world, implies an important step toward globalization in this respect. The conferences’ scope reflects this worldwide discourse.

Two issues seem a priori fundamental at the prelegomenon of this second conference: History and Literature and the Problem of Science, on the one hand, and, on the other, commitment on the part of historians (Barros, 1999b, pp. 108–109). Most debates and reflections can be situated around these two axes, although fundamental subjects such as History and globalization, past and future, History teaching, professional concerns, gender in History and male/female relations in the profession, post-Colonialism, or the emergence of Latin American historiographies (as evidenced in the postconference online debate “The Latin Issue in Global Historiography,” www.h-debate.com) have also been underscored in both the face-to-face and the virtual conference. Transcribed tapes from all roundtables, abstracts and papers, essays and oral debates, etc., from HaD conferences all provide reflection on these overriding issues.

Can any historiographic initiative be successful today without explicit debate? That is doubtful. Nonetheless, the geographic shift of centers where historiographic initiatives and controversy are generated is remarkable. Such centers are now less subject than ever to the old center versus periphery hegemony. Key debates such as the History-Literature and History-Science controversies that originated in the United States, which have been heightened in discussions from 1989 onward regarding History and Fukuyama’s “end of history.” The great debate, however, about the historian’s renewed commitment comes from Latin America, which provides or may provide international historiography with an unrivaled freshness in regard to History/Society and Past/Present relationships, as the second HaD conference indicates.

In contrast to the dynamism of the American continent, the European historiographic contribution is now in a worrying impasse, which is the consequence of the exhaustion of formerly innovative focuses, i.e., from Britain and France. Historians there seem increasingly dependent on their relationship with the United States (e.g., key contributors of the former Past and Present and Annales schools collaborate with Americans or work at American universities today). Likewise, German historiography faces difficulties going beyond its national borders: the transcendent debate by historians about acceptance of the German past with its historiographic revision has had almost no outside repercussions). The international coincidence of historiographic debate that History Under Debate generates no longer follows the old nation-state model which had such influence on other culturally dependent countries. What prevails today is the multipolarity of proposals along with the globalization of communication. The global connection has, or could have, a greater historiographic influence than the prevalent political, economic, and cultural role in any particular country. Obviously, this should not be construed as the disappearance of national interests from the international academic debate or historiographic relationships, but the latter now cross over national borders, language barriers, and cultural differences with greater ease and frequency than ever before.

Fernando Devoto on his way to a roundtable organized for a Galician journal moderated by José Manuel Núñez (1999) commented about his surprise upon learning that Argentineans were the second largest national group in HaD conferencing because, as he put it, "Argentina is not among the most important historiographies in the world." I really no longer know which historiographies will be "the most important" in the new century, or what such a thing as "impor-
tant historiography" will mean. This question was included in the HaD international survey "The State of History." The results are bound to be diverse. Assuredly no European or North American historiography has the capacity shown by the Argentine debate, as demonstrated in 1999, to express and vindicate so openly the relationship between Memory and History, Past and Present. The vitality and the quality of a national historiography will be measured, in fact, by the relationship between academia and society, and between historians and society, against the opposition of extremist practitioners of the "Positivist turn."

Globalization throws everything into a new arena, whether we like it or not, by enabling a democratization of academic and cultural interrelations which alters the rigid relationships of historiographic dependence known since the late nineteenth century. A case in point is the proposal of post-Colonial historiography derived from the "subaltern studies" in India, even though the great debate sparked by revisionism in Colonial history has yet to commence. Peter Burke at the first HaD Conference (Barros, ed., 1995, p. 52) maintained that innovation has more to do with the periphery than the center: "The contemporary historical world is polycentric in the sense that innovations now arise in many different places, notably in the so-called 'peripheries' in Europe and outside." This statement, while true, seems too conservative today, when successful historiographic innovation, whatever its origin, can only be global. It cannot triumph while enclosed within the old nation-state political or mental frame. Historiographic modification may be promoted from any country, but only succeed when they acquire an international world/global dimension. Whether they originate at the center or periphery, according to traditional criteria of geopolitical hierarchy, innovation must be diffused globally today, and be global in both its dimension and content.

The economic, cultural, and informative globalization together with the supranational integration processes transcend the nation-state as the framework for innovative proposals, and give rise to a new subject of supranational communities which exchange information and generate consensus at a much higher speed than the old conventional academic system based only on isolated face-to-face activities and slow publishing on paper. The "new historiography" that arises from informative and academic globalization now supersedes the national historiographic realities of yesterday. In the historiographic field, like so many others, in and outside academia, national isolation will be more costly in the near future, especially in countries where tradition has so much strength and political influence that these are stultifying. The rest of the world can only benefit from historiographic globalization.19

NARRATIVE HISTORY

One of the things about the preparation for the second HaD Conference that made me reflect more self-critically is the debate over History and Story, between History and Fiction, which had a renewed topicality that took all participants by surprise. It would be worthwhile, and this is my first proposal, to attempt a more narrative history, but one that does not lose its scientific nature—in keeping with the twentieth-century relativist concept. This should not be confused with the historical novel; a "new narrative history" or narrative of historians is distinct from that of fiction writers. They, unlike us, do not distinguish between fiction and reality, nor are they bothered by this confusion.

How often do we come across archival documents which point to a reality bigger than fiction? It is from them, rather than from personal imagination, that fiction writers often obtain material for their novels, contriving stories that amaze, entertain, and teach us because of the indirect but nevertheless real, testimonial, and documentary historical data contained in them. So why should the historian refrain from using such documents/testimonies in a plot, with historic narrators, and a characteristically literary style? If we found the right sources, we could learn from Literature but at the same time compete with it. By providing a relative, changing, and often plural truth, which requires for proper use professional qualification, expertise, and experience not as available in historical fiction, historians can use Literature as source material. Writers of historical novels, however, are free simply to invent characters, dialogues, and situations, which distort motu proprio voluntarily, but professional historians must refer to actual historical events.

It would be worthwhile, therefore, to verify practically the feasibility of "true historical stories" at the borderline between Science and Literature (closer to Science, of course), with a plot, but also with
We have learned from Kuhn that there are common points between Science and Art, but at the same time, we are aware of fundamental differences. Would it be possible to produce quality research that could also be popularized? Could we go hand in hand with the novel without renouncing serious History? We would have to try this before answering. It has been said, following the work of Hayden White and Paul Ricoeur, that all History is narrative, but the convergence between History and Literature we suggest would be more acceptable by the latter. History may be written literarily, be considered as literary, and may use Literature. I suggest writing History in a conscious literary way with the same rigor as in all historical research.

The “new narrative history” could therefore be a synthesis between the “new” and the “old” history as well as a good way of reconstructing our relationship with society. It would be significant to have some research read with as much, or even more, enthusiasm by lay readers as by specialists. Other historians, such as Georges Lefebvre, who follows an Annalist tradition, or Jerzy Topolski and Ciro F. Cardoso who follow Marxist tradition, have pointed to the same direction. What would be innovative, is going from theoretical debate to practice. This will undoubtedly contribute to reconstructing a new paradigm of History with old, new, and current material.

**COMMITMENT IN HISTORY**

The second proposition, which also includes issues addressed at the HaD conferences, consists of advocating a more committed History, more in touch with society, but one that does not compromise rigor in research and the historians’ search for truth. This truth claim is what endows historians with the moral authority that must underlie our ethical and social commitment.

A History more committed to social, political, national, and religious causes seems desirable, but not in the image of the 1960s-1970s “militant history.” We must be self-critical about the historiographies from those years whose failures have resulted in conditions that led to the current return of “old history.” If some colleagues in the current “Positivist turn” do not want to hear about what is happening outside universities, it may well be because of the excesses of a past “militant” history which often sacrificed historical objectivity for the sake of a party, an ideology, or a cause. This resulted in short- and long-term credibility if not viability problems. The self-criticism we suggest is of a political and historiographic nature.

Our historiographic commitment for the coming century must stem from a nondogmatic acceptance of the legitimacy of different kinds of commitments. When speaking of committed History, we seem to be talking progressive historians—not conservative historians who deny their commitment, shrouding their ideas and what they hold dear under the appearance of a nonexistent neutrality, without awareness of the harm such a stance may bring to their own views. This was certainly the case in New History. But the “returns” have brought new ideologies and commitments to the fore, which in some cases coexist in institutions with a progressive past, as in the case of the École de Hautes des Sciences Sociales in Paris where currently continuing education for executives of great French corporations cohabits the school with assistance of sans papiers immigrants on the part of directeurs d’études Jacques Derrida and the late Pierre Bourdieu. We must respect this commingling, unless we believe in “absolute truths” or in simply imposing one’s own ideas on all others. Would one opt for a nonintellectual political destruction of an adversary? This has been the case too often in Latin America, and more symbolically in a number of other places when a historiographic position is discredited by labeling its proponents with political, religious, or ethnic epitaphs without ever examining its arguments.

The tolerance we exercise is part of the identity of History Under Debate, but it cannot be applied equally par tout in all of contemporary History. This is the case in Argentina where, speaking from personal experience, it is difficult to defend tolerance when until the 1980s a professor’s political allegiance was cause for dismissal from a university post—or something worse. I am thinking of consolidated democracies or those countries where we may hold different academic and political views on some issues, and agree on others, without this disagreement itself hindering debate about the issues themselves. For example, neither off-the-record remarks nor debates themselves, in this conference or others, about prominent Latin Americans and Marxists should have any negative political consequences for them.

The differing and even contradictory relationship of historians with society, politics, and ideology strengthens us all—history and academe—so long as minimal ethical and professional consideration
Nationalism in particular, for example, rather than the different issue of legendary accounts transmitted orally in traditional cultures and prehistorical myths, since these originated before History became a critical and scientific activity. It is not usually easy to decide if in certain circumstances we behave as critical intellectuals or as political animals. This depends on circumstantial interests, on our personal academic or political involvement, or on our notion of History and Politics.\(^{21}\)

At the threshold of this new century political trends indicate that projects unreconciled with historical truth become extraordinarily vulnerable, if they are not swept away by history, as in the case of the Catholic Church during the last stage of John Paul II's pontificate when it sought such reconciliation with History over such controversial subjects as Galileo, the Inquisition, or Nazism. The historical lie as a political weapon is a form of ideological corruption that has become less and less profitable from a political and electoral point of view, given the increasing democratization of our access to information and the emergence of applied universal ethics. It is possible to anticipate that History and Politics in the twenty-first century will be more compatible than they have been in the twentieth century. Otherwise, History is at the risk of catastrophically losing its social, disontologizing, and scientific recognition in favor of two complementary phenomena: the novel on the one hand, and the erudite and academic isolation of historians on the other. We consequently envisage more favorable conditions for the independence of historians and their social recognition as experts on the past from a professional perspective not alienated from the Present or the Future.

In this sense, pacific and justice-searching global trends favor us. Such trends can be seen in new facts like the global scope of NGO and its judicial censure from Spain, the repression conducted by Chilean and Argentinean dictatorships, the demand for an independent International Penal Court or the peace-keeping role of the UN in certain conflicts despite blunders in Yugoslavia, where a double morality was applied by those who supported NATO bombardments and those who were against the war and their "collateral effects" but who remained silent to Serbian "ethnic cleansing." Ethic-universal consequential behavior is today costly in political and intellectual terms: the enlightened idea of moral and political progress of humanity is being recovered in practice. The question is whether academic phi-
The return of History from a critical present, from a rationality both critical and self-critical, so as to build a better Future.

REFLECTIVE HISTORY

Our third proposition entails implementing a more reflective History. After the first HaD conference I wrote that historians of the future "will have to reflect on methodology, historiography, and theory of History or else disappear" (Barros, ed., 1995, thesis 13). One naturally had doubts on the advisability of such generalization, despite knowing that tradition and the education of historians do not favor reflection on History and historians, because of its abstract nature and consequent distancing from the concrete, i.e., the sublimated historical document. The intellectual functions of social thinking or epistemology are still considered by many historians, both young and older, as the concern of philosophers, sociologists, and other theoreticians to whom we seem all too pleased to concede any reflection on History and historiography, or what Pierre Vilar called "thinking historically." We will not be able to teach this to our students if we have neither learned nor practiced it ourselves.

The experience of these past six years and the diagnosis about the historical profession that the second HaD conference provisionally offered, leads us to confirm even more strongly the path initiated by History Under Debate to look mainly at methodology, historiography, and the theory of History. There are three main reasons for these foci which are also our aims:

1. To consolidate and give continuity to the evident advances that have occurred throughout the 1990s. For the first time in the history of our discipline, the task of self-reflection and historiographic research has spread to historians across different generations, thus providing the hope of continuity from one conference to the other. We are, therefore, leaving behind the provisional, homespun, and elitist nature of those scarce and providential writings about methodology and historiography by the "great historians" of the twentieth century. The practice and the theory of History must start from the beginning of a professional career to rationalize one's writing of History, engage in "epistemological vigilance," place History equal with other disciplines, and maintain a fresh relationship with science, students, and
society. In short, so as to prevent a stalemate of History, we must think reflectively and historically.

2. To fight effectively against the "Positivist turn" by those who in the last half-decade have undergone an inversion in their historiographic positions and have rejected the postulates of New History in favor of approaches, subjects, and conceptions of the old preoccupations of historians: One must resist a return to the classical recounting and uncritical revisiting of History.

This is not an easily defensible attitude, and less so in public, nor is it one that is altogether conscious. Controversy will dilute the problem, but not completely. The struggle between a "backward" or a "forward" solution to the turn-of-the-century historiography will continue, but not always debate in the open. A prerequisite for an eventually progressive critical resolution and projection toward perspective of the Future is to make public debate, research, and reflection on where History is heading (Barros, 1995b), using facts as the basis for the historian's self-rule in writing History rather than market and political demands. By linking the reflection on History—ample, but confined to a minority—with the practice of historians as a whole, one might recover the "we" that defines us as a community, beyond the individual and his or her academic circumstance.

3. To control to whatever extent is possible the ongoing change in historiographic paradigms. The transitory nature of our discipline is subject to ebbs and flows, to question and defense, which quickly alternate, and which urgently require a holistic approach. In other words, we must reflect collectively about what is happening, from where historians have come, and where we want to go. The reason for this is that in a period of "extraordinary science" as Kuhn would put it, the classical problem-solving method, which is individualistic, pragmatic, and more characteristic of past "normal science," does not work.

We continuously refer to a historiography of the present which is completely different from the conventional "history of History." 23 The latter is focused on the study of noncontemporary historians, their work, and the institutions where they have worked, rather than a contemporary self-examination of historians and recent events (now a separate section of the electronic HaD conference). In the same way that we speak of "immediate history" when we analyze the events that have just happened or are just occurring and which the historian must assess with historical perspective, we shall call the writing of history, and their current evolution in the immediate past and future "immediate historiography." Immediate history and historiography differ from History in general and from the "history of History," respectively, in (1) a more transparent involvement of historians in the historical or historiographic events that are thus analyzed on the spot to resolve dilemmas and place immediately into historical perspective; (2) the temporary or tentative nature of immediate conclusions, which must remain open like the historical or historiographic action under study; and (3) the need to consider factors external to the historical or historiographic object of study (political, socioeconomic, ideological, and mental). The traditional "history of historiography" of a Positivist matrix has been extended to the present by updating and redefinition, seldom takes into account the influence of politics and society on historians, their work, and selection of different approaches. Kuhn, for example, did not take into account external conditioning in his post-positivist approaches to History and the Philosophy of Science.

The immediate historiography we propose, which we have been developing for some years, observes and interprets where History comes from and where the History being written is heading. It shows a commitment with future-oriented critiques and propositions. It should also reflect a sense of History in collaboration with philosophers who work in the present. Likewise, we must collaborate with journalists in the analysis of immediate history, as well as with fiction writers in their approach to and the spread of historical accounts. Why should historians not reflect, thus going from the concrete to the abstract and vice versa, on the theoretical implications of History and historiography? Why should the theory linked to "immediate history" be left to political philosophers? Would it not be more advisable to achieve a convergence of historians, philosophers, political analysts, sociologists, and journalists when interpreting the great events of immediate history (or, for the matter, nonimmediate history), each from his or her own perspective?

We are realists. Our efforts to give priority to methodology, historiography, and the theory of History confront a lack of education (and sometimes of interest, which is worse) by an important sector of professional historians. Many are self-taught when entering specializations, like amateurs finding their own way at first. This, added to the
unredeemed survival of Positivism, leads in some cases to a curricular underevaluation of this kind of comparative research and reflective work. This is so despite the progressive intellectual admiration of those who work exclusively with empirical data. This imbalance between education and demand brings to the fore the issue of professors’ continuing education—in this case, for History professors. The evolution of knowledge, which has been accelerated over the past few years, along with new technologies, demands that the professorate should undergo retraining. As long as this is not promoted by institutions, this lack must be compensated by both individual and collective efforts to take advantage of the most dynamic, less conforming groups at our universities. The improvements accomplished in a short period of time, to which the continuity and the results of History Under Debate are symptomatic, as well as cause and effect, show what the prevailing trend this is in the writing of History. However weak, academic institutionalization of these kinds of studies and debates has a positive side: it facilitates critical freedom and horizontal, esprit de corps–free relationships which are necessary for an innovative solution to ongoing historiographic change.

INTERDISCIPLINARY HISTORY

Our fourth proposition consists in doing a more interdisciplinary History—a History which leaves behind the limitations and the History/Social Sciences equation characteristic of the renewed twentieth-century History.

The dialogue between History and the Social Sciences, promoted by Annales and other groups of historians since the 1920s, has proven to have been a remarkable drive for historiographic innovation, but it has also shown signs of exhaustion. The relationship between History and the Social Sciences is undergoing a profound crisis because the crisis in History conditions its relationship with other disciplines. Resolution of this situation should entail three elements: (1) redefine History as a Social Science and, at the same time, as part of Humanities, thus dialectically overcoming the Science/Humanities divide; (2) overcome the dependency of History on other disciplines in some given fields of reflection and research; and (3) widen, quantitatively and qualitatively, as well as inward and outward, the interdisciplinary nature of History, in pursuit of an enhanced interdisciplinary approach.

The first flaw of the principle of interdisciplinary of the New History done in the 1960-1970s is its restriction to some particular, then-emerging Social Sciences. History will only find its place as a Social Science of a new kind, and will cooperate on an equal footing with other Social Sciences and Humanities only if it applies to itself the methodological and epistemological criteria of interdisciplinary. At the same time, dialogue must be spread across all areas of knowledge, from the Humanities (especially Philosophy and Literature) to the Natural Sciences, and to the new disciplines born of the Information Society. Marc Block was wrong when he said that History is not the science of the Past in general, but specifically of the human past, since we know that the history of humankind cannot be separated from the history of the natural environment. In other words, what we are seeking is a reaffirmation of the internal unity of History as a discipline so that it may multiply its options in collaborating with both the Sciences and Humanities, thus questioning the obsolete Positivist division of human knowledge in two opposing “cultures” as posited by C. P. Snow. Science and the Humanities are not antithetical forms of knowledge, even though there are frontiers between them, art, or fiction, etc., which define different approaches to knowledge.

Interdisciplinarity, therefore, must begin with ourselves. It is not rational to look for collaboration with disciplines that are far from History while we maintain walls separating different areas of historical knowledge, each supported by their corresponding corpora. The different historical fields must converge to explore the interfaces between Medieval and Modern History, Economic History, the History of Mentalities, General History, Legal History, History of Art, and History of Literature, etc. Note the experience offered by the recent convergence of Social History with other historiographic genres: History of Mentalities, Political History, and Cultural History (Barros, 1995). The crossing of different lines of historical research is a guaranteed source of historiographic creativity because of its dynamic synthesis. To quote a commercial slogan, “there are other worlds, but they are in this world,” i.e., the universal purview of History.

Interdisciplinary collaboration between historians from different fields is yet to be achieved fully. Applying the interdisciplinary principle to History (what we called “interhistory” in thesis 11, Barros, “La historia que viene”) will make a more balanced and complementary cooperation with other disciplines possible. Otherwise, the exter-
The Return of History

GLOBAL HISTORY

Our penultimate proposal for the History now and to come must be its global scope.

The first argument is that globalization is unifying the history of the world. So when one speaks of Global History, we must qualify whether we are referring to World History or to what New History called "Total History." We prefer the term Global History because it suggests finite, material, and reachable limits, as opposed to infinity or "total," which seems to imply a utopian and idealistic sense. This new term Global History, like World History, opens up a new line of research and debate within this forum (with important precedents) which could throw light onto a past that has been preferentially studied within the spatial and political framework of the nation-state. If universal history, a fundamentally philosophical notion, becomes immediate and global history, here is yet another reason to speak of a new paradigm for History.

This new concept of Global History, however, should not make us forget its primeval sense. The desire to do total or complete History, which today has almost died away, must adopt in the future new forms and learn from past errors (Barros, ed., 1995, thesis 10). To this end, the conference has the thematic section "How to do Global History." The few responses received, as expected, presented a worrisome question: Are we going to continue with the division of History in the time of globalization? Can a fragmented History survive in a more unified world similar to that of the twentieth century, whereby all of History has been divided into space and nations, periods and subjects?

The global nature of research has to do not just with the "micro" or "macro" scale of the phenomena, but also with the synthetic, wide-ranging, overarching approaches to each field of study. In this latter sense, Global History has less to do with the past and more with the future. It is the starting point of our research, not the "unattainable aim" of the new historians from the 1960s-1970s. We must see this as practice rather than unproved theory with no concrete application.
The current social and political demand on History for popular and teaching purposes calls for an overall History, not a divided one. If inheritors of the old innovative History going back to Annales and historical materialism are unable to provide alternatives, the old History will return. This is the business of narrative syntheses, i.e., to provide adequate responses according to the old criteria of chronology and the history of the “great” men, grand institutions, and singular events.

Will new global approaches be part of the research process, or will they be reduced to ways of synthetically presenting the product of specialized, fragmented research for didactic purposes, but without assimilation by the reader—as has been the case so far? Historiographic rationality should encourage trying out global approaches through the new historical narrative that unify both research and popularization. Will the best historiography of the coming century follow this venue? This is undoubtedly the best option, and new information technology greatly favors such convergence. But as we all know, epistemological and methodological rationality is not everything. Sometimes it is not even the most important consideration when a community of specialists, in this case historians, makes decisions.

Given the limited time (six months) we have had to organize the second HaD conference, we resorted to the Internet to accelerate the convocation process. Had we used traditional communication, two years lead time might have been necessary. Without the Internet, colleagues from “far-off” places would have received the invitation via postal mail after the conference had taken place. This shows that there are already two historiographic communities, one a more global, dynamic community with Internet access and another that is locally based and conservative, still without access to the Internet. The former has fewer members than the latter but has more clout regarding proposals for the future. Our organizational effort focused on the Internet, not just by accident, but because we are aware that we are contributing to the emergence of a new, truly global community of historians. Such electronic communication should play a key role in the resolution of the paradigmatic transition to the twenty-first century.

Globalization and such new information technologies make possible a more global history in two senses: (1) they enable a more global/worldwide historiography, and (2) they provide technical conditions for a more global/local approach to our aims. Because of the problems faced in implementing this innovative paradigm of global history, we are overcoming some physical limitations in our research: books have a limited number of pages, a linear mode of reading with just one possible beginning and end, and they allow for only brief quotations and footnotes. CD-ROMs and newer digital technologies, however, make possible at the research and dissemination phases, along with written texts, the inclusion of oral and visual elements, sound and video, which bring us closer to the global perception of reality that our five senses permit. Our sources may thus be more diversified, reproduced in their original format, and reformatted for new technologies.

Hypertext is used everyday when we surf the Internet, along with multimedia sources, which may transform both research and popularization processes (or what classically in the Social Sciences was distinguished as research and expository methods) into a whole by bringing the traditionally analytic and fragmented practice of Social Sciences closer to a reality which we know is essentially synthetic, complex, and global. Citations and notes are now links that take us to texts of unlimited size which may also include other links to other data, texts, sounds, and images. This means that a work may have several beginnings and ends. Its circulation on the Web may likewise be wider than in book format. These new technologies, hypertext, and multimedia or hypermedia, whether in CD-ROM format or Web-based digital media, are already being applied to the teaching and popularization of History, but not as much to research, although there have been some pioneering experiences in Archaeology and the History of Art. The use of the Internet at all teaching levels will benefit the change in mentalities required to make use of all new technologies, i.e., varied approaches by linking data, texts, sounds, images, and videos.

**ASSERTIVE HISTORY**

To finish our propositions, we believe that, given the current situation, we need History that vindicates more decidedly its role in both society and culture in relation to other disciplines and sciences, political powers, and mass media.

The suggestion has been made here that a registered professional body of historians be established in Spain. Such a “body” is probably
not the best idea, especially if we take into account the esprit de corps it entails. But there is certainly a gap which some are trying to fill through a public promotion of the oldest historiographic institution: the Royal Academy of History. It must be acknowledged that the existing associations of historians fail to publicly defend the interests of historians and History. They fulfill a role which is probably necessary in each professional group, so we acknowledge the role of those working there; they devote time and effort to these associations, which, however, could be used in more academically profitable and satisfying activities. Such associations often do not connect historians with society, with the centers of academic, political, and media power. Throughout the long "debate on humanities," which in Spain started in 1997, none of our specialized associations participated as such, nor in regard to the problem faced by young historians in seeking employment (Barros, 1995b). The more problematic flaws of such institutions are their excluding nature regarding historians from other fields, and their lack of connection between them and with society at large. In short, a strong esprit de corps mentality may bolster the independence but actually exclude members of such institutions from larger academic or political organizations.

A new type of historiographic association is required, therefore, which is less endogamous and enclosed, which vindicates and communicates History to the world and among all historians, promotes collective projects in and outside academia. Maybe the problem lies in this "collective" nature. The difficulty for historians to leave behind personal interests linked to their academic careers pertains to the much-talked-about crisis of any collective, oninstitutional project. History Under Debate would like to revise this exclusionary tendency.

We hope that the "return to the past" we hear about soon becomes the "return of History to the future" thanks to new information technologies. Let us also hope that we take with us the best of the twentieth century into this millennium.

NOTES

1. The situation of the world (especially Russia and the "Asian tigers") had already forced Fukuyama to admit in an interview for the New York Times (August 30, 1998) that he had made a mistake when proclaiming the "end of history" (see Sarmiento, Chapter 12, in this volume).

2. The Seattle protest in November 1999 against the World Trade Organization shows one of these new global contradictions, but unlike Chiapas or Kosovo, this was a historical event occurring at the heart of the "Empire," fueled basically by union members and young Americans.

3. The events of 1998 seem to indicate a final point (the end of the twentieth century and its "extremes"), but rather it has turned out to be the starting point of a new process whose finality is hard to ascertain unless we subscribe to a great teleological accounting of History.

4. The "Humanities debate" that began in Spain in 1997 implies an advance in the problems posed by teaching, culture, and the society of the coming century.

5. Is not the historical novel the prevailing literary genre par excellence among contemporary fiction writers? This was the subject of a serious postconference debate in the History Under Debate Listserve in February and March 2000 (see the exchanges at URL www.h-debate.com). The interest by fiction readers in the history of Antiquity, the Middle Ages, or the Ancient Regime compensates the contemporary, present-laden trends in a significant sector of academic History and in mass media, with a deficit in historical consciousness that this present-mindedness entails.

6. A clear indication of the difficulties faced by historians when attempting to respond to the current crisis is the present-biased statement that the Future should not concern us, because historians are not "prophets," as if the flow of time came to a stop at the present. Some suggest that the present should not concern us either, while attempting to confine our role to learning about the past without relating such knowledge to present or future generations.

7. Seventy years after the formulation of the Principle of Uncertainty, for which Heisenberg won the Nobel Prize in 1932, there still survives among historians the mechanistic and objective assumptions of seventeenth-century science which were made popular by nineteenth-century Positivist historians (see thesis 3 of La historia que viene, C. Barros, 1995c, pp. 99-100).

8. The program of the XIX International Congress on Historical Sciences (CIHS) held in Oslo, August 2000, likewise included concerns and reflections (global history, past and present, historiographic balances, etc.) that, like us, seek historiographic synthesis (see the Commission Internationale des Sciences Historiques, 1998 and 1999-2000).

9. We would like to emphasize that contrary to popular opinion and the often biased concept as a paradigm as a "compulsory" model, we follow the Kuhnian sense of sets of values and beliefs shared by a community of specialists (Barros, 1994-1995).

10. Obviously we are not speaking of the necessary use of sources in historical research, but of those who, being oblivious to the evolution of twentieth-century historiography, want to confine, either consciously or unconsciously, the work of historians to sources only. One of the most positive aspects of the "return to Rankes" which we are witnessing, along with the ongoing rehabilitation of Langlois and Seignobos, is that we have learned so much more about these historians. It has been said, rightly so, that von Ranke was not as simplistic and objectivist as the quotation
"History is to know the past as it was" implies. It is true, however, that it was in this limited interpretation that his teaching spread among twentieth-century historians.

11. The historical novel that is successful currently is not in the fashion of Sir Walter Scott, but it tends to introduce in its own issues of logic, mentalities, society, and power—thus providing for a turn-of-the-century renewal of historiography.

12. For instance, the public reaction by Spanish historians against the report by the Spanish Royal Academy of History (June 2000), construed as a return to a Positivist stance which sees the history of Spain as composed of great names and battles, as imposed by the Franco dictatorship in schools and its counteroffensive against the opposite ideology, namely, the liberal ideology prior to 1936.

13. The accidental death of Benard Lepeit in 1996 hastened the end of tourant critique promoted by the journal Annales in December 1939, which we then enthusiastically welcomed. Ten years later, it has resulted in dispersion and a lack of momentum which has prompted a tourant conservateur; which we hope is only temporary, given our affection to the great school founded by Marc Bloch and Lucien Febvre and continued by Fernand Braudel and Jacques Le Goff through the 1980s.

14. Debate, reflection, and vindication are completely opposed to the definition of the historian made by nineteenth-century Positivism. It is for this reason that we consider inaccurate to refer to the current traditional as "neo-Positivism," because the historiographic neo-Positivism of the second half of the twentieth century is that of a return to the past.

15. But, of course, unlike the "Positivist turn," this new turn of the screw, the "Narrative turn," in its most genuine form (both deconstructionist and radical), has a more theoretical nature—hence the incompatibility between both of these phases as a "return to the past."

16. During its first year, there have been between 25,000 and 30,000 visits by historians to our Web site, most of them from the United States, Spain, Argentina, and Mexico, in this order. In our mailing list some 1,200 colleagues from forty-five countries now participate (850 at the time of the second conference)—Spanish historians, mostly young, are among the largest minority.

17. The advantage of powerful countries with their areas of influence (not just Western countries but also Eastern ones; not just in the North, but also in the South) is their political and cultural dominance, whereas the advantage of formerly dependent countries is precisely the opposite: the lack of a tradition that encumbers them, curbs their audacity, suppresses an innovative spirit, or impedes adaptation of the new.

18. Internet presence differentiates the possibilities of the United States from those of Germany or France. Similarly, the growing importance of Spanish as the second Western language accounts for the emergence of the Latin issue in a globalized world.

19. I can tackle some proposals for debate and consensus on the reconstruction and reform of the History paradigm of History in reaction to the second HAD conference starting from conclusions of the previous conference ("La historia que viene") and from what we have been able to see and discuss so far, together with personal thoughts and experiences. All this is preliminary, since the ongoing debate will extend beyond the conference itself.

20. In the conference program, narrative history was included but subordinated in roundable K as part of the debate on Modernity and the "Linguistic turn." In fact, it is rather an ultimate consequence of the return of the old History, favored by Postmodern critics who seem unable to offer alternatives that take into account historiographic tradition.

21. A local case may be used to exemplify this difference, i.e., the mythologizing by part of Galician historiography of mantic Pardo de Cela as the instigator of the Galician independent movement against the Catholic Monarchs, which contradicts every historical evidence (see Carlos Barros, 1994, 1995a).

22. It is easy to criticize the historical amnesia of the "others," but difficult to do the same for oneself and one's own people. For example, the refusal by the best-known historians of the Spanish Civil War to participate in the debate, which is certainly uncomfortable and riddled with aspersion, about the events that took place in 1937 in Barcelona and the "persecution" of the POUM.

23. This traditional historiography or history of History, albeit useful, often endures in sheer empiricism and description, without providing adequate explanation for the changes in period paradigms or lasting contributions. It may classify developments into periods, paradigms, or tendencies but does not always connect the evolution of historiography with the social, political, and mental history surrounding such development, as if History could exist outside its own time.

24. The only time when History professors/researchers "must" read and write about methodology, historiography, and theory of History in Spain is when they write their teaching project to be eligible for a university tenure or a chair. Evidence of this is the success of the proceedings of the first conference among examining panels, who consider them as an important reference for updated approaches and debates on historiography.

25. The failure of the tourant critique advocated by the journal Annales to yield results by late 1989 has to do with the unsuitability and the limitations, sixty years after its formulation, of the History/Social Sciences relationship when it comes to solving the serious epistemological, methodological, and historiographic problems of late twentieth-century History.

26. The fall of the great historiographic paradigms has resulted in the illusion of a nonexisting historiographic and personal originality. The positioning of historians before the crisis can be summarized in four main groups: (1) old and new traditional historians; (2) those who have continued histories from the 1960s-1970s; (3) Postmodern or skeptical groups; and (4) reconstructors and reformers.

27. That is the sense of our suggestion to reanimate the paradigm of Women's History into General History so that it is taken into account where necessary at the same time that historiography is reinforced (Barros, 1997b, pp. 55-61; see the debate in roundable O, Volume III of these HAD proceedings).

28. Many colleagues, at least in Spain, have Internet access and e-mail provided by the computer services of their universities, but they do not use them or, if they do, only to a very limited extent. The spread of e-commerce, the future advantages of having access from the home, and the ascend of the new generation will no doubt complete the process of universalization of the Internet and of the new historiography.

29. Without renouncing traditional methods—at least for now—and despite their cost and slowness, we have posted more than twice the number of brochures (along
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Chapter 2

History Under Debate Manifesto

HaD Signatories

After eight years of contact, reflection, and debate, through conferences, inquiries, and, of late, over the Internet (www.h-debate.com), we are compelled to make explicit and update our stance in the critical dialogue with other historiographic developments from the last decade of the twentieth century: (1) continuism during the 1960s and 1970s, (2) Postmodernism, and (3) the return to “Old History” in contrast to the New History of the late twentieth century, the latest historiographic “innovation.”

We are experiencing both historical and historiographic transitions whose outcome is yet unknown. History Under Debate, as a historiographic process itself, wishes to contribute to the configuration of a unifying and plural paradigm of historians of the twenty-first century which ensures a new dawn for History, its writing and teaching. To this end, we have set forth eighteen methodological, historiographical, and epistemological proposals which we now submit to historians all over the world for debate and, if so deemed, for their critical agreement, possible endorsement, and further elaboration.

METHODOLOGY

1. Science with a Subject

We advocate neither Ranke’s objectivist History nor the subjectivist History of Postmodernity. We propose a Science with a human subject that discovers the past as people construct it.

To take into account the two variables that most influence our process of knowledge, historical agents and historians themselves, is the
best guarantee of objectivity in the practice of History and of its production, which are inevitably relative andpluralistic, and, therefore, the discipline must be rigorous in its method and results. The time has come for History to update its conception of itself as a Science by shedding the naïve objectivism inherited from nineteenth-century Positivism, but without falling into the revival of the radical subjectivism of the late twentieth-century Postmodernism.

The growing confluence of the “two cultures,” the scientific and the humanistic, will facilitate in the century ahead the double definition of History as a Social Science and as part of the Humanities—
a hybrid which we need.

2. New Erudition

We favor a new kind of erudition that:

- widens the concept of historical sources to include nonofficial documentation, material evidence other than the written word, such as oral or iconographic evidence; and the nonsources, i.e., silences, errors, and gaps which historians should evaluate in an effort to preserve objectivity and also in the plurality of sources.
- is decisively based on other than source-knowledge, which the researcher provides. History is made of ideas, hypotheses, explanations, and interpretations, that contribute to discovering and building sources.
- transcends the innovative historiography of the 1960s-1970s by incorporating the new relation with sources provided by women’s history, oral history, ecological history, world/global history, and other relevant renovations developed in the 1980s-1990s, as well as the “new historiography” which is being born over the Internet, of which we are a part.
- faces the fact that empirical work, although needed, does not decide historical truth because this may be reached only through communities of historians, generated from debate, and through reaching consensus in collective forums.
- enables one to overcome the “Positivist turn” and conservatism that led to the crisis of the great historiographic schools of the last century, thus threatening the discipline with reversion to nineteenth-century thinking.

3. Recovering Innovation

A new paradigm is urgently needed to recover the social and academic prestige of innovation in methods and new themes, in questions and answers—in short, in the originality of historical research. We need a new historiography that looks ahead and restores to the historical profession its enthusiasm for renewal and historiographic commitment.

New lines of research will come to light by considering that nothing historical should not concern us; advancing through the mixture and the convergence of methods and genres; filling old casks with new wine from biography to microhistory; and paying attention to scientific and cultural, social and political needs of a society subject to a profound transformation.

Twenty-first-century historiography requires both the illusion and the reality of truly innovative approaches if it is not to turn, like Lot’s wife, into a statue of salt.

4. Interdisciplinarity

The proposed new historiography must stress an interdisciplinary approach to History, albeit in a balanced way: inward within the wide and diverse community of historians, by strengthening the disciplinary and scientific unity of professional History, and outward by stretching the range of alliances beyond the classical Social Sciences.

We must build bridges that communicate across the vast archipelago our discipline has grown into during the past decades. At the same time, History must exchange methods, techniques, and approaches not only with Social Sciences, but also with Literature and Philosophy (especially of History and Science). One cannot forget those emerging disciplines which deal with new technologies and their transforming impact on society, culture, politics, and communication.

Past experiences have taught us that there are three avenues which, in our view, must be avoided if we want History to be enriched by an interdisciplinary approach: (1) to pursue an impossible “unified Social Science” around any other discipline, without this affecting its
full interdisciplinary development both individually and collectively; 
(2) to turn the dialogue between History and Social Sciences into the 
magic wand for "the crisis of History," which we understand as a 
change in paradigms; and (3) to dissolve History in this or that suc-
cessful discipline, as radical narrativists propose in relation to Litera-
ture.

5. Against Fragmentation

The failure of the "total history" of the 1960s-1970s triggered the 
quick fragmentation of universal themes, singular methods, and cohe-
sive schools, accompanied by unbridled development and epistemo-
logical chaos which seemed to halt in the 1990s, but which is proving 
ever more anachronistic in the world ahead, based on interrelationships 
and global communication.

Our alternative is to go further into historiographic practice in 
search of new forms, global in scope, which make possible the con-
vergence of historical research across space, genres, and depths of 
analysis.

To make possible a well-articulated, integral History, we must 
therefore experiment with research proposals which take the global 
as their starting point and not as a "Utopian horizon": mix lines of 
study regarding sources and topics, methods and specialties; incorpo-
rate into general history the most innovative, specialized paradigms; 
combine qualitative and quantitative approaches; design temporal 
frameworks which include the Present and the Future, for different 
levels of analysis; scrutinize the global through concepts and meth-
ods that are potentially wide-reaching and comprehensive (e.g., men-
tality, civilization, culture, society, network, and social change; narra-
tion and comparison), and create new ones; investigate World History 
as a new front of Global History; use new technologies to work simulta-
aneously with the written word, voices, and images, thus combining 
research and information dissemination; promote reflection and de-
bate, methodology and historiography, making them common ground 
for all historical specialties as well as a meeting place for other 
disciplines.

6. The Historiographic Task

Knowing as we do that the subject influences the results of re-
search, the need arises for looking at the historian as researcher for 
the sake of historic objectivity. How?

1. By trying to integrate individuals in groups, schools, and im-
  plicit and explicit historiographic trends that unavoidably con-
dition the internal evolution of written history.
2. By studying historians for what they do and not just for what 
  they say, and for their works, not just their words.
3. By applying opportunistically, for qualification, three key con-
  cepts in History as a post-Positivist science (i.e., the "paradigm"
  as a set of shared values; the "scientific revolution" as both dis-
  ciplinary break and effective continuity; the "community of spe-
  cialists" because of its decision-making power, which is, in turn, 
  conditioned by the social, mental, and political environment.
4. By employing, in short, an immediately circumspect historiog-
  raphy which strives to understand historical events that influ-
  ence historiographic changes we are witnessing.

7. Global Historiography

The exhaustion of twentieth-century national centers of renovation 
has given way to an unprecedented historiographic decentralization, 
driven by the globalization of information and academic knowledge, 
which transcends the old Eurocentrism. Historiographic initiatives 
are now within everyone's reach. The momentum, for instance, of a 
critical Latinate historiography and of post-Colonial historiography, 
demonstrates this. The transnational communities of historians, orga-
nized over the Internet, already play an important role in the creation 
of new forms of consensus to the detriment of the former system de-
pendent on national historiographies and where academic exchanges 
were elitist, hierarchical, and slow.

We do not conceive historiographic globalization as a standardiz-
ing process. We think and practice History and the history of History 
as teachers and researchers, in different overlapping and interrelated 
spheres: local, regional, national, continental, international/global, 
and universal.
8. Autonomy of the Historian

As the collective projects of the twentieth century decayed without being revived by a new, common paradigm, this has led to greater influence of the publishers and their market, and of the mass media and political institutions, in the writing of History and the choice of topics and methods, in the formulation of hypotheses and multiple conclusions. A slant toward the promotion of the old History of the "great men" has become increasingly more evident.

To recover from such established powers the critical autonomy of historians to decide for themselves the how, what, and why of historical research, the following is needed:

1. to rebuild the scholarly trends, associations, and communities that revolve around History and Historiography that go beyond conventional academic fields;
2. to use the Internet as a democratic and alternative medium for communicating, circulating proposals, and publishing research; and
3. to pay attention to the evolution of an immediate history, without falling prey to Presentism, so as to address historiographic needs, both present and future, of local and global civil societies.

9. Identifying Tendencies

The most obnoxious way of imposing one's own historiographic preference, usually a conservative tendency, is to deny that historiographic inclinations exist or should exist. The prevailing individualism, academic practices and departmentalization, and national borders and cultural boundaries obscure what we have in common, many times without awareness or ability to voice our opinion because of our formative education, reading, affiliations, and attitudes. We are consequently in favor of exposing such more or less latent work habits and organizational tendencies to clarify stances, delimit debates, and facilitate consensus building. An academic discipline devoid of momentum, discussion, and self-reflection is subject to external non-academic pressures which frequently negate its development. Our conscious historiographic commitment frees us from third-party influence; breaks down personal, local, and corporate isolation; and promotes public acknowledgment and the scientific and social usefulness of our professional work.

10. Received Inheritance

We oppose a fresh start which ignores the History and Historiography of the twentieth century. The recent return of nineteenth-century History makes it useful and advisable to be reminded of the critiques of the Annales school, Marxism, and neo-Positivism. In all fairness, we should admit that this "great return" shows the partial failure of the twentieth-century historiographic revolution in which these persuasions were the chief protagonists. The unavoidable critical and self-critical balance of historiographic vanguards does not, therefore, invalidate their relevance as necessary traditions for the construction of the new paradigm. They symbolize the "spirit" of a school of thought and a historiographic militancy, as well as exemplify a professional History open to the new and to social commitment. These are essential features which we are to recover now in a different academic, social, and political context, where the means of communication have been greatly enhanced over the 1960s-1970s and the century just finished.

11. Digital Historiography

New technologies mean a revolution in the access to bibliography and the sources of History, putting an end to the constraints of paper for research and publishing, and making possible new global communities of historians. The Internet is a powerful tool against the fragmentation of historical knowledge, if used within its scope and possibilities, i.e., as an interactive medium able to transmit information in an instantaneous and horizontal way over most of the world.

In our view, digital historiography must continue to be complemented by books and other conventional forms of research, dissemination, and academic exchange, and vice versa. This new paradigm of electronic social communication, consequently, is not going to substitute for face-to-face communications, group activities, and the roles of centuries-old institutions, but it will become increasingly part and parcel of the reality of academic and social life.

The universal spread of the Internet in universities and in society at large, together with the increased computer literacy of the younger
generation, is going to place this new digital historiography as a highly relevant factor in the still unfinished paradigmatic transition between the twentieth and the twenty-first centuries.

12. Generational Change

The second decade of this century will see a remarkable generational change in teachers and researchers as those born just after World War II retire. Will this transition mean the consolidation of an advanced change in our paradigms? This we cannot say.

The 1968 generation was rather an exception. Among university students now we find a historiographic and an ideological heterogeneity similar to that found among the academia and society at large. We may find older historians who remain innovative and younger historians who hold nineteenth-century notions of what constitutes the profession of historian and its relationship with society. Our responsibility as educators of students who will become teachers and researchers tomorrow is, in this sense, enormous. It has never been so important to explain History with advanced approaches and their self-criticism as well, starting at elementary and secondary school through postgraduate courses. Future History will be conditioned by the education given here and now to future historians: our alumni.

THEORY

13. Thinking History

It is essential for historians to think about their topics, sources, and methods; questions and answers; social interests and theoretical implications; conclusions and the consequences of a research project. We oppose a "work division" where History provides data and other disciplines reflect on them (or write stories based on them, for wider circulation).Communities of professional historians must assume their intellectual responsibility for seeking to complete the full cycle of historical studies, from archival work up to the assessment and vindication of their impact on the Social Sciences and Humanities, in both society and the political arena.

The learning of university students in History about issues of methodology, historiography, philosophy of History, and other theoretically based disciplines is the way to enhance increased future cre-ativity in historical research, to underpin the place of History in the scientific and cultural system, and to foster new and promising vocations for professional historians.

Our aim is that the historian who conducts empirical work does so also with intellectual reflection, and that researchers using concrete data in their investigations think in some depth about what they are doing, thus obviating the deadly disjuncture between (Positivist) practice devoid of theory and (speculative) theory without practicality. A greater unity of theory and practice will furthermore enable a greater cohesion among historians—both individually and collectively—between what is historiographically said and what is empirically done.

14. The Ends of History

The historical acceleration of the last decade has replaced the debate about the "end of History" with one about the "ends of History."

Assuming that History has no preestablished aims and that in 1989 a profound historical turn occurred, we should ask ourselves, in the interest of academic History, where this is taking us, who leads it, in favor of which interests, and what are the alternatives.

The future is open-ended. It is the men and women who as professional historians assume responsibility to help through the exploration of their subjects in History to build future worlds that guarantee a free and peaceful, full and creative life to men and women of all races and nations.

Communities of historians must therefore contribute to building a "new representation,” another Enlightenment, which, learning from the errors of History and from Philosophy, reflects theoretically on the sense of progress society demands today, assuring the great majorities of North and South, East and West, the human and ecological benefits of the revolutionary advances in Medicine, Biology, Technology, and Communications.

SOCIETY

15. Vindicating History

The primary political commitment of historians should be to vindicate before society and the powers that be the ethical function of His-
tory, the Humanities, and Social Sciences in the education of citizens and in the formation of communitarian conscience.

Professional History must combat those parochial and neo-Liberal conceptions still intent upon juxtaposing technical knowledge and culture, economy, and society, present and past, past and future.

The most noticeable effects of public policies that devalue History socially are the lack of career prospects for historians, a decrease in vocations in the History profession, and the threat to historical continuity between generations. Communities of historians must accept as their concern the lack of occupational prospects of students who want to become historians by cooperating to look for solutions for this situation, by engendering the public’s value of History, reevaluating the historical profession, and examining its working and living conditions, within the framework of defense and development of its public function in education, life of the university, and research contributions to knowledge.

16. Commitment

In times of paradoxical “returns,” we endorse and encourage the “return to commitment” by many scholars, among them historians, in different parts of the world with the social and political causes related to the defense of universal values of education and health, justice and equality, peace and democracy. These are indispensable attitudes of solidarity to counteract nonacademic vested interests of the great economic and political powers, mass media, and publishing enterprises. Such commitment is a vital counterbalance, therefore, and prevention of the potential entanglement of academic History writing in relation to the social forces and political majorities that finance with their taxes History teaching and historical research.

The renewed commitment we foresee is diverse, critical, and future oriented. Historians should combat with the truth we know, those myths that manipulate history and promote racism, intolerance, rigid class structures, gender inequality, or ethnic exploitation. Using our knowledge of the past, historians as professionals and as citizens should reject undesirable futures, work with and even outdo other social scientists and humanists in the construction of historically better worlds.

The involvement of the historian with the surrounding reality suggests its analysis in a continuous temporal framework. If we accept that objectivity in historical Science is inseparable from the (plural) subjectivity of the historian and agent, we must conclude that there are no great qualitative differences between an immediate history and a mediated History, between a more contemporaneous history and one more distanced in time. Everything is History, although the more we distance ourselves from current events, the greater is the burden on us as historians in the absence of applications by the more present-oriented disciplines.

17. Present and Future

Our objects of study (men, women, the humanized natural environment, etc.) are obviously in the past, but we are in the present, presented with an array of futures. All of the Present is full of Past and Future. Historians cannot write History with presence outside their time and its endless flow.

We see several levels in the relationship of historians with historical immediacy: the social and political commitment, the topic of research, the historiography of intervening interpretation, and the selection of general methodological criteria for research. Half a century ago the founders of the Annales school formulated this guideline or motto: “To understand the past through the present, to understand the present through the past.” It is equally necessary today to stress this Past/Future relationship in the Present.

The fall of the teleological philosophies of history, whether Social-ist or Capitalist, has shown a future more open than ever. Historians must play a role in its definition through their experiences and historical arguments, with hypotheses and proposals originating in History. To build the future without taking History into account could condemn us to repetition of errors, to resignation to the lesser evil, or to building castles in the air.

18. A New Paradigm

Historiography depends on historians and immediate history. The changes in historiography for a new paradigm we have been suggesting since 1993 rely on the accelerated historical change going back to 1989. Between December 1999 in Seattle, Washington, and July 2001 in Genoa, Italy, we have seen the beginning of an unprecedented global movement against the ravages of globalization which is al-
ready searching for an alternative society: unique pensée is now less unique. Many consider these major changes in civilization: globalization and its critics, the Information Society, the new scientific-technological regime, and a global social movement. It is not easy to glimpse what the future has in store for us, but there are reasons for hope. We all should contribute to the best possible future.

History Under Debate is an active part in this transformation process: we want to change the History being written and contribute to changing human history. As historiographic debate and the most immediate history evolves, our proposals will receive academic consensus, more or less, and we will alter them, or not, according to our best interests. Nonetheless, there are approaches which, even if a minority at the moment, seem essential to condition critically the new paradigm in the making: the plural set of values and beliefs which is going to regulate our historical profession in the new century. For all these reasons, let us hope that History shall absolve us.

ATTESTATION

On the Internet, September 11, 2001, <h-debate@cesga.es>

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PART II:
DEBATE AND DISCUSSION
Chapter 3

The Linguistic Turn and Postmodernity Among Spanish Historians

Francisco Vázquez G.

An analysis of Social History in Spain today must consider the responses by Spanish historians to certain recent debates, in particular those about the Linguistic Turn and Postmodernism. This can be presented in two sections. The first is a brief historical review of the different stages in Social History as a discipline in Spain, from its academic formalization to the present day. Within this general view two types of analysis are combined: (1) internal history, centered on epistemological and methodological alternatives in the discipline; and (2) external history, referring to political context and institutional structure. While taking into account the weight of this inheritance, the second part shall briefly attempt to explain the manner in which the Linguistic Turn and Postmodernism have been treated in Spanish historiography.
The existence of a Spanish tradition in Social History before the breach of the Civil War (1936-1939) and Franco’s regime (1939-1975) is still a controversial matter. Some maintain that a corpus of sociological and historical studies concerning the labor movement was unequivocally present in nineteenth-century Spain. These studies, it has been claimed, were comparable with what Raphael Samuel (1981, 1994) named “Popular History,” exemplified in Great Britain by the works of J. L. Hammond (1925/1974) and R. K. Webb (1971). Others (Gabriel, 1995; Pérez Ledesma, 1993), on the other hand, denied this approach. The historical reflections on peasant and working-class movements published between 1870 and 1913 in Spain seem closer to ideological discourses than historical research. Spain really lacks a legacy comparable to “Popular History” in Great Britain (e.g., the studies of Emile Lefebvre [1900/1969] and Georges Lefranç [1950, 1964] in France, or the pioneering work of Franz Mehring [1975] in Germany).

While not attempting to settle this dispute, it is important to note that Social History in Spain had its academic origins in the 1950s-1970s as a political and scientific alternative to the official historiography prevailing during Franco’s regime. This official historical discourse served to legitimize the dictatorship, promoting a historical account that was based on political events and the actions of the great men who had founded the imperial destiny of the Spanish nation (Passamari and Piero, 1987; Passamari, 1991). This post-Franco era demarcates the introduction and normalization of Social History as an academic subject in Spain.

During the 1950s, what was then termed as Socio-Economic History was slowly coming to the forefront of Spanish historiography in the universities. Jaume Vicens Vives (1959), a Catalan historian and specialist in modern history, was its principal promoter who made Social History inspired by the Annales school better known in Spain. As a result, by the end of the 1950s, a group of Catalan historians whose style was clearly different from that of official political history had already emerged (Muñoz y Lloret, 1997; Riquer i Permanyer, 1994). They were beginning to conduct research into new problems: economic and demographic structures, rural history, social conflicts, etc.

Shortly afterward, from the 1960s onward, Sociology studies were gradually introduced into the universities and an academic community of sociologists was formed. Their underdevelopment in Spain was considerable when contrasted to other countries. The process that gave rise to sociological thought from the nineteenth-century, such as the collapse of the Ancient Regime, rapid industrialization, etc., never took place in Spain. From the beginning of the twentieth century, Spanish social thought concentrated on the subject of the national identity of Spain and the decadence brought about after 1898 by the loss of its colonies. Sociology was first introduced into Spanish universities in the 1960s, during the period known as the “technocratic phase” of Franco’s regime (Julia, 1993: 36-37). Economic growth and social development provided the stimuli for sociological thought during this decade. Since then, Spanish sociologists have centered their attention on the contemporary social process, i.e., the formation of the Spanish middle class. This concern with the immediate present has kept historical and sociological studies apart to this present day.

After the 1960s, the influence of the Annales school was complemented by the widespread reception of Marxism. For obvious reasons, the diffusion of Marxist tendencies within the university environment encountered great difficulties. The greatest stimulus was provided by Manuel Tuñón de Lara (1989), a historian exiled in France and apart from Spanish academic institutions (see Aroestequi, 1993), who nevertheless played a crucial role in the reception of Marxism by young Spanish historians at the beginning of the 1970s. The extraordinary impact of Tuñón de Lara’s work was fundamental for Social History in contemporary Spain. Second, his participation as organizer and instigator of the Social History conferences celebrated annually in Pau, France, was decisive (Pérez Ledesma, 1993: 210-211). This exchange of information and discussion helped introduce a heavily ideological anti-Franco Social History into Spanish universities. This New Social History openly challenged all the protocol of the historiographic establishment and took into account subjects which had been virtually banned before: e.g., contemporary Spain, particularly the Second Republic and the Spanish Civil War, and the labor movement.
What was the epistemological profile of this first social history produced in Spain? In its theoretically most elaborate form, and also of greatest quality, as in the case of Tuñón de Lara, it dealt with social history inspired by the teachings of French Marxist historiography, mainly Albert Soboul (1976), Robert Labrousse (1970), and Pierre Vilar (1947/1971). It combined language and methods typical of the Annales, such as descriptive statistics, the distinction between structure and “conjuncture” with vocabulary and explanation, and the all-encompassing aims of historical materialism.

Social formations were conceived as being totalities interrelated at different levels. The lowest consisted of demography and the economic base. Within the latter, the structures (relations of production) and various “conjunctures” were differentiated. The second level, in an intermediate position and object of Social History, consisted of (1) structures or the relationships between social groups and (2) social conflicts. The group par excellence was the social class, conceived in an objective manner as being the way people are grouped according to the position held in the social organization of work and the means of production (Aróstegui, 1993: 182-183). The inherent contradictions in the social structure and their intensification according to the variations of conjunctures enabled social conflicts to be explained and arranged in order of importance. Finally, ideologies and politics were placed in the highest echelon. Culture, mentalities, and symbolism in general were included at this level and were clearly differentiated from the “real” objective spheres represented by economic and social matters.

In contrast with the causal mechanisms attributed to the most vulgar forms of Marxism, this Social History defended a functionalist model of explanation. Social events were explained on the basis of reciprocal interaction between different levels. Consequently, discussions about a “correlation” or structural and circular causality were preferred to considering ideological or social changes as a simple reflection of economic factors. However, the explanatory primacy of the base was accepted, particularly the link between the production relations and social structure. This dichotomous and objectivistic manner (the distinction between that which is symbolic and that which is material) of presenting social aspects could adopt theoretically less elaborate forms than that of Tuñón de Lara’s. During the 1970s, a schematic version of Althusserian Marxism (Althusser, 1994) reached certain popularity among a number of young Spanish historians (Barros, 1997: 9; Piqueras, 1991: 98). Here, the mature Marx of Criticism of Economic Policy (1976 ed.) outweighed the young Marx of the Manuscripts of 1844 (1961). For this reason the role of structural determinism was emphasized in contrast to the limitations of social action and the rigid teleological succession of modes of production that prevailed over the contingency and plurality of the social movements.

Finally, in a surge of publication the work of conceptualization was replaced with mere militant ideology. This consisted mainly of monographs about the Spanish labor movement that favored a purely institutional and episodic type of analysis. Leaders of the workers and their organizations replaced the great personalities and statesmen; strikes and social revolts were substituted for battles and conquests. It was a case of History being impregnated by voluntarism which devoted itself to filling the most traditional forms of Political History with different content (Fontana, 1973). The type of Social History that spread in the Spanish universities during the 1980s would be very critical of the work realized during the two previous decades. Consequently, the first stage of this discipline was thought of poorly in Spain, being identified with this purely episodic, institutional, and militant history.

We now know that this image is exaggerated and too unilateral (Gabriel, 1995; Barros, 1997: 23-55). One cannot underrate, despite its defects, the theoretical, methodological, and organizational work of Tuñón de Lara, as well as the other work by Spanish historians of the 1960s-1970s on working-class organizations and ideologies, or on social conflict from the Middle Ages to contemporary times. It was precisely at the end of this period when one of the most important Spanish journals of Social History, Estudios de Historia Social, was founded in 1977 (published by the Ministry of Labor). This first phase, therefore, meant a change of direction for Spanish historiography. Social History was confirmed and recognized as an academic discipline, and historical accounts thereafter finally gave way to Social Science History.
The 1980s were a new phase in Social History from and about Spain, and 1982 was an emblematic year. An article, both symptomatic of and a stimulus for a new situation, was published in *Revista de Occidente*, a well-known cultural journal. Its authors were two young Spanish historians, M. Pérez Ledesma and J. Alvarez Junco (1982), specialists on the labor movement and frequent attendees of the innovative Pau conferences. This article is extremely critical of the content and style of Social History produced in Spain during the 1960s-1970s. The critical admonitions previously expressed by others about the typical labor history of that period were all taken into account and extended. They declared an end to anti-Francoist Social History, so weighed down by ideology and militant arbitrariness. The professionalization of Social History was proposed, supported by the application of more advanced empirical methods and the aim of objectivity. A change in research objectives was also proposed: the labor movement as a subject should be confined almost exclusively to social movements in general. This implied the opening of new subjects, such as the role of elites, poverty, crime, language differences, and gender relations. This also meant restructuring the analysis of working-class groups. Instead of giving priority to the exploration of institutional aspects of the labor movement (political parties, union organizations, individual leaders, etc.), inquiries were made into the material welfare and the standard of living of the working class. Food, clothing, health, disease, work conditions, schooling, family life, leisure, social behavior, etc., were all to be taken into account.

Since the 1980s to the present there has been a spectacular increase in the amount of research dedicated to these matters in Spain. At the same time, such areas as Economic History, Historical Demography, and Political History became methodologically and institutionally independent of Social History. New associations and specialized publications came into existence to cover the needs of these newly independent areas (De La Granja, 1995: 302; Casanova, 1991: 161-163). Social History itself followed the same tendency. In 1979 the UNED of Valencia (the Spanish Open University) organized the first Social History meetings. These continued in 1981 and 1987. The Institute of Social History and the publication *Historia Social* were both founded there in 1981 and 1988, respectively. The journal became recognized soon after its creation as the best Spanish periodical in its field (reviewed by Piqueras, 1991: 206; Julia, 1993: 90-91; Mainier Baque and Garcia Encabo, 1997: 209-211).

This undeniable productivity also had weaknesses, e.g., fragmented growth marked by thematic renovation, changes in prevailing tendencies, and lack of innovation in theory (Piqueras, 1991: 97; De La Granja, 1995: 305; Barros, 1997: 24-25). For various reasons a distrust of theory building increased during this time. This occurred when in other countries, especially France, "the crumbling away of history," represented by François Dossé (1987), was taking place. There was thematic diversification without the integration of conceptual frameworks. Even so, the general tendency toward dispersal of History was more problematic in Spain because it was a country with no consolidated Social History tradition of its own.

The replacement of dominance by French historiographic influence by the enthusiastic acceptance of British Social History, when during the 1990s *Historia Social* published two monographic treatments (1995) of E. P. Thompson and E. Hobsbawm, must be placed in this context (De La Granja, 1993: 300; Aróstegui, 1993: 171). The empiricism of authors belonging to the group of British Marxist historians, particularly Thompson and Hobsbawm, and their interest in the conditions of life of the working classes, have been widely adopted in Spain. The emphasis placed on the preeminence of social groups or the role of culture in the formation of a collective consciousness (explicit in E. P. Thompson's work, 1989) has received less attention. Fontana (1980: 242) had criticized British Marxist historians for their lack of concern for economic factors. On the other hand, the distrust felt by Spanish historians in the 1980s regarding theory was made quite clear with the good, albeit late, attention to criticism of Althusserian Marxism by M. Brenner (1977) leading to the 1985 Brenner debate (Aston and Philpin, 1985; Wetherly, 1992), and of E. P. Thompson (Fontana, 1980: 242-244; Piqueras, 1991: 98-99; Barros, 1997: 78) after the 1981 translation of *The Poverty of Theory*.

This empiricism, although associating renovation with the increase in the number of subjects studied and with increased professionalization, conserved the objectivistic ideals inherited from previous decades. Occasional research has investigated those aspects
concerned with symbolism and Cultural History. However, discourse was still considered to be a speciality and not an active element in all social experience. The dualistic separation between language and social reality persisted. As a consequence, almost all the works published in Spain in the 1980s concerning the relationship between discourse and social events were translations of works published abroad and coverage in *Historia Social* (Julia, 1993: 90-91). This change in tendency within Spanish Social History in the 1980s was influenced by the political and institutional history of that period. The roots of fragmentation and unconcern for theory are not simply epistemological in nature; they relate also to the political evolution of Spain during those years.

In 1982 the Spanish Socialist Party won the general elections. This implied the establishment of parliamentary democracy in Spain, soon after the failure of the 1981 military coup. The Spanish Socialists had already in 1979 rejected a Marxist orientation of the party, and once in power they established a pragmatic style of government in problem solving. This meant subordinating ideological principles to a *Realpolitik*, often measures of a socioliberal type, in an international context dominated by the crisis of the welfare state and the rise of liberal economic policies.

The expectations of social transformation created by the left-wing parties during the last years of Francoism and the first years of democracy yielded to a period characterized by “political disenchantment” (Barros, 1997: 20-22). It is not far afield to establish a link between this new political pragmatism and the ideological devaluation of Social History in the 1980s. The young militant historians of the 1960s-1970s were now part of the academic establishment. Many of them had risen from assistant lecturers to university professorships.

Meanwhile, a crucial change was taking place in the structure of the state. In the 1980s a centralized state was transformed into what is practically a federation, the so-called “state of the autonomous.” This transition from centralization to diversification in the political structure of Spain has decidedly affected the treatment of History as a profession in this country. The university system that had been rigidly controlled by the central administration during the Franco period (through institutions such as the Ministry of Education or the Scientific Research Council (CSIC)) was replaced by the proliferation of a large number of universities, many of which were quite small by comparison with the old establishment. These institutions are autonomous, yet have close links with local, provincial, and regional administrations (De La Granja, 1995: 303; Valdeon, 1995: 310-313). In the case of History, the number of departments involved in this discipline multiplied in all the universities around the country. To a great extent, these departments controlled teaching, research, and access to professional posts in the universities. This has favored the creation of miniature “fiefdoms” which are often isolated and inward looking.

In this context, a debate between historians is more a result of stimulation from the administration than the consequence of the internal dynamics of faculty research. The regional authorities promote the creation of an almost uncompromising regional and local past, while the central government seeks the services of the historians of different departments only for the celebration of anniversaries: 1981 and 1986, the fiftieth anniversaries of the Spanish Second Republic and the Civil War, respectively; in 1988, the commemoration of the reign of Charles III and the centenary of the loss of Cuba; in 1992, the celebration of the discovery of America, etc. A sad situation arises when historians compete with each other for leading roles in these different celebrations. This generates bitter disputes that are more of a personal and ideological than of a conceptual or methodological nature, with everyone attempting to impose his or her own interpretation of historical events on their public commemoration (note comments by Julia, 1993: 43-44; Valdeon, 1995: 310; Barros, 1996a: 474-475; Carcel, 1995: 2291-2298).

At a local and regional level, the administration usually supplies everything necessary for historians to hold conferences, colloquia, or seminars and to publish their work, so long as a local or regional perspective is provided. This has promoted a move away from an all-encompassing, single account of Spanish Social History of the 1980s to the multiplication of minor local and regional histories that question the nature of the state itself, thus revealing a myriad of incommensurate geographical entities (Julia, 1993: 44; De La Granja, 1995: 303; Valdeon, 1995: 313; Barros, 1996a: 482-484).

Such stimuli at a local level have also been reinforced by two political measures. One is concerned with education policy. The last secondary school legislative reform (LOGSE) passed during the Socialist government advises that the teacher should pay special attention to the pupil's local environment, particularly in Social Sciences and
History. Second, regional governments tend increasingly to monopolize control over education policy. This empowers them to introduce material of exclusively regional nature into History and Social Science curricula. Under these circumstances, decentralization has followed the tendency to favor local studies at an academically low level, both in conceptualization and methodological elaboration. In its own way, such institutional development has encouraged the fragmentation and the empiricism that had previously been affirmed epistemologically.

Despite these shortcomings, it would be unjust to judge this period completely negative. During the 1980s, an abundance of empirical research of unquestioned quality has enlarged and renewed the range of topics in Social History. Contacts with research centers and universities of other countries have increased greatly, favored by generous pre- and postdoctoral grants and by Spain’s increasing integration into international organizations, especially the European Union (EEC). During this phase Social History was professionalized, as confirmed by the emergence of a large number of associations of historians, specialized conferences and congresses, and scientific publications of excellent quality. However, at the beginning of the 1990s, a consensus has evolved in the Spanish historiographic community regarding the wide gulf between the expectations created in 1982 and the reality of Social History ten years later.

THE SUBJECTIVIST TURN

During the first years of the 1990s, the dissatisfaction by Spanish researchers regarding the history of social movements favored in the 1980s became quite evident. This feeling was expressed in different articles published in journals and in lectures given in recent congresses, such as those in Valencia (1990), Santiago de Compostela (1993), and Vitoria (1996) (Barros, 1997: 23-24). Historians now appear to be clearly aware of the main limitations of Spanish Social History: (1) the absence of an original approach developed in Spain, and, thus, (2) a dependence on foreign historiographies. The root of the situation is usually identified with the weaknesses of a historiographical tradition marked by a lack of conceptual work and mistrust of theoretical reflection and sociological thought. Julia (1993: 40-41), Piqueras (1991: 97), De La Granja (1995: 305), Valdeon (1995: 310-311), and others remark on the “poverty of theory” in Spain. This situation has not only resulted in limited dialogue between historians and other social researchers; it seems also to be a situation prolonged by university policy.

The majority of university History curricula are comprised of subjects that exclusively pertain to this discipline. The need is felt for the presence of subjects such as Sociology, Economics, Social Anthropology, Linguistics, or Philosophy as well (De La Granja, 1995: 305; Piqueras, 1991: 106). This seems partially due to tradition as well as the lack of career prospects for historians. In the 1970s-1980s, the enormous demand for higher education on the part of the expanding middle class meant the creation of a number of new universities. History studies were in great demand in times of political protest and democratic transition. The labor market was soon saturated, however, and now there a large number of graduates and even doctorates in History facing very poor career prospects (Valdeon, 1995: 310; Barros, 1996a: 486-490). To be able to absorb the best, faculties of History have had to create new posts, but only by burdening the curriculum with multiple offerings in subjects of the same specialization. These circumstances suffocate all attempts to include subject matter from other Social Sciences in university History programs.

Over the past few years, greater awareness of these obstacles has encouraged Spanish historians to react in two clear ways: (1) in contrast to the empiricism of the 1980s, there is renewed interest in the problems of historiographical theory and History; and (2) in contrast to the implicit objectivism of the previous decade, there is now an increasing epistemological movement toward acknowledging subjectivity in research. This movement is consonant with the post-war international crisis of the great hegemonic objectivistic paradigms: Historical Materialism, Structuralism, and Functionalism.

This first reaction has resulted in an attempt to reconstruct a Spanish historiographical tradition that existed before the rupture caused by Francoism. It has been stated frequently that it is impossible to overcome Spanish dependence on foreign historiography if this heritage remains undeveloped in Spain itself. In contrast with this ignorance of Spain’s historiographic past, there is now increased research aimed at recovering and shedding light on this past, i.e., a history of History. Barros (1996a: 479) sees the history of Spanish historiography as a field of study with a promising future (as do Passamar and
Piero, 1987; Passamar, 1991; Fontana, 1991; Gabriel, 1995, etc.). On the other hand, the first general reaction against the fragmentation and empiricism of the 1980s is now taking place. We are now witnessing the increased promotion of theoretical thought and conceptual work among Spanish historians. This is confirmed by the considerable increase in this type of work at the end of the 1980s and throughout the 1990s (cf., Julia, 1989; Bermejo, 1987, 1989, 1991; Casanova, 1991; Fontana, 1992, 1997; Ruiz Torres, 1993; Moradiellos, 1994; Andrés-Gallego, 1994; Aróstegui, 1995; Hernandez Sandoina, 1995; Sanchez Prieto, 1995; Mitre, 1997, Fontana, 1997; etc.). This search for a new theoretical synthesis will improve the previous empiricist dispersion of Spanish historiography. This is being conducted from very different options: a new nondogmatic, flexible approach to the traditions of historical materialism (Piqueras, 1991; Fontana, 1997); a new dialogue with Anglo-American historical sociology (Julia, 1989; Casanova, 1991; Aróstegui, 1995); a return to humanist philosophical anthropology (Andrés-Gallego, 1994; Olabarri, 1993); and the search for a middle ground between the great post-war paradigms and the new alternatives, e.g., microhistory, new cultural history, etc., of the 1980s-1990s (Barros, 1996b).

The second tendency mentioned may be placed under the heading "Subjectivist Turn." The renewal of Spanish Social History undertaken in the 1980s limited itself exclusively to professionalization, the expansion of the range of topics, and the incorporation of new study techniques, but the hollowed objectivistic epistemology of the 1970s remained virtually intact. This objectivism stressed the leading role of the socioeconomic structures to the detriment of the creative role of the social agents. This is changing. This crucial epistemological change from the end of the last decade consists of revising the active function of the subject—individual and collective—in the construction of social processes. At a theoretical level this has been expressed in a new understanding of the relationship between action and structure. Based on structuralist or structurationist sociological tendencies of C. Lloyd (1983), A. Giddens (1991), and others, it is now a question of emphasizing, without losing the perspective of History as a Social Science, the creative dimension of the subject when it comes to accounting for the generation and destruction of social structures conceived as processes in continuous movement (Aróstegui, 1995: 158-160). On an empirical plane, this "Subjectivist Turn" has become more specific in the recovery of the biographic genre, prosopography studies, and the new proliferation of works concerned with social conflicts and disturbances (Barros, 1996; 1997: 31-36). Compared with what happened in the 1970s, these processes now tend to be explained from the viewpoint of nonobjectivistic parameters, emphasizing the role of the conscious and deliberate actions of subjects in the dislocation and support of existing structures. Last, it must be said that with this "Subjectivist Turn" Spanish Social History is closer to the trend today in most Western historiography. This trend or tendency has recently been theorized by authors such as G. Noiriel (1989; 1996) in France or G. Stedman Jones (1996) in Britain.

**THE LINGUISTIC TURN AND POSTMODERNISM: MISTRUST AND REJECTION**

The attitude of Spanish historians toward Postmodernism, and more specifically its "Linguistic Turn," may be explained adequately with analysis of the theoretical and institutional legacy that shapes the Spanish Social History panorama.

The well-known controversy caused by the publication of "History and Postmodernism" (L. Stone; P. Joyce; G. Spiegel; C. Kelly) in *Past and Present* at the beginning of the 1990s was soon translated into Spanish (Stone et al., 1993). At almost the same time a formal statement concerning the repercussions of philosophical and cultural Postmodernism on History was published in a specialized journal of importance, *Historia Social* (Moradiellos, 1993). Although it was a text that exclusively limited itself to describing the situation, some took it as a defense of Postmodern attitudes within historiography, and was the target of bitter criticism (Morales Moya, 1992, 1994). These debates occurred at the same time the V International Colloquium on History was organized in Pamplona. This conference focused attention on the theoretical questions of historiography and social change. In the prologue to its minutes, opposition to extreme Postmodernism was expressed, with the prediction by Barros (1997: 28) that there would be a return to the "socio-scientific methodologies of proven productivity in this century."
Rather than an intellectual trend known and debated, Postmodernism is for many Spanish historians a heresy that endangers the scientific vocation of History, a creed to be abjured if one wished to become part of the scientific community.

The “Linguistic Turn,” which tends to be interpreted as one of the principal effects Postmodernism has had on theory, does not enjoy a good reputation in Spain either. Neither of its two most relevant constructs have been accepted, either as an epistemological proposal about the narrative condition of History, or as social theory about the symbolic or discursive nature of all experience. Both Narrativism and the semiotic theory of experience have been considered threats to the scientific status of Social History, i.e., ways to sabotage the aspirations of the discipline. This rejection can be detected in the historiographic right wing, which supports the return to a historical synthesis based on Christian Humanism, as well as in the left wing, which intends to preserve a renewed historical materialism. In Spain, as in Great Britain, we also have our Palmer and Elton, but the difference is that the other side hardly exists.

As is known, the “Linguistic Turn” penetration in Social History has come about principally through the subdisciplines of Intellectual and Cultural History. Since the academic normalization of Social History in Spain, these subdisciplines have either been neglected or considered secondary in importance with respect to the study of material conditions, the economic base, or social structures.

During the Spanish renovation of the 1960s-1970s, anything that bore resemblance to Intellectual History had a bad press because the latter was associated with official Francoist historiography. The ideallists of this official historiography believed that “Great Ideas” would be the ultimate force behind historical change. Opposing this position were culture and symbolism, at that time combined under the rubric of Mentality. They were identified as forms of conscience of a subsidiary nature and determined by the social structure. Barros (1992: 60-66) recalled the distrustful reception in Spain of the French mentalité construct. All that was considered to be symbolic was situated on the same level as ideology, whose historicity could be explained functionally according to changes in economic and social structures (see Aróstegui, 1993: 165, 181, about this modus operandi in Tuñón de Lara’s work).

With the change in direction of Social History in the 1980s, new subjects of study were introduced: among them, Discourse Analysis, which is to be understood not as an expression of preexistent social identities, but as an element that actively shapes those identities. This approach was made known in Spain from 1967 onward when the series Estudios de Historia Social (Social History Studies) published a monograph primarily intended to make known diverse French papers from the Discourse Analysis Centre of Lille University. On the other hand, at the end of the 1980s, Historia Social dedicated one of its issues to the problems of language, gender, and the working class and published articles by Stedman Jones (1989) and Joan Scott (1989) on these subjects, and during this period, two important essays by Robert Darnton (1987) and Stedman Jones (1989) were translated into Spanish. These also emphasized the constructive role of symbolism in all social aspects.

Despite these inclusions, those historiographic tendencies that are based on the study of discourse or that emphasize the role played by symbolic action are peripheral in the Spanish scene. A series of papers on vocabulary and political language were published in the 1980s. This lexicometric research also had little impact (Castro Cuencas and Aranda Pérez, 1991: 73-74). Meanwhile, research on the history of mentalities along lines of that produced by the Annales school, showed late acceptance of this genre which faced widespread prejudice (Barros, 1992: 60-66). Later, toward the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s, Chartier-style microstoria and sociocultural history were introduced into Spain and were well received, particularly in Valencia and Barcelona, traditionally the most active and innovative historiographic centers. Even so, research of this type by Spanish scholars is still scarce. One might mention the methodological essays of A. Serna y Pons (1993) and of an American working in Spain, James Amelang (1995), as well as the empirical work of Jaime Contreras (1992).

The strictly epistemological aspect of the “Linguistic Turn” known as Narrativism has had no better fortune in Spain. Except for a few isolated cases (Ruiz Torres, 1993; Carreras, 1993; Morales Moya, 1994; Bermejo, 1987, 1994), the revival of narration for historical knowledge has been avoided by historians, or simply dismissed as afad or an attack on History as a Social Science. The subject has been debated more extensively among philosophers and semiologists than
by historians (Cruz, 1987; Lozano, 1987; Morey, 1987; Sevilla, 1993; Vázquez García, 1995).

What were the reasons for this negative attitude of indifference toward the influences of the “Linguistic Turn” in modern historiography?

First, one must refer to the epistemological inheritance received and maintained almost intact since the 1970s. This entails an objectivist understanding of everything concerning social aspects. This understanding creates a dichotomy between what is historically “real” and “solid” with economic and social structures, distinct from what is “ideal” and “ethereal,” identified with discourse. This dualism prevails still among the majority of Spanish historians, mainly because it has not been subjected to theoretical reasoning and serious questioning. This prejudice was manifest during the 1970s-1980s in the most defiant rejection of mentalité history (Fontana, 1980: 209-211; 1992), or in the shelving of Cultural History tasks until the history of social structures and transformations had finally become consolidated (Casanova, 1991: 166; Bernal, 1991: 238).

Another factor favoring an aversion toward research that took the “Linguistic Turn” has been the peculiar reception of Structuralism and Poststructuralism among Spanish historians. The majority of the latter were Marxists during the 1970s, and the word structuralism was associated not with C. Levi-Strauss or J. Lacan, but with the works of Louis Althusser. During the empiricist period of the 1980s, they enthusiastically accepted, albeit with some delay, E. P. Thompson and P. Vilar’s criticism of the French philosopher’s excesses with regard to theory. In this period the British Marxist historians replaced the Anales school as a reference point. All that had its origins in French anthropism was systematically discredited and classified as propositions that defied discourse, surreptitiously restoring an idealistic or deterministic vision of the process of history. Authors such as Michel Foucault or Jacques Derrida all were assimilated on the basis of simplistic stereotypes; no real effort was made to understand them (Moradiellos, 1993: 101; Aróstegui, 1995: 368, are good examples of this reception of Derrida by Spanish historians; the similar case of Foucault is illustrated in Julia, 1993: 45; cf., Hernandez Sandoica, 1995: 287; Olabarri, 1993).

Finally, this rejection of the “Linguistic Turn” and denunciation of Postmodernism had to do with certain peculiarities of Spanish historiographic development. In the 1980s, just as the professionalization of Social History was occurring in Spain, renewed insistence on the narrative condition of history began to spread. While a large number of Spanish historians attempted to enhance the prestige of their discipline among the Social Sciences, distancing themselves from purely humanistic studies, a type of narration that in its most radical form questioned the substantive difference between historical and fictional narration was spreading internationally. It is not surprising that under these conditions most of the Spanish historiographic community closed ranks and opposed what was considered to be a fearsome epistemological “Trojan horse” (Casanova, 1991: 111-112; Fontana, 1992; Aróstegui, 1995: 259-261).

The lack of theoretical work and debate, another Spanish peculiarity, does not facilitate necessary interdisciplinary study that is required to understand contributions such as continental hermeneutics, French Poststructuralism, or the new Anglo-American literary criticism without which it is impossible to grasp the significance of the “Linguistic Turn.” Only when one takes into account this lack of habit do certain contradictions and misinterpretations by Spanish historians become understandable when contributions in the aforementioned trends are referred to in the Spanish historiographic literature (e.g., Aróstegui, 1995: 170-171, about Paul Ricoeur; Olabarri, 1993, and Hernandez Sandoica, 1995, about Foucault; and Moradiellos, 1993, about Nietzsche).

The last explanatory factor, this time shared with other European countries, is of a political nature. Where the “Linguistic Turn” has had the greatest repercussions, not only in History but in all the Social Sciences, is in the United States. This tendency toward explanation of everything as a matter of language has been specially prevalent in multicultural studies, women’s studies, and subaltern studies, all now well established in American universities. In American political practice conflicts are structured in cultural terms with regard to the definition and exclusion of ethnic, religious, age, or gender identities. By contrast, in Europe, political life is still structured in socioeconomic rather than such cultural terms. The role of discourse in the construction of identity has remained eclipsed for a long time due to the greater importance attached to criteria linked to salaries or to objective work conditions. This still persists in Spain where political conflicts related to gender, ethnic group, religion, or sexual preference
have emerged later or in a more attenuated form (e.g., racism and xenophobia) than in other European countries. When it comes to shaping political identities, this lesser degree of sensibility with respect to all that is symbolic or related to discourse can also be appreciated in the field of historiography.

However, certain signs on the horizon indicate a change in this situation. In certain historiographic centers such as Valencia or Barcelona, attitudes are changing and the implications of the "Linguistic Turn" are being gradually accepted. An increasing number of articles and manuals on methodology present this tendency in a more favorable and moderate light. The German Grundbegriffsgeschichte was well received by Abellan (1991: 47-64), and one might note the changes in the essays collected by Barros (1995) and the works of Burdiel and Romeo (1996: 333-346) and Cabrera (1997). The very same dispersion of Spanish historiography at university level and the inexistence of a unifying force encourages pluralism and receptiveness toward new tendencies, put into practice at times in peripheral universities, such as the seminar "History and the Linguistic Turn," organized by Miguel Angel Cabrera at the University of La Laguna, Canary Islands (1995). The lack of solid tradition in the field of Social History has been a handicap in the Spanish case; yet, set in an international context dominated by dispersion and uncertainty within the profession, this may be considered a new virtue (Barros, 1996: 469).

### Bibliography


Chapter 4

Teaching Women’s History in Spanish Universities

Cristina Segura Grañño
A. C. Almudayna

UNDERREPRESENTATION OF WOMEN IN HISTORY

The History of Women in Spain is over twenty years old. The long list of publications relating to the subject attests its importance. Numerous conferences in this specialized area provide findings highly important to the study of History as a whole. In most Spanish universities there is a center, institute, seminar, or workshop devoted to research in Women’s Studies, in which History plays a central role. It is not my intention to belabor this point because there is little argument about the value of Women’s Studies, and within these the History of Women, but it is my conviction and reflection upon experience that the importance of this scientific corpus is not sufficiently or commensurately reflected in university curricula in Spain. Some years ago when the History of Women sought to raise the profile of women within society, one could count few among our ranks who were concerned with the construction and analysis of our own past, but the current volume of publications is now large enough, after sufficient output, to make historiographic assessment possible. The emergence in 1997 of an important work titled Historia de las Mujeres en España (History of Women in Spain) demonstrated that the extent of research in this field had reached the point where the production of a “manual” seemed appropriate. This included enough bibliographic material to establish the History of Women as a scholarly entity in its own right, and pointed to a number of women historians responsible for most of
this production. The need for a guide could also have meant a demand for such critical literature at university level to facilitate the teaching of the subject when a series of new curricula was being developed. If this might be seen as responding to the need for more modern criteria for inclusion in these curricula and replacement of outdated pedagogic approaches, these expectations have not been met. Today faculties are considering further reform in some curricula which are not even a decade old.

In the 1980s the History of Women had no official recognition within higher education. Unfortunately, the current situation, much improved although it may be, still leaves much to be desired. Women’s history has a long way to go before it matures as a subdiscipline or is fully integrated into the mainstream. If now at the advent of a new millennium, the most anxious and concerned historians, male and female, are discussing a new paradigm for History but cannot reach any consensus about the importance of the History of Women, one might assume that the most traditional and reactionary groups have not even begun to acknowledge that half of the population has been female, and that women as such, their historical importance and achievements throughout the ages, have been and in many cases continue to be inadequately represented in history books.

WOMEN’S STUDIES: THE STATUS QUO

A few years ago, the Women’s Institute of the Spanish Ministry of Social Affairs wanted to produce a “white paper” about Women’s Studies in the Spanish university system. To do so, an ambitious project was undertaken which developed into a “white book.” It was composed of two very clear stages. The first involved investigation into the precise profile of women in certain areas at university at all levels (teaching, research, publications, dissemination, scientific meetings, etc.). After specific data were gathered, the second stage undertook the analysis of these data. As a result an important documentation center was created to store all the information obtained, and a major publication appeared in 1995: Los estudios de las Mujeres en las Universidades españolas 1975-1991: Libro Blanco, coordinated by Pilar Ballarín, Maite Gallego and Maribel Martínez Benlloch.

Consequently, women historians were able to take stock of the situation within Spanish Universities in 1992 when the investigation into activities relating to Women’s Studies ended. The data gathered were published to promote further research. History was certainly central to these findings, but this was not unforeseen as a natural conclusion of such study. This benchmark publication now seems little more than the starting point, confirming some progress in the advancement of Women’s Studies, but more so identifying how much remains to be done. The Institute of Women’s Studies at Granada University acknowledged the importance of continuing this line of investigation. To do so, with the support of the Women’s Institute of the Spanish Ministry of Social Affairs, another project was undertaken as a sequel and to update the study through 1995 in principle, but for some issues, related activities were accounted through 1996. From then until the HA D conference, the situation has hardly changed.

The trends observed in 1992 and 1996 seem ongoing. The presence of Women’s Studies within Spanish universities seems minimal, but its foothold is solid and such studies are making gradual and unstoppable progress. The related activities with greatest exposure are not curricular, however, but are the result of the initiative of identifiable groups of women. However, that said, curricular incidence is growing stronger, since this is a subject that has come to attract a lot of attention. The update of the white book has resulted in two important publications coordinated by Teresa Ortiz (1999), lecturer in the History of Medicine at Granada University: Universidad y feminismo en España (1): Bibliografía de estudios de las mujeres (1992-96) (1999). This bibliography provides references to all the publications produced between 1992 and 1996. In the second volume (Ortiz et al., 2000), all the gathered data were analyzed. In that context, I was assigned the task of analyzing the presence of Women’s Studies in university curricula. In this article, and based on the conclusions I reached while working on the aforementioned piece of work, which were of a more general nature, I intend to focus on something more specific, and which interests me as a woman historian—the History of Women and its limited profile, from my point of view, in the academic world.

In the aforementioned study, activities relating to Women’s Studies were organized into four categories: (1) publications, (2) research,
(3) teaching, and (4) other. My summary of these data on the distribution of Women's Studies follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activities</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Publications</td>
<td>2,604</td>
<td>37.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Research</td>
<td>826</td>
<td>11.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teaching</td>
<td>601</td>
<td>8.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Courses</td>
<td>55</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Part of the curriculum</td>
<td>80</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Postgraduate activities</td>
<td>333</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extracurricular activities</td>
<td>133</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>2,928</td>
<td>42.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>6,560</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TEACHING WOMEN'S HISTORY

Each unit represents only one activity as a whole—a book, project, congress, course, etc. The breakdown shows that within these activities relating to Women's Studies teaching ranks less than research in a purely quantitative scale. Consider just History teaching (Segura, 2000, table 7) to assess the important role of History in university curricula. The following data show the distribution of teaching activities by subject areas:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subjects</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Anthropology</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>7.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Architecture</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Art</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natural Sciences</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Law</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economics</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>10.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philology</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philosophy</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>5.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geography</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>History</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>15.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linguistics</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Literature</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>15.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Medicine</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>5.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Various disciplines</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Journalism</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Politics</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Psychology</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>8.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sociology</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>9.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theology</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>601</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note the relative importance of History compared with other subjects. Only five subjects total more than fifty units; History and Literature share first position with ninety-two units each (data from 1996 activities; only slight increases have been recorded thereafter). A quantitative approach does not provide defining measure. The more or less consistent pattern indicates overall that ninety-two units, in contrast to all the other teaching activities in Spanish universities, constitute but a drop in the bucket. Moreover, these History units include courses from the first and second educative cycles, courses from the third educative cycle (i.e., postgraduate courses), and extracurricular activities. The latter correspond to nonregulated courses which are not in the formal curricula as requirements, and which are therefore all electives. They do not pertain to the academic training of the entire student body. These electives taken by individual choice have to be paid for apart from basic tuition fees, and they are not reflected in the primary academic records of students. The data for the distribution of teaching activities in History follow:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Course</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Postgraduate</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extracurricular</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Attention must be paid to the core courses themselves because they affect the whole curricula and constitute the university's regulated teaching. None of these courses are included in the core curriculum, so they are noncompulsory for the student body as a whole, but all curricula today tend to offer students greater flexibility to choose what they want to study. The highest number of current activities cor-
respond to postgraduate courses. All decisions concerning such
courses are made by faculty, which has allowed many women to teach
Women’s History without the consent of the ruling university elite in
academe, which is, of course, male dominated. It was through post-
graduate courses that the History of Women began to be taught in
the 1980s, while regular courses date only to very recent times when the
new curricula were introduced.

Many changes are taking place today with curricular reform. The
situation is not stable, however, and from the number of qualitative vari-
ations are evident. Courses relevant to our concern here remain outside
the core curriculum. Although the number of courses is still low, an
important change observed currently is that more women are teaching
conventional History, and they are more aware of their own
importance within the subject area. Women are thus taken into account
more, and some History is taught from a specifically woman-centric
perspective. But this ideal approach is reflected in only a minority of
courses and does not affect the more general lines of study. The distribu-
tion of courses taught in various universities is shown in the
following data:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>University</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UAB</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UAM</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>14.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UBA</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UCA</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UdL</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ULL</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UMA</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UPV</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>14.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UVEG</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>14</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note that these figures do not correspond with those from the pre-
vious list because they include three new courses from Murcia Uni-
versity. Still, in most universities only one course (only three have
more than one) is the norm, and only ten of nineteen universities have
any course on Women’s History. Despite such a nominal presence,
some progress is being made. Women’s Studies, and History in this
particular case, must continue to fight for a larger forum and over-
come resistance from the most recalcitrant elements.

Women faculty regret the small number of relevant courses intro-
duced in curricula, and that these play to audiences already interested
in the subject rather than introducing Women’s content in coursework
where it may be needed most. As noted, courses already implemented
remain optional and belong to the second educative cycle. They en-
roll the already interested; the uninterested avoid them. Also, some
departments which have agreed to include them consider themselves
“exonerated” and forget the whole issue, as if reassuring themselves
with a self-satisfied pat on the back that the one course covers all that
needs to be done, without integrating Women’s History into other
History courses. Women must propose more courses and integrate
the topic into mainstream History to reform the overwhelming male
orientation of the curricula, not just for the past in History, but for cur-
rent events and new social approaches that are too often unwelcome
because they include women in their scope. Courses on the History of
Women are needed to fulfill the interests of those developing this sub-
ject professionally as a specialization, which requires an underpin-
ning with more general coursework for those simply desiring to learn
more about the subject. It is essential in either case that, in all History
courses, women are portrayed playing the important roles they have
traditionally assumed all throughout History. Half the human popula-
tion in history cannot simply be discounted as nonexistent.

**POSTGRADUATE PROGRAMS**

In the third educative cycle the situation is a little different. A lot
more activity exists here, although the numerical difference, which is
large (fourteen contrasted to sixty-three recorded activites in post-
graduate work), does not reflect this completely. In some cases these
subjects have been taught only once; in others they repeat yearly.
Consequently, the figures are more indicative than conclusive. Cur-
rently four specifically postgraduate programs in Women’s Studies
exist; they were developed at the Universities of Oviedo, Granada,
and Malaga, and another will begin at the University of Zaragoza.
These include seminars on the History of Women and thus represent
the beginning capability of academically recognized specializations
in Women's History. Consider the following data for the distribution of postgraduate programs in Women's Studies:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>University</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UAB</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UAM</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UBA</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UCA</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UCLM</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UCM</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UGR</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UJCS</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ULL</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UMA</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>12.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNA</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UOV</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UPGC</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UPN</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UPV</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USE</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UST</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UVEG</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UZA</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The data for the distribution of Women's Studies presented earlier show that postgraduate activities account for 333; History, with sixty-three activities, represents 18.9 percent of this total—the only discipline exceeding fifty activities, which suggests a concentrated awareness of women as a subject for study more than in the rest of the curricular spectrum. It has been possible for some time to demonstrate and sustain this interest in Women's Studies in a subject domain where teachers have greater autonomy, i.e., in postgraduate programs which allow increased freedom to choose electives within a department's curriculum, and to select the topics faculty wish to cover. Women faculty have started teaching their history in this way, as a strategy to fill voids with knowledge that is otherwise excluded from regular curricula. Consider the following data for the gender of faculty teaching postgraduate Women's History courses:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>93.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This tabulation shows clearly that it is women who lead the introduction of Women's History in curricular innovation through postgraduate electives. The small contingent of men in this movement deserves mention, however, since it suggests that the History of Women is not simply something only about and for women, as has been claimed by some reactionaries.

### EXTRACURRICULAR ACTIVITIES

The last category composed of extracurricular activities includes master's curricula, seminars, postgraduate courses, courses within the Erasmus program, workshops, BA degrees, and other diplomas and courses. They are all nonregulated activities, which are not included in academic curricula and which do not result in any kind of recognized university degree. Although these are certainly all educational activities, they are undertaken voluntarily. They are, however, very important because they fill in gaps in university training. In 1996 the number of activities in this group was 113, but these are increasing because of the growth in new degrees and master's programs, which themselves indicate a growing demand by students for Women's Studies in general and History in particular.

The History of Women is indeed being taught more and more. However, current levels are still insufficient. Even if not yet properly quantified, other contributions to this field made through different courses must be taken into account also—those special events that encourage students to explore this kind of education, such as conferences and extracurricular noncredit activities. At the end of this past academic year, a new graduate who had not attended my lectures sought advice about where to go for postgraduate studies in the History of Women: "I do not want to continue studying History that does not respond to my own personal concerns," she concluded.

What are the reasons why the History of Women has remained at such a low profile in Spanish universities? Some are quite obvious...
and ubiquitous, like the predominant sexism in Spain's society as a whole and lack of concern about social problems. Others, more hidden and specific to the academic world, are composed of less obvious factors. One problem is a general lack of interest for all that is new—a lack of interest symptomatic of too much of the university teaching body, mostly in the male contingent, but, unfortunately, such complacency is also identifiable among women lecturers. Most teachers have spent many years teaching precisely what they studied when they were students or when they prepared for the exams that allowed them to become university lecturers. They do not keep abreast of new contributions in all sorts of fields other than their own. The History of Women in Spain is not even two decades old, but the demand for currency in this field is difficult and requires more effort than those in traditional fields are willing to make. As a result of this conservatism and lethargy, the History of Women and many other subjects are not being incorporated into curricula.

For many protagonists of Women's History, this interest is not simply academic but evolves from a deep sense of political motivation and quest for vindication. This can undermine the importance of our work. Many consider the strong ideological agenda in the History of Women contrary to the objectivity needed in every historian. Is it only the History of Women, however, that has such ideological overtones? Those who argue against Women's History on this basis also express an ideology. It is always questionable if only the opposition can determine what is objective, scientific, etc. Objectivity or lack thereof is not always the real culprit; exclusionary extremism is.

All of these issues can be invoked when explaining the limited profile of Women's History in most university curricula. But another important factor is the distribution of academic power, to which women have never had full access. Generally speaking, the university is still a traditionalist arena in which many reactionary values considered decadent in other sectors of society, still apply. The male-dominated professorate fights en masse to defend the few bastions of power conserved thus far, including a gender mix that relegates women to a minority. It is a false notion that women have already taken their place within the university on an equal standing with men because some have, when most have not and so many colleges of higher education and university faculties remain with no women among the teaching body at all, or only small minorities.

The aforementioned work *Mujeres en minoría* by Marisa García de Cortázar and María Antonia García de León (1997, p. 25) provides the facts illustrating the social reality of minority standing for women within universities:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subjects</th>
<th>Women</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Men</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Humanities</td>
<td>173</td>
<td>15.9</td>
<td>1,087</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Sciences and Law</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>1,462</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sciences</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>1,520</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health Sciences</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>866</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineering and Technology</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>850</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>555</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>5,785</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Outposts of male domination exist within most universities. While a few situations occur where there are more female than male teachers, and where women play an important role within a faculty, the post of professor is still a goal that very few women can aspire to without overcoming considerable obstacles. Some fields in the Humanities, where History often resides, have more women, but within History there are also major differences:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subject</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Men</th>
<th>Women</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Prehistory</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ancient History</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medieval History</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Modern History</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contemporary History</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>10.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note that in Contemporary History women make up only 10.7 percent of the faculty. These data lists illustrating faculty characteristics should be shown alongside others reflecting the number of women in posts such as department directors, deans, rectors, etc., to provide the full picture of the status of women in academe and the problems in introducing change from the top or from within faculties in this area.

A university in which women do not have the same possibilities for promotion as men, not according to statute but because of social reality, self-perpetuates a certain mentality. Until women obtain recognized authority, political power, and scientific legitimacy to modify these old-fashioned mentalities, Women's Studies and the History of
Women, in particular, will not achieve the importance they deserve in Spanish university curricula.

APPENDIX:
UNIVERSITIES TEACHING WOMEN’S HISTORY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institution</th>
<th>City</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UAB</td>
<td>Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UAM</td>
<td>Universidad Autònoma de Madrid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UBA</td>
<td>Universitat de Barcelona</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UCA</td>
<td>Universidad de Cádiz</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UCLM</td>
<td>Universidad de Castilla La Mancha</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UCM</td>
<td>Universidad Complutense de Madrid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UGR</td>
<td>Universidad de Granada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UJCS</td>
<td>Universitat Jauma I de Castellón</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UdL</td>
<td>Universitat de Lleida</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ULL</td>
<td>Universidad de La Laguna</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UMA</td>
<td>Universidad de Málaga</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNA</td>
<td>Universidad de Navarra</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UOV</td>
<td>Universidad de Oviedo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UPGC</td>
<td>Universidad de Las Palmas de Gran Canaria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UPN</td>
<td>Universidad Politécnica de Madrid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UPV</td>
<td>Universidad del País Vasco</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USE</td>
<td>Universidad de Sevilla</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UST</td>
<td>Universidad de Santiago de Compostela</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UVEG</td>
<td>Universitat de Valencia Estudi General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UZA</td>
<td>Universidad de Zaragoza</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

BIBLIOGRAPHY


Chapter 5

Centers and Peripheries:
Writing and Teaching Medieval and Early Modern Spanish History

Teófilo F. Ruiz

INTRODUCTION:
RESEARCH CENTERS AND PARADIGMS

This essay, about centers and peripheries in the writing and teaching of Spanish Medieval and Early Modern History, begins with some general methodological and personal reflections. On the eve of a new millennium, historians throughout the world face serious challenges as to what History is or ought to be, and question the direction History will take in the twenty-first century. These are significant issues for professional historians but also for the general public. Our construction of History, or of histories, helps shape the present political and social climate and the immediate future (cf., Benjamin, 1969: 253-264; Appleby, Hunt, and Jacob, 1998: 17-36; Schorske, 1998; Stone, 1987). This construction is deeply intertwined with the swift pace of current social, economic, and political changes, or what may be described as the rapid pace of globalization, the spread of transnational economies, and transformations in material culture.

In my almost three decades as a graduate student, teacher, and writer of history, I was fortunate to have been a firsthand witness to dramatic methodological transformations. First as a student and later as visiting faculty at Princeton University and long-term resident of Princeton, I attended the Shelby Cullom Davis Center for Historical Studies’ weekly meetings for over twenty-five years. Magisterially and forcefully directed for over two decades by Lawrence Stone, a distinguished historian of early modern England, for over two de-
cades, and afterward by Natalie Z. Davis and William C. Jordan, equally distinguished early modern and medieval historians, respectively, the Davis Center became an important magnet for historical research. Through the selection of specific themes (run on a two-year cycle), the exploration of new methodological approaches, and the frequent visits of well-known foreign historians (Carlo Ginzburg, Roger Chartier, Georges Duby, and many others), the Davis Center became one of the leading institutions for the formulation of historical trends and new historiographical paradigms in the Anglophone world. Selected papers were published regularly, providing a published body of testimonies to the Center’s evolution over time. The number of volumes published by the Davis Center—a selection of the best papers presented in a two-year cycle on one specific topic—is too extensive to cite fully here, but one can easily consult those edited by Stone himself (1974) and Wilentz (1985) as examples.

At the same time, since a good number of the members of the editorial board of Past & Present, one of the most influential historical journals in English, either taught at Princeton or visited with great frequency (in its early years the Davis Center concentrated mostly on early modern English history), there was a continuous cross-pollination between these two loci of historical research. Having published my first substantive article in Past & Present (1977) and having been greatly influenced by this journal’s emphasis on Social History and on “history from below,” I was ideally positioned to observe how the writing of History has evolved over the past thirty years.

In addition, as a visitor to the École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales several times over the last twenty years, I had the opportunity to sit in Jacques Le Goff’s seminars and to obtain a different perspective on how History was conceived in the late 1970s and 1980s. Le Goff’s influence, the manner in which he—together with other notable French medieval and early modern historians—created a new histoire des mentalités had a deep impact on the historical profession. Like the scholars of Past & Present, many French historians came to the Davis Center at Princeton, and just as many from the United States (a good number from Princeton) and from England went as visitors to the École. In these three centers, a good number of new methodological approaches were tested in the past thirty years. Some were successful and remain the mainstays of our discipline (the New Social History, the History of Mentalities, Anthropological History, Microhistory, etc.; others proved to be passing fads and were soon set aside: Cliometrics, Psychohistory).

History in both the Anglophone world and in the intellectual centers in Paris also faced the great challenge of integrating areas formerly ignored or completely neglected in the past. Topics, such as women, minorities, the “people without history,” presented a challenge to traditional history and, when met, provided a multivocal, multicultural perspective on old historical problems. It was a most appropriate change, and these new areas of historical research have been, on the whole, successfully integrated into the curricula of most of the important History Departments throughout the United States, England, and France.

What is clear, however, is that until around the mid-1980s these historical centers—the Davis Center, the École des Hautes Études, the Past and Present Society—had a disproportionate role in formulating the dominant methodological approach (or approaches) and in selecting the thematic content of that History. Other types of History were being practiced, of course (sometimes within these centers themselves), but most historians recognized the aforementioned types of histories produced in these places as among the leading paradigms of the discipline.

In the past decade, the so-called “Linguistic” or “Cultural turn” (i.e., the challenges of literary theory and Postmodern ideas), has deeply disturbed the historical profession. The topic was explored in a special issue of Speculum (65: 1990), where, above all, Spiegel’s work (1990: 59-86) work was praised by Lawrence Stone (cf. Stone, 1995: 177-190) in Past & Present, thus enshrining her contribution as one of the influential pieces on the debate over literary theory and its role in the making of History. Thus the dominant historical paradigms have given way to a multitude of interpretative strategies. The Davis Center itself no longer commands the central role it enjoyed in the past. The two years in which, under the directorship of Natalie Z. Davis, it examined postcolonialism and postcolonial discourses were fraught with acrimony, and intense debates (e.g., Spivak, 1988; Bhabha, 1994) ensued over the appropriateness of “traditional” historiographies versus the new critical and literary approaches. Some historians argue that these literary and textual approaches are passing fads and that a “new turn” is in the air. They may be correct, but what is clear is that the former sense of confidence with which
Spain. In addition, controversial pieces by Henry Kamen (1998), John Edwards (1996), and others have advanced historiographical and methodological questions of crucial interest to historians of Spain. One cannot deny, therefore, the role of Past & Present in the making of Spanish history, but my point is that within the journal itself, the history of Spain was secondary to other continental histories.

There is, of course, some logic to this neglect. After all, it is not surprising that the English and the French should be mainly concerned with their own national histories. This neglect, however, is most poignant in the United States, with its early ties to Spain, its large Latino population, and its present ties to Latin America. My contention is not that the History of Spain is second to that of England and France, but that in the United States, until very recently, it had truly been marginalized and almost completely absent from the curriculum.

Paradoxically, the waning of methodological paradigms and of influential centers in the United States has perhaps led to a growing interest in the history of medieval Spain, which is now perceived as a multicultural society and, thus, as a model for the present United States. A number of appointments in medieval history—Paul Freedman at Yale, Thomas Bisson at Harvard, and, to a lesser extent, my own at UCLA—hold promise for the renewal of teaching and writing in Spanish history in the United States.

CENTER AND PERIPHERY IN TEACHING AND WRITING ABOUT SPAIN

Several peculiar obstacles to teaching Spanish History in the United States may be noted, and other problems affect the teaching of that history in Spain itself. Although, as mentioned, a few signs suggest that the study and teaching of Spanish History may be turning a corner for the better. The pattern of employment in new jobs in medieval history (and early modern as well) in the United States during 1997 may indicate a promising departure from old patterns, since jobs at Princeton, Stanford, Columbia, Purdue, Kenyon College, UCLA, the University of Kentucky, and others, were filled with scholars working on Spanish topics. This was an unprecedented de-
velopment in the trend of academic employment in History in the United States, and may send a message to universities throughout the country as to the importance of Spain as a field of study. Recently Richard Kagan (1996), in discussing Prescott's paradigm, noted the burgeoning school of American historians of Spain. Whether something concrete will emerge from these developments is still to be seen. But until recently, other national histories, above all those of France and England, have prevailed in American curricula and historiography.

Another issue to be explored is the relation of center and periphery from a pedagogical perspective, and one can question the prominence of Political History at the detriment of other types of History and the spotlight on certain social groups or regions to the neglect of others. These questions can be related to both medieval and early modern Spanish history (the chronological boundaries between the two periods are artificial and certainly of no validity when doing Social History), but most of my examples will be drawn from the medieval world (see the introduction to Ruiz, 1977).

In a recently published collection of medieval sources edited by the well-known (in the United States), and now unfortunately deceased, American medieval historian Warren Hollister (a specialist in English Medieval History), and three of his colleagues and former students (Hollister, Leedon, Meyer, Spear, 1997), we gaze upon a history written and studied almost exclusively from a particular geographical and methodological center. After more than three decades of feminist scholarship, years of cultural and multicultural battles, and the new social history, the histoire des mentalité and history from below promoted by Annales and Past & Present, Hollister and his coeditors remain deeply wedded to political, institutional, and intellectual history—by the latter I mean the "old-fashioned" History of Ideas. They remain committed as well to a geographical terrain which does not wander too far from Paris and London, the learned foci of twelfth-century western medieval Europe and, until recently, the centers of political power in contemporary Europe. Hollister and his coeditors are, of course, not alone. Similar types of History continue to be written in the United States, in Spain, and throughout western Europe. They serve as reminders that we may have exaggerated the impact of innovative methodologies (the influence of Annales or Past & Present) and downplayed the resilience of old historical forms, tied as they were, and are still, to enduring national projects.

What makes this collection so remarkable, to return to my original point, is its dogged determination to give only token representation, very token indeed, to sources that might illuminate the lives of women, of the poor, or of areas other than England and France. To paraphrase Jacques Le Goff, but in a different key, we may call this the "other" Middle Ages.

Hollister et al. are not alone. The general textbooks, including Hollister's own textbook, from which many students in the United States have learned until recently their general knowledge of the Middle Ages, address materials from the geographical and social peripheries of privileged cultures only as adjuncts to their central narrative. What I mean by this is that the history of women, of marginalized social, ethnic, and religious groups, the history of the Mediterranean lands, of Scandinavia, Eastern Europe, and, in our own particular case, the history of medieval or early modern Spain, become excursi, added chapters included now to satisfy political correctness. These diverse "other" histories, however, are never fully integrated into the main narrative. Rather, they appear in the text as additional and segregated chapters, as supplements to a central hegemonic narrative. The main concern of this normative history is to tell the story of those areas and people in the Middle Ages and the early modern period that went on to establish their supremacy over European and the world in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. This is, in many respects, Whiggish history at its very best (or worst), in which the past is seen only as a prelude to an imperial and colonial present.

We are all too familiar with Walter Benjamin's short and beautiful allegory (1969: 257-258) on the angel of History to accept uncritically the march into history of Western powers, or what we have called progress, as the rosy outcome of the past. Another quote from Benjamin deserves full rendering (1969: 256), for it brilliantly encapsulates what I am describing here:

... if one asks with whom the adherents of historicism actually empathize. The answer is inevitable: with the victor. And all the rulers are the heirs of those who conquered before them. Hence, empathy with the victor invariably benefits the rulers. ... Whoever has emerged victorious participates to this day in the triumphal procession in which the present rulers step over those who
teach in the classroom. We make brave attempts to integrate our research and writing into our curriculum, but often fail, or succeed only partially. Although I write exclusively about the kingdom of Castile in the late Middle Ages or, to be more precise, about specific and discreet aspects of that history and within a limited geographical section of the entire kingdom, I have seldom taught any undergraduate course on Spain during my twenty-seven years as a teacher. In introductory courses of the Middle Ages or of the early modern period (which is what many of us essentially teach), we may feel the need not to neglect the "basics," or the master political narratives of Western history: the rise of Christianity, the barbarian invasions, the monastic reform, the Investiture Controversy, the Crusades, the rise of cities, the rise of feudal monarchies, the cultural revival of the twelfth century, and, as a fitting and Whiggish conclusion, the genesis of the nation-state and of modern culture. Consciously or unconsciously, we have privileged and continue to privilege one kind of history and one kind of people over other kinds—and dare I add?—one class, or social group, over another. The accomplishments of the University of Paris or Salamanca, the Romance of the Rose, or the writings of Erasmus meant absolutely nothing and would not have any kind of impact on their lives, until this very day, for generations of peasants in medieval and early modern Europe, who made up probably more than 90 percent of the population in the twelfth century and later as much as 80 percent of the population. The transactions of kings and popes and learned scholars pale when compared to the peasants' vital need for rain and good crops and their scant hope of relief from the unending brutality and horror of their daily lives. A very good example of how we have neglected the voices from below is the recent and moving book by Thomas N. Bisson (1998) which vividly captures what it was like to be an oppressed peasant in rural Catalonian. Most of the brutality and horror, one should add, was inflicted by powerful ecclesiastical or lay lords (cf., Freedman, 1991: esp. Chapters 4-6). Yet, our descriptions of the social order begin (at least most textbooks do) by examining those on top. In the tripartite division of society, textbooks and teachers start with the knights, follow with the clergy, and end with the peasants, which, in terms of Social History, is like putting the cart before the horse.

In addition, we—or let me say, I—fail to teach what we know and write about because teaching materials are nonexistent. The Univer-

are lying prostrate . . . the spoils are carried along in the procession. They are called cultural treasures [which] owe their existence not only to the efforts of the great minds and talents who have created them, but also to the anonymous toil of their contemporaries. There is no document of civilization which is not at the same time a document of barbarism.

In short, history is written by victors to justify the legacies of their victories. Spain, the victim of catastrophic military defeats in the seventeenth and in the late nineteenth centuries, and long mired (until its recent economic rebirth) in economic stagnation and political isolation, has only begun to find its way into the dominant historical trends in the past ten to fifteen years. Moreover, if we are going to be really Whiggish historians, then we should be studying the history of medieval Spain. After all, from 1494 almost to the defeat of the Spanish tercios at Rocroi in 1643, Spain was truly the world's first superpower. Moreover, Spain and Italy, neglected orphans at the table of History through great segments of their national past, hold more promise today as industrial nations and appear to be moving far more successfully into the next century than England, deeply entrenched as it has been, until recently, in endless social, political, and economic turmoil. To wit, Spain successfully dealt with its outbreaks of regional conflict a decade ago, a problem which Great Britain is only now beginning to tackle.

For all this, however, I am not advocating a dismissal of the canonical sources in medieval or early modern historiography. I certainly would not wish to teach from a reader or textbook that did not include excerpts from Aquinas, Dante, or Descartes, that ignored Paris for the sake of Prague or even Madrid, or that gave short shrift to Martin Luther for the sake of Martin Guerre. We should have the latter without forgetting the former. How, then, are we to accomplish this, and what are the obstacles in our path?

TEACHING THE CENTER FROM THE PERIPHERIES

It is obvious to all of us that a wide gulf often exists between what we write and publish as scholars—that is, between the research we do, the books we read, the kind of methodologies we follow, aimed as they often are at a select and narrow audience—and the History we
sity of Pennsylvania Press recently published a collection of primary sources on Iberian Medieval History which have been translated into English. Edited by Olivia Constable (1997), the book contains material from Iberian Islamic, Jewish, and Christian sources. They are the first English-language foray into the cultural, religious, ethnic, and political history of medieval Spanish kingdoms. As commendable as this enterprise is, however, note that we have had to wait until the eve of the new millennium for such a tool to become available for teaching. Until recently, almost no sources, except literary ones, were available to teach undergraduates about Spanish history in the United States. We still lack a similar collection of sources which would help illustrate the history of early modern or modern Spain.

**THE PARADIGM OF CENTER AND PERIPHERY**

As the French structuralists and deconstructionists have argued, we are prisoners of language, and that by employing and accepting such concepts as center and periphery, we are already admitting to a hierarchy, not only in terms of culture and historical significance, but, far more important, in terms of power. That is, we posit one civilization, ethnic or religious group as superior to others, as having achieved or produced a “better” culture, as having more political power, as being a center having a periphery. Why should Paris, one should ask, be a center to a Spanish periphery? It can only be so if we look at history and the world from the perspective of Paris. But it is not so, if we look at medieval and early modern history from the perspective of Córdoba—which by the year 1000 was a highly civilized place, a center for higher learning, while Paris still endured a rough village life—or from the perspective of Madrid in the late sixteenth century, when it was truly the political and military capital of the Western world. Our new medieval and early modern history, all History, has to set aside some of these cultural, geographical, and political hierarchies and attempt to bring out an integrated vision of the Middle Ages and the early modern period from a variety of perspectives.

To restate the case, History as presently taught and written throughout most of the United States and in many parts of Europe is done from the perspective, often the exclusive perspective, of Paris, London, and, sometimes, in the case of cultural history, of northern Italy or Tuscany. We have to stop thinking of some historical entities as centers and others as peripheries. Doing so results in the demotion of important aspects of Europe’s history to secondary causes, while other, less influential developments are promoted by virtue of location or association with privileged locations.

**LOCAL, REGIONAL, AND NATIONAL HISTORIES**

The flip side of the emphasis on one region over others or of the formulation of History as center and periphery, when treating European History as a whole, is the narrow focus on one specific area without reference to or comparison with others. From the perspective of someone who does not live or teach in Spain, the History of Spain as taught and written from within Spain itself often seems utterly parochial, as historians in autonomous regions turn inward to the exploration and construction of their own historical peculiarities and ideologically motivated analyses of the local past. Such is the case throughout Spain, where it is difficult to find anyone studying or writing the history of a region or town other than the one in which she/he was born in and consequently studied. By emphasizing one’s own local past and ignoring everyone else’s history—or, worse, by seeing the other’s history in competitive terms—and by descending into the most ferocious microhistorical analysis (without the vision of well done Microhistory), historians of autonomous regions, cities, or neighborhoods neglect the broader vision of the whole and the interaction and linking of one region’s history with that of its neighbors (Amelang, 1995: II, 307-312).

I am not here advocating at all that we turn our back on Microhistory or Local History—which happen to be two very different types of History. The contributions of both methodological approaches to the development of historical thought in the past thirty years have been significant indeed. The works of Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie (1975), Carlo Ginzburg (1996), Natalie Z. Davis (1983), Giovanni Levi (1990), and others are sufficient evidence of the manner in which local and microhistorical studies can illuminate an entire world. I, for one, have spent most of my life as a researcher working on local or regional history, mostly either the history of Burgos or that
of Old Castile, so that I have a very healthy respect and commitment to microhistorical analysis.

My objections lie in another direction. They are twofold. First, Local and Regional History, as often practiced in Spain today, seldom establishes ties to a wider world or presents historical evidence within a comparative framework. Local history becomes isolated from the historical context and, as such, unintelligible to a wider audience or of any real interest to other historians writing their own local or regional histories. There is no exchange of ideas or transfer of knowledge or methodologies. My second objection is a more fundamental one. It addresses the ideological context in which local histories are written in Spain, or, for that matter, in other European countries and even in the United States. I realize that in many respects local and regional studies are a healthy reaction to decades of brutal centralizing of national projects. The latter, I would add, are as bad as the former. The long tradition of national historiography and the emphasis on and idealization of the national state as the apex of human political development have already led us—and continue to lead us, as witnessed by recent events in the Balkans or in Kashmir—to recurrent human suffering and to utter destruction. Nonetheless, as presently practiced in many History Departments throughout Spain, local history focuses exclusively on the radical construction or reconstruction of local identities and communities, on their glorious and particular pasts. It privileges the local patria over other local patrias and, above all, over the centralized nation. One could say, without exaggeration, that there are no peripheries, but rather a multitude of centers, often unconnected. That would be good, except that these newly instituted centers see other localities as peripheral to themselves or, worse, as nonexistent. Local histories thus build their own peripheries in the construction of local mythologies. The proliferation of local and regional histories is also promoted by banks (Cajas de Ahorro) and civic institutions (municipalities, provincial Diputaciones). Books and journals produced by local publishers are bought by local elites, displayed proudly in local bookstores and seldom have any impact beyond the immediate region. In an ideal world, a Catalan historian would be writing the history of Castile and vice versa. A postgraduate student in Valladolid might be doing his research in Valencia or, better yet, in another part of Europe.

But, then, realistically, what prospects are there of moving upward in the academic hierarchy of a Spanish university, if historians were to follow this course? A very good example of this is Hilario Casado Alonso (1987), one of the outstanding young medievalists in Spain and, one could say, in the world. His work has progressed from local to regional to transnational economic history. In his monumental study of maritime insurance, which is deeply grounded in local history, he has opened new ways of understanding international trade and social life across national boundaries, which is exemplary of regional history placed within a broad historiographical context, and his most recent and ongoing work on the Bermuy family—which traces the family throughout Europe—or his maritime insurance project which examines Burgos, Flemish, and French localities. This work is of great interest to many of us abroad, including some historians who do not work directly on Spanish history and who do not read Spanish. He should be rewarded for the excellence of his work, but not unlike the great Antonio Domínguez Ortiz who toiled in a high school, Casado Alonso teaches in an empresarial school. In this context one might undertake a survey of research practices and academic employment in Spanish universities to determine what types of History are rewarded by employment, tenure, and promotion, and which are not.

OVERTURNING CENTER-BASED HISTORIES

Comparison of Córdoba or Baghdad in the ninth, tenth, and even the fabled twelfth centuries with Paris, London, or even a Christian city in northern Spain would come as a severe shock to most of our students reared on an orientalized vision of Islam and on the hegemonic culture of the West. The same result could be had if we were to compare Burgos with Zaragoza, Seville with Valencia, or Bilbao and Cádiz. To be effective, this comparison, however, would have to be more than a passing reference to Córdoba's greatness, to Baghdad's magnificence, or to Barcelona's commercial life which the students might conveniently forget or set aside. Rather, it would have to provide detailed descriptions of these other worlds and a full contextualizing of historical developments. In some respects, I am advocating a kind of Comparative History (cf., Stone, 1997; Elliot, 1998).
There are various other kinds of center/periphery hierarchies to be considered. Hegemonic cultures have their centers and their peripheries; neglected cultures have them as well. There are geographical, social, and economic peripheries and centers. Of geographical hierarchies, think of the general history of Spain which has often been told and written almost exclusively from the perspective of Castile in the Middle Ages, or of Madrid in the early modern period. This is a history which, with few exceptions, has also been presented from the point of view of hegemonic groups. How very different the history of all of Spain in the sixteenth century would read, if it were written from the perspective of Catalonia, Galicia, or México.

The other center/margin dynamic is social. For all the lip service paid to Social History, seldom are our students engaged in the history of the lower social groups—peasants, urban workers—or of marginal groups, even though marginality has its alluring qualities and plays well in the classroom. A good number of recent books serve as models of what and how we could be teaching our students. By placing the story in a comparative framework, these books enable the study of important issues in medieval history from a diversity of social and geographical perspectives. David Nirenberg’s exciting recent book *Communities of Violence* (1996) exemplifies multiperspectival history at its best. It focuses on intransigent violence between Muslims, Christians, and Jews in fourteenth-century Aragon, with a comparative excursus across the Pyrenees. A tour de force, Nirenberg’s book brings to light the complex world of religious beliefs, sectarian antagonisms, compromise, and violence. It is history written from below and from a so-called geographic periphery; yet, it is very good history, gripping, moving, with a new way of seeing and portraying the other Middle Ages. Students even in introductory courses will be delighted with such books and will leave our classrooms with a completely different feel for the Middle Ages, for medieval Iberia, and, by extension, for their own world than they will from reading the description of the coronation of Charlemagne for the umpteenth time, or yet another account of the court of Louis XIV.

**CONCLUSION**

A brief summary of my key points may drive them home. A new Social History must examine historical transformations from a variety of perspectives and voices. The history of late medieval and early modern Spain has already made important strides in this direction, as the works of David Nirenberg (1996), Richard Kagan (1998), Sarah Nalle (1992), and others have shown, and as a whole cohort of young Spanish historians become interested in the history of women, marginal groups, and other issues. More still needs to be done in this respect. Such histories must transform and ultimately supersede the master narrative of Spanish history if they are to serve any purpose at all.

Finally, addressing specifically the teaching and writing of the history of Spain in the United States—although this is relevant to the teaching of history in Spain as well—I have attempted to critique the privileging of certain countries, regions, and social groupings and the neglect of others. In the United States, until recently, the history of Spain has not been given the attention that is given to other national histories, even though large segments of the population of the country are of Hispanic, i.e., Latin American, birth or descent. This is also the case in Spain, where the privileging of local history leads to ignorance of other regions. Broader, more inclusive histories and comparative approaches, such as those undertaken by Sir John H. Elliott (1996) in his magisterial book on Richelieu and Olivares, in which the histories of France and Spain are given equal weight, are the only remedy for this long-lasting malady. Finally, much work is still needed to make the tools of history—new editions and translations of documents, textbooks, and the like—accessible to our students, as we construct a New History for a new millennium.

**NOTE**

1. As I was revising this article, I received news of the death of Lawrence Stone, a distinguished participant in 1993 of Historia à Debate. His influence as a historian and as a teacher has been extraordinary. I owe him a great debt for the many years in which his example kept my faith in History alive.

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Writing and Teaching Medieval and Early Modern Spanish History


Chapter 6

The History of Historiography:
Retrospective Analysis and Research

Gonzalo Pasamar Alzuria

The “history of Historiography” is a classical subject whose importance most historians recognize, but whatever consensus exists among them, although the expression—euphonic and complex at the same time—hardly facilitates change. Its growing prestige materialized in 1980 with the creation of a Commission of History of Historiography within the International Congress of Historical Sciences (CIISH) which met in the Romanian capital where the well-known journal Storia della Storiografia is published and several international conferences about Historiography have been convened. This acknowledgement, which goes back to the early decades of this century, has its origin in the objective proclaimed by its scholars, namely, studying the discipline of historical writing and historians themselves. This may seem obvious now but was far from being well established given that the old term historiography has long been known for its semantic imprecision. Remember that the expression history of Historiography owes its meaning to two interpretations of the term historiography in circulation during the nineteenth century: (1) the
German *Geschichtsschreibung*, which could be rendered as "historical writing," and (2) the French sense of *historiographie* as "literary history of history books," as seen in the 1887 supplement of Émile Littré's *Dictionnaire de la langue française*.

It would be erroneous, however, to mistake this general regard with the hallmark of a clearly established research domain. Its intellectual foundation and familiarity are quite transparent. The main cause of this stems paradoxically from the fact that historians themselves are the objects of research and the subject of their writings. Many of the common assumptions surrounding this subject matter have their origin not just in the mere assumption of the conclusions reached by literary people and philosophers, but also, and possibly more important, the need for identity and reflection by historians on themselves. The main concepts and representation of historical writings and the agenda of their authors are so closely linked to ideal images through which the profession looks at itself that more difficulties and misunderstandings are seen than advantages when engaging in in-depth research.

Everyone concerned with presenting this field as worthy of scholarly consideration has underlined this characteristic in one way or another, namely, its proximity to the "professional memory" of historians themselves (although many have felt satisfied with epistemological arguments only). Benedetto Croce (1965: 135-146), a pioneer in reflection on the purpose of a history of Historiography, attributed its importance to the "contemporaneity" of the researcher's intellectual operations (what he called "history as an act of thinking"). Canadian Serge Gagnon (1973: 399-408), in another groundbreaking 1970s paper, found the main motivation for that curiosity to be the proliferation of "relativist" or "subjectivist" assumptions among leading contemporary historians. Charles-Olivier Carbonell (1993), a renowned specialist, defended a similar thesis in the presentation of *Storia della Storiografia* when he claimed that the contradictory and antagonist influences of Croce, Marxism, and the *nouvelle histoire* "have led to the relativization of historical knowledge, and consequently to the need for an evolving knowledge." Widening the range of influences, Antonio Nifo (1986: 395-417) points in the same direction; his was the first recently published paper in Spain that has seen in this subject matter a new field of research. On the other hand, historian José Carlos Bermejo (1994: 197-216) reflects on the Philosophy of History, moving away from the idea that the "subjectivism" of certain historians of the twentieth century (e.g., Noriel, 1997: 15-50, 101, 168) has activated this interest in the history of Historiography.

In the study of contemporary Historiography specifically, that realization has important implications. The multiplication in both quantity and quality of professional historians in the Western world over past years has raised unprecedented levels of interest in investigating themselves, as well as their interest in methods of diagnosis and innovation, as suggested by Noriel (1997). Hence, an internationally accepted terminology has been recognized to acknowledge the present and future of the discipline, which suggests the existence of "turns," "returns," and even "U turns," or breaks in the intellectual avenues followed by historians, if as their direction were always linear. As these criteria are open to retrospective analysis, they have inevitably become part of the repertoire of the historian of Historiography, thus making axiomatic a number of assumptions about which exists a profound disparity of opinions. To underline such antagonism in describing the vicissitudes of historiography over the past decades, note the frequently mentioned recent controversies in Germany—eloquent but surprising in their virulence. Thus, the proponents of a "History of Society" (*Geschichtschaftsgeschichte*) presented themselves in the 1970s as spearheading a "paradigm" which enshrined new issues, such as the structure of social classes and their relationship to domestic politics—all deliberately and sometimes elaborately conceptualized. In turn, the paradigm was sometimes substituted for the old notion of the preeminence of foreign policy, which in turn is descriptive, unable to penetrate the most important aspects of contemporary German Social History, and hence it was doomed to disappear because of its lack of effectiveness as a paradigm (Lipp, 1990: 69-70, outlines such controversy with references to chief protagonists). For these historians, the appearance of proponents of "micro" perspectives who justified a history of "everyday life" (*Alltagsgeschichte*) was a capricious and suspiciously resurrected but superseded von Rankian assumption or, worse, a "soup of bubbles," according to Hans Ulrich Wehler. If the aforementioned analysis of the decline of Historicism has already been the object of a critique (e.g., Jörn Rüsse), the assessment of the meaning of "microhistory" has also exposed discrepancies within its proponents (Veit-Brause, 1990: 52-53). The latter were seen as the result of a new political culture and the confrontation
with the "guild" of historians (Zunft) endowed with hierarchic features, rigid control over their succession, and a tendency to monopolize publishing.

SITUATIONAL OVERVIEW

Consider the peculiarity which places the history of Historiography between retrospective analysis (rather than exploratory analysis) and research. Consult my review elsewhere of the growing literature about this subject (Pasamar, 1995: 49-57; cf. Tollenbeek, 1994: 59-81; and for Spain in particular, Olábarri, 1987: 122-138; Poiró 1996: 22-26). The modern interest in Historiography was born among the historians and professional scholars of the past century who developed source criticism and the major criteria of authority. In this endeavor genealogies of masters and disciples appeared together with analyses, past and present, of their contributions and influence on the discipline. Leopold von Ranke, for instance, included an appendix to his History of the Latin and Teutonic Nations from 1494 to 1514 (1824), under the title A Critique of Modern Historians (Zur Kritik neuerer Geschichtsschreiber). As a "history of erudition" or in the sense given by Littre, Historiography was intensely investigated throughout the nineteenth century. Associated with "historical bibliography," it reached its height in the Romance world in the well-known treatment of Charles Victor Langlois, in his Manuel de Bibliographie historique (1901-1904) with considerable attention to the particular "histories of historical studies," although he denied that this constituted a discipline comparable to focci on classical antiquity or the national history of a country (Langlois, 1968: 229-239). The main works of Spanish scholar and bibliographer at the Center for Historical Research Benito Sánchez Alonso are also a case in point: between the 1920s and 1940s he attempted to differentiate the "historical bibliography" (which in Library Science and Bibliography became the history of books and printing) from the "history of Historiography," without giving it more than ancillary status (Sánchez Alonso, 1927: vi). The former he considered supportive of the modern historical research, citing the "witty distinction by B. Croce between 'contemporary history' and the 'chronicle.' " For the latter he reserved the French sense of a "mere branch of literary history" whose aim was to "draw the general picture of historical production, establish its appearance and stages, point out how the different historiographic species appear and which characteristics are favoured in each of the successive periods" (Sánchez Alonso, 1943: 187).

The term history of Historiography, however, had made its appearance at the beginning of the century as an attempt to clarify the seemingly convoluted term history of History, when the History profession began to change with its spread beyond the French-German framework and its enrichment with new perspectives. The retrospective aspect would be soon joined by that of relativism or interpretation in the context of existing notions. The characteristics of the classical Geschichte der neueren Historiographie by the Swiss historian Eduard Fueter (1911)—the most important of those early books—illustrate perfectly those beginnings. According to this historian's biographer (Peyer, 1985: v-xv), this groundbreaking book looked at historians from Petrarch to Jacob Burckhardt (who incidentally had taught his uncle, Heinrich Gelzer, also a historian). Furthermore, he sought to make this kind of study independent from the purely ancillary and erudite activities in which it was embedded, but without turning it into a detailed study of the philosophies of these History treatise writers. He endeavored in his own works "to observe the books of the historians in themselves" in a wide perspective, as well as to treat "the major avenues" followed by "the major historians" without neglecting specialists in Church, Legal, or Literary History. The Swiss historian had not followed German Historicism, although he had been a student between 1896 and 1898 at the University of Berlin. His family environment and his studies, which he continued in turn-of-the-century Paris and London, made Fueter open to new approaches but had prevented him from teaching at the University of Göttingen. He was interested in Economic and Social History, and his concern for the work of historians who had provided synthesis and were attentive to the great processes of History is evident in Fueter's own work, but his historiographic contributions were cut short by an early death in 1928.

After Fueter, the history of Historiography has taken on an independent momentum thanks to the indefinite and miscellaneous versions of Intellectual History in the first quarter of the twentieth century. Their common cause was to avoid merely the concise narration of political events. Arnaldo Momigliano (1993: 11-14), the most renowned European specialist in the subject until the 1970s, remarked...
that the origin of his curiosity went back to the 1940s in Oxford (1939-1948), where he had exiled after studying and teaching at the universities of Turin and Rome. It was provoked by contact with different European traditions of Intellectual History: the Italian, the British, and especially the German Ideengeschichte. Moreover, this was where at the same time reassessment of Freidrich Meinecke’s ideas (1936; 1946) about Historicism was undertaken. Momigliano had arrived in Oxford as yet another Ancient History scholar, but his contact with exiled German intellectual circles and his visits to the Warburg Institute, not to mention the Italian influence of Croce and De Sanctis (Murray, 1991: 52-54), persuaded him that “the unavoidable corollary of historicism is the history of Historiography as a way of expressing the awareness that historical problems constitute in themselves a history” (see Christ, 1991: 11). More modestly, pioneering Spanish historians, like Santiago Montero Díaz or Juan José Carreras Ares, who investigated in the 1940s-1950s the historiography of Ancient and Medieval History, owe much to such Intellectual History movements (Pasamar and Peiró, 1999). In the French case, specialists agree that these new themes have appeared very late: Fueter’s “personal reading” of Georges Lefebvre in his Notions d’historiographie in 1946 is considered an isolated case.2 Such delay, thought Carbonell (1976: 47), was related closely with the notion that Historiography was a domain in Literature. Remember that Philippe Ariès, a great historian of Historiography, wrote his major essays in the late 1940s and early 1950s, when they went almost unnoticed. He was an “amateur historian,” as he called himself, of Catholic and monarchic origin and an admirer of Lucien Febvre and Marc Bloch (Chartier, 1988: 20-25).

In the United States, however, Intellectual History received considerable attention and enjoyed a prestige among professional historians unknown to Europe, so that it is no coincidence that some of the most prominent specialists in Historiography hail from that country. In the collective volume Historical Studies Today, which shows the state of Western Historiography to 1972, Felix Gilbert (1972: 142, 144) acknowledged, in his references to “the history of History” under the heading of “Intellectual History,” that the relevance of his curiosity traced back to historian and sociologist Harry E. Barnes, the author of the 1937 classic History of Historical Writing (Hankins, 1974: 702-703). This subject matter is today represented by SUNY at Buffalo’s professor Georg G. Iggers, whose classic book in 1968 about “the German conception of history” from Herder’s time to the period following World War II is well known. He has promoted debates and inspired many studies in Historiography, and he currently co-edits Storia della Storiografia.

Historiography studies did not gain momentum, however, until the 1970s. It was only during this decade that they began to appear as a proper field of investigation. The changes in the profession seem to have been a major cause of transformation; they included a double set of factors.

The first originated in the tensions and the search for topics within the group of American “intellectual historians.” As Gérard Noriel (1997: 131-132) pointed out, many of these historians in the 1970s sought an alternative from focusing on Social History and other Social Sciences (the second edition of Thomas S. Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions [1970] had just been published), or held their ground by turning to linguistic methods (i.e., what later was called the “linguistic turn”). The effect on scholars in Historiography was immediate and essentially consisted of divergent lines of research. The one emphasized the use of sociological criteria in the analysis of historians of the past and their writings, so that contemporary historiography revealed itself as a process of creation of scientific and professional communities, with attendant appearance, consolidation, and change in paradigms. The other focused on the same subject matter but with analysis of the figures of speech used by past historians. In the first case, the following studies deserve a mention: William J. Keylor (1974) on the appearance of the French historiographic profession during the years of the Third Republic; Leonard Krieger’s intellectual biography (1977) of Ranke as the first “professional historian”; and Iggers’s book (1975) on “historical paradigms” after World War II. In the second case, Hayden White’s famous Metahistory has paved the way for a number of research projects studying the language of the past century’s French historians, like those of Lionel Gossman (1976) on Augustin Thierry or that of Linda Orr (1976) on Jules Michelet.

The second set of factors has its origin in the emergence and the transformation in the 1970s of the historical discipline in Europe when, following different paths, Social History opened a diversity of problems in Political, Intellectual, Literary, and Science History.
which previously had remained the concern of these special genres. It was during that decade when Historiography began to be perceived as a genuine domain of research or, as one of its greatest proponents, Charles-Olivier Carbonell (1981), pointed out in the first issue of *Storia della Storiorafia* (1981: 7), "a specific, autonomous, enriching and fascinating discipline." The phenomenon should be attributed directly to the publication of two important studies: Carbonell’s *Histoire et historiens: Une mutation idéologique des historiens français, 1865-1885* (1976) and Bernard Guenée’s *Histoire et culture historique dans l’Occident Médiéval* (1980).

Undoubtedly, these works have meant a turning point in historiographic studies. Both illustrate the great complexity of the world of historians in the past, the existence of a diversity of domains and of writers of History in the periods covered by their studies, but they also open the door to the "historical culture," that is, the success of books in terms of readers in the case of medievalist Guenée, or in Carbonell’s the change in historical opinion regarding the Franco-Prussian War. Key problems are addressed: in Guenée’s case (1980: 68-73), to what extent the writing of History in medieval times would have fortement some features of modern erudition; and in the case of Carbonell (1976: 326-327, 330-331, 410-413), the appearance of modern historical schools.

Despite these studies, the recent development in France of this subject matter does not originate exclusively in the mere imitation of research models. Carbonell was isolated without followers for a long time (Grell, 1993: 10). Where does, then, this growing concern about historiographic subjects originate? Among other factors, from the growing trend of professional "self-inquiry" occurring over the past decade and which has surfaced in the heated debates on the future of *Nouvelle histoire*, or New History, as reflected, for instance, in the controversial books by Hervé Coutau-Bégarie and François Dossé (discussed by Barros, 1991: 83-111), or the attempt to reassess national history and its “places of the memory,” which is the argument François Hartog (1988: 18) uses in his analysis of the work of Fustel de Coulanges. Scholars are divided between a majority concerned about historiographic debate and a minority devoted to researching the history of Historiography. *Mutatis mutandis*, the situation in Spain is closer than usually believed to what happens in other countries. As Peiró (1997) confirms, a marked interest or concern (depending on one’s viewpoint) can be discerned in historiographic reflection, exemplified by more scholars working in Historiography.

The recent changes in the journal *Storia della Storiorafia* (from issue 19: 1991 onward) provide additional evidence of the increasing regard for "self-inquiry" as an international tendency in the discipline. That issue’s editorial claimed that, although the journal has always focused on the historical practice than on the debate over methodology and the philosophy of history and it has pledged to "maintain this specific characteristic," there is also a wish to "open up the journal to the general study of the interpretations, historiographic tendencies and schools as well as methodological and theoretical discussions" (editors George Igers and Edoardo Tortarolo, 1991: 3).

**CONCEPTUALIZATION**

Given this scenario, discussion about the concepts used by historiographic scholars cannot be postponed further. To serve this purpose two different definitions of the history of Historiography may be proposed: one which places it in the field of Intellectual History, and a second which considers it a Sociology of Science. Such characterization as perfectly differentiated phenomena may be a theoretical exercise only; such a clear distinction is not common among researchers. The trajectory of this discipline shows, rather than the strategic search for "epistemologic models," a more complicated discovery of research strains attendant with anxieties and dissatisfaction in the profession. The usefulness of such discussion could well be to indicate that some of the common assumptions in past Historiography have originated from these two orientations and still ally with them.

The first classification as Intellectual History gives priority to the History of Ideas in the wider sense of the term and focuses on the three components that receive different emphasis by different authors: (1) erudition and the historical method; (2) philosophical premises; and (3) literary genres. Benedetto Croce (1965: 140-144) has been seen as the proponent par excellence of this orientation because he identified the history of Historiography with "the development of historiographic thinking" in his *Teoria e estoria della storiografia*. 
Greek times, based on what had been seen or heard. Such change in belief was requisite for a number of perceptions of time in “profane history” from the Renaissance onward.

The notions of space, time, or causation, among others, as schemata that allow historians to make sense of content in the sources deserve special attention on the part of historiographic scholars, as José Carlos Bermejo (1994: 211-212) points out. Research into these notions should be conducted within the historiographic method, taking into account the historians concerned, together with their political and intellectual ideas. Remember the critique by Jaspers (1942: 31-34) of Friedrich Meinecke’s study on the genesis of Historicism. This book belongs to the Ideengeschichte school characteristic of the approach to the theory and history of Historiography by some early twentieth-century German philosophers and historians. This German writer sought to redefine the assumptions of Historicism traceable to the appearance of the notion of “historical individuality” as a necessary response to the limitations of the mechanistic thinking during the Enlightenment. Apart from the classical nature of the work, its contents have proven equivocal and unsatisfactory as it leaves aside the antirevolutionary ideological and conservative features opposing Hegelian philosophy so characteristic of that doctrine about History. Historicism could not be understood outside the political and academic context or Germany’s Vormärz, where it appeared.

In studies and references to nineteenth-century historiography, common assumptions and misunderstandings are closely associated with the need for identity in the profession. This happens when this century’s historians approach historical writings from the previous century in terms from the history of literature and philosophy, such as the usually pejorative use of “Romantic” or “Positivist.” The term Romantic as an aesthetic and intellectual attitude loses in precision what it gains in amplitude. It enables one to consider on the same level Walter Scott’s historical novels, Chateaubriand’s essays, the writings of the doctrinaire politician and historian Prosper de Barante, who was fond of medieval chronicles, or the research and commentaries by Augustin Thierry, also inspired by chronicles, but who concentrated on methodology, or such work as that of Jules Michelet, a polyhistorian in the multiple sense of the nineteenth century (e.g., a philosopher, moralist, professor, narrator, scholar, and political agitator) (cf. Fueter, 1985: 442-461; Reizow, 1956, cited by Knibiehler,
1973: 44, 51, 106; and Tréver-Roper, 1969: 6-21, speaking about Scott but also B. G. Niebuhr, Ranke, and Thomas Macaulay in the same context). Such removal of context ignores completely what those historians thought of themselves. In Latinate countries by mid-nineteenth century, most important historians considered themselves part of the old eighteenth-century abstraction of the “Republic of Letters” and did not possess the notion of a “historical school.” They defined themselves instead by concrete aspects like political opinion, their rhetoric, or the importance attributed to erudition (Pasamar, 1994: 190-196).

Similar reservations can be applied to the notion of “positivist historiography.” If Positivism is understood as a general conception of scientific knowledge or a “system of positive philosophy,” Langlois and Seignobos themselves may be considered positivists par excellence. They (Langlois and Seignobos, 1972: 160-161) were critical of Fustel de Coulanges’s evocation of scientific-like metaphors and warned against the temptation of imitating the method of Biologic Science. Misunderstanding is even greater if by “Positivism” we mean a naïve understanding of events applicable to historians other than the French, like Ranke, whom Benedetto Croce (1965: 234-235) dismissed with just such a label. Nor does the term positivist historicism work any better (Colomines and Olmos, 1998: 17). Historical work and its branches do not mesh with the application of mere categories originating in the Philosophy of History. When nineteenth-century German historians spoke of Historismus or “Historicism,” they were speaking about a historical school, not of a philosophical school. When late nineteenth-century French historians invoked the “positive knowledge” of facts, they considered it one of the keys of historical method, but not the only one. However, the importance attributed to the profession and historical method led them to identify themselves as an école méthodique. Carbonell (1976: 401-408) does not exaggerate when wondering about the existence of Positivism in nineteenth-century France; he questioned the existence of a group of historians who could unequivocally be characterized as positivist. Something similar occurs in late nineteenth-century Spanish historiography. Few historians adopted genuinely “positivist” thinking in the philosophical sense of the term: perhaps only Antonio Rodríguez Villa as a young scholar, when he wrote for the early issues of the journal Revista de Archivos, Bibliotecas y Museos in its first series; the former Krausian Manuel Sales y Ferré, the first chair of Sociology at the Universidad Central (1899-1911); or the Aragonese Arabist Julián Ribera, for a very brief period at the turn of the past century. The remaining historians, either out of their Krausist influence or their Catholicism, considered metaphysics positively but they did not consider it a central concern of their profession. They saw themselves believing, however, that “we have reached a positive epoch,” as expressed in 1897 in the conservative Revista de Archivos, Bibliotecas y Museos (Peiró and Pasamar, 1996: 186).

The use of criteria from the Philosophy of History to characterize Historiography, far from having receded, has accentuated recently the need for reflection on certain historians and epistemologists. Evidence of this is the use of the term postmodern historiography to gauge the discipline by examining its current vicissitudes. The staunchest proponent of this is Dutch specialist in the Philosophy of History F. R. Ankersmit (1989: 1990), who contends that Historiography has adopted a trajectory with the main features of postmodern culture, materialized in constant flux of information about and scepticism toward the great scientific certainties of our time. Thus, the impressive emergency of historical writing over the past decades would have had the effect of annulling the impression of reality that historical texts and writing have traditionally transmitted. That mixture between language and reality, concludes Ankersmit, would have returned Historiography to the realm of Literature; although it may have been considered scientific in past decades, today it seems to survive only by unravelling the differences in “literary style” distinguishing historians from each other. This interpretation, which most historians think owes much to Hayden White’s notion of “historical imagination,” is based on a vision of the discipline that has little to do with the historian’s job and its current situation. This leads him, among other confusions and mistakes, to ignore the capacity of historical methodology to transmit certainties about past events, and this line of argument exaggerates, in turn, the importance of language differences among historians and historical schools that in some cases reflect different strategies and professional identities but do not prevent agreement on the veracity and validity of certain historical interpretations. Finally, the supposition that changes in Historiography are exclusively based on the explicit will of historians, regardless of erudite traditions, public opinion, or prevalent ideologies, is unlikely
(see the exchange between Ankersmit [1989: 275-296] and British historian Pérez Zagorin [1990: 263-274]). Ankersmit’s argument, even to a greater extent than that of Hayden White, makes the history of Historiography an exercise in literary theory and criticism.

The understanding of Historiography as a Sociology of Science is much more recent. Such generic reference can be found in some of the most important essays in past decades that purport to go beyond Intellectual History or to justify their own methods of research. Carbonell (1976: 63-65), for instance, introduces classifications of and statistics about historians and historical writings while maintaining that “historiography should be studied from a sociological point of view.” However, he hardly devotes time to indicating the sources of that perspective. However, Canadian Serge Gagnon (1973: 508-515) provides one of the first and most important glosses on the sociological approach to understanding the history of Historiography. He proposes a wide range of tasks, such as reconstructing the environment in which historians work; making an inventory of the “social frameworks of memory” (i.e., studying images and the historical symbols); and examining the ideological value of History. However, he completely rules out the possibility of discerning the truthfulness of historical interpretations of the past and argues for abstention of “the relevant problems of epistemology.” This thesis can be traced back to the “naturalist” Sociology of Knowledge of American writers who, according to such authors as David Bloor (1976), should “be impartial of truth or falsehood, rationality or irrationality, success and failure” (cited in Pereyra, 1984: 168).

The greatest influence among those who have researched the social context of historians’ work has undoubtedly been the Kuhnian study on “scientific revolutions.” Thomas Kuhn (1962) was concerned mainly with the success and failure of scientific views. Its appeal, as scholars have pointed out (Hollinger, 1973: 375-378), lies in its notion of “historical development,” which implies an acknowledgment of the ability and the experience to organize any given activity—the opposite to any teleological vision of change. His speaking of “scientific communities” and “paradigms” is not only part of the current terminology in most reflection on History as a discipline, but it has also inspired historians in Historiography. William R. Keylor (1975: 14-15, 88, 242), for instance, in his study on the appearance of the History profession in France contradicts Kuhnian conclusions several times, but acknowledges that Kuhn was an interesting read that had led him to explore other social and scientific developments in History. Igers (1984: 5-6, 25-26, 31-32) remarks about Kuhn similarly in New Direction in European Historiography.

Kuhnian influences have been enriched ever since the 1970s with other crosscurrents, such as those Americans in Sociology studying professionalization or the contributions of the multifaceted French author Pierre Bourdieu (1972). The main achievement of such sociological research has been to identify the “profession” in the work of the modern historian, the appearance and development of which has played a reciprocal part in the development of teaching and research institutions with their academic titles, journals, and conferences. History is now a profession which shares standards and generic features with other professions.

Probably American Leonard Krieger is the most important historian inspired by Sociology in this regard, especially in light of his well-known book (1977) on Leopold von Ranke. This work poses the question of the origin of this German historian’s fame as the supposed originator of “modern historical science.” Krieger (1977: 1-9) answers the question by citing the capacity of the father of Historicism to bring together different notions on the method and interpretation of History, which were already known but were disperse, to form a “paradigm that may be communicated to the whole of the profession as a distinctive element of identity.” According to Krieger, the four seminal notions in the Rankian paradigm are (1) the objectivity of historical truth; (2) the priority of facts over concepts; (3) the singularity of all historical events; and (4) the centrality of politics. Doris S. Goldstein’s work (1983: 4-8) on the professionalization of History in Britain at the turn of the nineteenth century, where the influence of Ranke is apparent, is influenced by this sociological approach. In France, the followers of Olivier Dumaroulin (1986: 49-59) are inspired by the Sociology of Professions, although not directly by the Kuhnian approach.

Despite these influences, historians of Historiography have always been wary of Kuhnian approaches and their appeal. Their study of historians and historical writings of the past has helped them avoid simple generalization. They have underscored the differences and nuances between the historical discipline and other scientific communities, namely, (1) the importance of modern traditions that support his-
CONCLUSION

All of these considerations lead back to the beginning of this discussion. The history of Historiography is both a new and an old field. It is a field of research about historians and their historical writings which is open to new methods. But it is also one with wide scope and a long tradition with its own classics, which now reflects on the need for identity of historians. To examine its potentialities, one must meditate about its singularity.

NOTES

1. On the polysemy and complexity of the term historiography, cf. Topolsky (1973: 55); Carbonell (1976: 43); Guenot (1980: 12-13, 44-45); Aróstegui (1995: 23-26). The meaning introduced by Littre (1873) explains why French historians so frequently use the dull expression history of History: like Littre, they identify the noun historiography with a literary genre, so that when they refer to the history of historical writings they prefer history of history, a centuries-old term attributed to La Popelinière, a French sixteenth-century writer. Sometimes, as in the case of Carbonell (1993), Littre’s old term is preferred.

2. Better known as La naissance de l’histoire moderne (published by Guy Palmade with this title in 1971). Note that the personal “reading” included the influences of the main works on history of early twentieth-century French historiography (for instance, those by Monod, whose unfinished biography of Michelet was used by Lefebvre to write his chapter on the democrat historian author of the Histoire de France.

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Chapter 7

History Facing the Perpetual Present: The Past-Future Relationships

Jérôme Baschet

INTRODUCTION

It is a strange feeling for a medievalist to be in Santiago de Compostela and not to speak about the Middle Ages. However, it is sure that the road often taken is seldom the most direct: the old one road to Santiago, beginning in Paris, led to Conques and seemed to meander to León, through so many other places full of history and wonderful medieval art. In this case our road runs through San Cristóbal de las Casas in Chiapas, Mexico—a major detour, no doubt, and a meandering as well without real justification or excuse for all of the digressions that follow. This is a journey of thought, stretching one’s imagination in distance and changed context, to consider the question of the interrelation between historical work and the concern of our contemporary reality which was so exemplarily understood by Marc Bloch, and which is perceived today in view of extraordinary disenchantment and so much scepticism that this perception has an acute edge from which it is very hard to step back for a more distant perspective. One of many different divides we will attempt to cross is the relation between historic time and the time and centrality in which one reflects on that history. Particularly, this reflection is on the relationship of past/future and consideration of some questions raised in the History Under Debate conferences, such as the twelfth thesis formulated by Carlos Barros (1995: 109-111) in his “La Historia que viene” essay.¹

¹ Our point of departure is the semantics of the historic time as proposed by R. Koselleck (1990; 1997), who points out that the concep-
tion of historic time is constructed through the tension between a field of experience and a horizon of expectation. This makes possible the three principal configurations in the development of Western History. In Antiquity, as for most of the traditional societies, the cyclic rhythms of nature and agrarian work imposed their brands on the representations of historic time. Time is less something that passes away than what is forever returning, and the rising expectation is that of repetition of whatever one’s ancestors experienced. Structured by Christianization (Christianity was baptized by Marc Bloch as the “Religion d’historiens,” better qualified as a semihistoric conception), the society of the Middle Ages which continued into the eighteenth century, exhibited ambiguity and duality. The utilization of a linear vision of history released a brand-new overwhelming change in expectations, inscribed in eschatological perspectives as the End of Time. But this change of scene and unheralded expectation are projected completely into the beyond of what can be seen, over the horizon, and speculation, indeed a preoccupation, concerning the destiny of humankind in another world while still in this one, instead of the field of past experience which continuously imposed itself as the dominant referent under the logic of older rural societies.

In the eighteenth century the process of dissociation between expectation and experience arrived at the degree of total rupture, giving birth to the modern notions of history, progress, and revolution. It evoked then, at a time in this world, an impatience because of hope for a new future, so that submission of present experience to passed referents became increasingly a habit of thought not followed. So was born an absolutely historic time, presumed to be totally irreversible, and therefore quickly taken in and intellectually controlled, simply because it could be written along the predictable lines of progress leading to a foregone conclusion, namely the end of history.

This powerful conceptualization and convincing demonstration motivate us to try joining it to two supplementary frames. The first, scarcely addressed by Koselleck, concerns the configuration in which we actually find ourselves. This would be characterized by phenomena widely commented upon, where the intellectual roots reach far into time, but for which self-awareness dates from the beginning or the middle of this century and its most spectacular manifestations appear in the 1980s. Apart from the emblematic debate about the “End of History” beginning in 1989 (Fukuyama, 1992; cf. Anderson, 1996), which fits into the critique of the notions of Progress and Universal History, consider the characterization of that configuration as domination of a “Perpetual Present” where emphasis tends to obliterate a critical knowledge of the past and at the same time obscures perspectives of the Future. It also diminishes our field of expertise in creating expectation for the future. The second additional concern pertains to the actual perspective of “letting go” or at least a critique of this aspect of the Perpetual Present.

Such an enterprise is, however, very delicate, especially were its demands more than a simple wish or strictly personal conjecture. This is why it would be ideal to find a basis for such analysis in a practical and discursive experience, observed in a certain context. This deserves our aforementioned detour.

**MIDDLE AGES IN CHIAPAS: ACTUALITY OF THE INACTUAL**

It is impossible to dissociate the articulation of Past/Future from the relationship of Past/Present that defines more directly the position of the historian. Therefore, this will be analyzed from the following question: Why do we study the old societies? This question would be asked simply if it were possible in the present to encounter the past, if it were possible, for example, to conceive the voyage to Chiapas as a kind of stream across time rather than just a trip across space. In fact the spatial change of place often seems to be a time regression. In the Chiapas experience, numerous signs of that sensation pertain precisely to conceptions of time. Notably, they are shocked by the persistence of time and are still partially insensitive to the modern tyranny of the clock with its relentless measurement of hours, or they acknowledge it as little as possible and with amazing flexibility!

So, the hourly admission or rejection of social and political conflicts so symptomatic of the Mexican nation’s frailties creates a duality of discordant time in the heart of the same territorial entity, evoking for a medievalist memory of the diversity of time measures and calendary references coinciding with feudal fragmentation. However, in the Mexican southeast, the rhythms of history are also discordant with those imposed from Europe: other chronologies exist there, other rhythms of elapsed and historic time. In Chiapas, for example,
all pigs are gray! It is this gray that their European counterparts lost during the course of centuries. Genetic change in the same species in two different areas occurred in different ways at different times. Thus Michel Pastoureau has an extras in the film The Name of the Rose, pink, not gray, pigs, which would seem odd from one perspective and normal from another.

It would be possible to multiply such examples but never make another Middle Ages, even in such a case where the collected effects of medievalism are common to numerous societies that are still principally rural (this primary sector contains 60 percent of the Chiapas population), but adjoining very specific elements. It seems, for example, that during the present century many great rural properties (fincas) when being absorbed into the larger market economy have saved in their womb some forms of exploitation that are considerably archaic—sometimes through the 1970s. The case of the peones acasillados, countrymen forced to stay in their place and reside at a place throughout their lives, generally through the mechanism of debts contracted within the monopolistic system of property ownership that protects the landlord's interests, despite differences invites a comparison with two of the fundamental components of the feudal relationship between dominium and dominion: the fixation of men to land, and the aggregation of power over both land and its people (Guerrero, 1981). Of course, these elements did not always have the same global importance and they were inscribed in very different frames. If not feudalism strictly speaking, one can nevertheless detect at least an amazing survival of forms of exploitation of feudal character, articulated in a global capitalistic logic.

Think at the same time about the organizational forms of indigenous communities. Far from constituting an ideal reality and a sign of the times, these Indian communities are actually the result of a long and complex history during which they have been transformed and sometimes reconstructed. An important degree in this change process was the transference of the model of the medieval village community used during the Conquest simultaneously with the development of the Christian ideology of spiritual confraternity that ever pervaded this development. This is found in more recent forms, reactivated today by the adaptation of Liberation Theology. This is the case where similar forms of communal organization in Europe have disappeared with the development of capitalism over two centuries, but these have been obstinately conserved in New World pockets, with a renewed fight against neoliberal politics and a struggle against those who wish to impose in Mexican lands the norms of property ownership and exploitation according to market exigencies (e.g., Reform of the Twenty-Seventh Article of the Constitution). However, the aforementioned effects of medievalism were supported by this characteristic resistance of the Mexican rural zones to modern Westernization, and intensified by reasons known to the Indian population because of their marginality in secular affairs (Florescano, 1998).

There is nothing in this that could give it intelligibility, neither for Europe's Middle Ages nor for the contemporary Chiapas, except perhaps some comparative sensations ("la comparaison suggère, elle n'explique pas," remarked Marc Bloch [1995a,b: 87-123], ardent defender of Comparative History). Those perceptions could be the beginning of an experience of alterity that, bringing us beyond our habits, would be such little peepholes that they would be unusable except as an initial effort to glimpse the realities of a world so different from our own as the Middle Ages were. All that can help us to depend on the evidence of our time is worth consideration, following the well-learned lesson from historical Anthropology. And if it is not important which exotic people could help in this matter, it would never be bad for a medievalist in a generation without anchorage in cultural to gain a little familiarity with a society that is still largely traditional and in which, moreover, Christianity provides an essential framework for tradition, even if it is only partially accepted.

The question here is of a living world where life goes on at different paces in difference places, resulting in multiple presents rather than the Present, without reproducing the evolutionist schema of a universal history operating as an unique graded ruler by which each society is measured and takes its place in accord to some unanimous concept of progress or singular course toward the future. It must be admitted that some presents exist more presently than others—perhaps. Conversely, some presents exist more fully charged with the past than others. As with so many singular places, Chiapas was sorely tried by discordant times, a "contemporaneity of the non-contemporary or [a presence] of the non-contemporary in the contemporaneous," as expressed by R. Koselleck (1990: 318). To end with this point, I would make an improbable comparison between San Cristóbal de las Casas and Rome, two cities where the historian expe-
periences feelings of ease because one can breathe in the past with each day and in every street detour smell the past, and reach out to touch it. In these cities of immanence, the strata of historic evolution, normally buried, become visible with an evidence that is rare. Remembering entails some very different directions to be sure, but in one city just as it occurs in the other, time, what is reputed to be impalpable, seems to appear sensible.

Returning to our line of thought in keeping with the proposed question—Why do we study old societies?—we might invert the commonplace perspective by juxtaposing the effects of proximity of past with the irrecoverable distance that separates us from that past. No more a present past, but one simply bypassed or left behind, and detached, in short, dead. This idea brings us back to the ambiguity of the historian’s position in a space between two contradictory demands: on one hand, the willingness to be integral and part of this contemporary and actual world, to practice a history that, in lieu of not appearing to be simply a product “born of the time” ignorant of everything before, would be consciously preoccupied with present-day issues; on the other hand, the necessity to confer on the discipline a certain autonomy, giving it the possibility of defining its objectives and its criteria of validation without being submitted either to utilitarian imperatives of marketing or to the yoke imposed by serving a cause, but to seek excellence for itself. If the questioning of the historian is formed with the present and is developed as a function of themes asked presently, it is easy to conclude that writing History only at the level of such questions of presence and actuality would be absurdly limited. We would be condemned to ignore everything that was in the past radically different from us today. In addition, especially by holding onto only aspects found as actual and laying aside all others, we would inhibit exploration of things different and never arrive at global understanding of societies in the past, and would return to the misleading operational logic of singular evolution. It is not in today’s interest, to be sure, to attempt understanding of the present while, paradoxically in ignorance, one excludes the past. 7

How, then, can one reconcile this wish for History in the present and that immersion in a past that is so obviously remote from us? How can historians assume our social role without falling into the trap of instant necessities, and avoid retreating back into oversimplification or official, political, or militant history? How do we venture into the complexity necessary for a holistic understanding of another époque without losing connection with today and keeping track of our civic involvement, so as not to immerse ourselves in antiquarianism, which was denounced by Marc Bloch?

The question is even harder for one studying a distant époque like the Western Middle Ages and, in addition, teaching this European History in Central America where it may be perceived as foreign and irrelevant. Why be concerned from a vantage point in Mexico about a society so far away in time and space? Of course, it might be argued generally that Medieval History explains the formation of Europe and the dynamics of its take-off and expansion, one of the consequences of which was nothing less that the Reconquista and its continuance as the conquest and colonization of the Americas by Europeans. Then it may be seen that the medieval world implanted itself on the other side of the Atlantic, and, in a way, the Middle Ages formed half the historical parentage of Mexico. This direct historical link makes possible unilateral comparisons between numerous institutions, practices, and European and Amerindian representations, such as, to name a few possibilities, comparable communal organizations, urban institutions, impact of the universities, the cult of saints and use of images, confraternities, etc. (Baschet, 1998: 74–87). The more proximate Middle Ages—much closer than prevalent ideas or common opinion—became integral to and transformed the history of Mexico. The historian’s work is here that of actualization because History provides a present reappraisal of the past fact, perhaps forgotten, and sometimes denied. In this case I would wish insist that this process, the reserves of Presentism, of putting the past into the present, although indispensable, is dangerous, especially when not conscious of one’s own limitations. In each past as we perceive it today is something radically gone, totally dead, irreversibly separated from the living (but, of course, even the dead “live” in the thoughts of the living). For this reason, what resides in the past and its recall is of interest. So the Middle Ages in their long duration may be considered as a universe other than ours (Le Goff, 1985: 7–13): a world of tradition before modern times, a rural world before industrialization, a world of an omnipotent Church before laicization, a world of feudal fragmentation before the triumph of the State, and a world of interpersonal dependencies before wages. In short, the Middle Ages are for us
another world or even antworld or counterculture from before the reign of the market economy.

More concretely, consider that, in the modern world, time seems to constitute the principal dimension through which social controls are imposed. It is the basis of salary by the calculation of working hours that dominates always the means of production, with multiple consequences for those pressed into service and stressed by such developments as this submission to the "tyranny of the clock" and the compulsion to know all the time the ticking away of time, as critiqued by Norbert Elias (1996). In fact, one rule seems to makes everyone feel the effects of this overwhelming sense of time across all aspects of life: "Time is money." Conversely, in medieval society, it was the spatial relationship that dominated the crux of social organization and means of production: the first condition for work in the feudal system was the fixation of people on the land, their integration in a restricted space like a geographic cell, forever in the same fief, lordship, and parish where they had been baptized, paid their ecclesiastical and seigneurial rents, and, finally, were buried, when in death they expected to meet again in the afterlife their community of ancestors (Guerrero, 1996: 85-101). In our nonlocalized world where place is in the way, no more than an intrinsic dimension of being and placement of events, where everything might finally occur indifferently and in any point on the globe, we have lost our ancestors’ sense of locality and place, only to trade it for another form of submission, i.e., to time. It is symptomatic that the principal form of punishment imposed by the modern justice system, with the exception of capital punishment, is prison, that is, the privation of freedom and impediment to a change of place. In the Middle Ages, imprisonment was very temporary and accessory discipline, another form of stabilitas loci in medieval society, while banishment was a different matter: the rupture of ties between an individual and a place for living was in social terms quasi-death ("d'une certain façon, l'exil est pire que la mort," Claude Gauvard, in the preface to Zaremska, 1996: 12) because it constituted displacement, forced dislocation, which was the exact reverse of prison. Constriction could be principally spatial on the one hand, and on the other mainly temporal. This distinction so schematically expressed illustrates the radical polarization between the medieval and modern worlds.

It is possible at the same time it to try to render the Middle Ages understandable from our perspective with some continuity in mind, or to work with the idea of discontinuity by distancing our perspective and seeing this period as something other than our world. Both instances are at the same time justifiable but excessive, better when combined in the analysis of historic dynamics that brought us from a medieval universe to the modern world. The second approach is no less important than the first. Then, if History is history, it is so because the past is, at the same time, intimately bound with our present, basically different, separated and therefore not actual, but reconstructed. This is the paradox of History as we would like it to be understood: It must transform the noncurrency of past into a present-day intellectual issue. It must reveal to us the presence of nonpresent.

HISTORY, A BRIDGE BETWEEN PAST AND FUTURE

If the relation "past/present" with its own ambiguity is in the heart of the practical approach of the historian, the articulation "past/future" determines the concept of historical time, referring to what is written in historical work As a basis for reflection on this point, consider the relation between present and future as it is manifest in the textual production of Neo-Zapatism since 1994. The recourse to this type of text, foreign to university press publication, may be surprising, especially for those who do not want to elaborate a theory of history. These are practical texts whose purpose was to incite political action. Therefore, it will not hinder their utilization, when it is possible to justify interest in them for their symptoms of sometimes unperceived aspects of our contemporary world. Moreover, judgment about Indian sublevels at Chiapas is not necessary here. It is enough to admit that the Zapatistas were neither saints nor heroes in the last revolutionary effusion at the end of the past century, nor the grotesque specters of the stereotypical arch-guerilla, but that very simply they give form to a social movement woven of contradictions, which had reality and undeniable impact.

References to History are everywhere in Zapatist texts (Colectivo Neosaurios, 2000), whether under a particular species of Mexican history as symbols that make for an outrageous fight, or under the universal species of History in capitals, where they are will-
ingly invoked as instances of legitimation. Its strategic status tends equally toward representation of conflict as a combat of memory against “oblivion”—a term transformed as a synonym for the exploitation and racism suffered by the Indian population. Therefore, oblivion is not only analyzed in relation to colonial or neocolonial domination, it takes on another sense as well, for the humanity as a whole at a time when it was perceived as characteristic of neo-Liberal logic. It imposes in fact the reign of a Perpetual Present, denying the before and after, and making of the Today or “the here and now” in Zapatista terms, a new altar on which everyone must offer sacrifice. In the modern world on the way toward globalization, this preponderant emphasis on Today creates a new tyrant which, to assure domination, shades the Past with oblivion and clouds every perspective of a Future that is not an iteration or amplification of its current domination. By denying a Future, such dominion believes or makes believe itself is for eternity. As in the imagery of Macbeth, power sees itself in a mirror and becomes convinced of its own invincibility, and refuses to believe that the forest could ever crowd the road right up to the palace. A more recent version of such triumph from below or encroachment from the masses has been the proclamation for the better of the “end of history” as known, with the ruins of the Berlin Wall as the appropriate backdrop.

In the face of this logic, Zapatista texts vie for a recovery of the historic consciousness of the past and at the same time for a vision of a future. Being associated with multiple terms sustained by the desire for a better world, the future appears under forms discarded by the revolutionary traditions of the foregone century. Having renounced capital and a unifying concept of Revolution and the idea of an avant-garde consensus with the goal of guiding people toward a final destiny of which it claims foreknowledge, the Zapatista texts make a place for a desired future, but one without certitude, different but unpredictable, possible but only conditional. It is a future that cannot be determined, is not announced by any plan laying out the track, and guarantees nothing by way of usage. It is a way not yet traced and impossible to know before advancing.

In close combination with this concept of the future, the relation Past/Future is established in sometimes amazing forms, as when it appears in the adage “look behind to go onward,” inspired by Alice in Wonderland, or another that even more paradoxically recommends that one “advance backwards” (CIACH, 1999: 198, 219-220). Therefore, the question of promoting a return to the past is not in question. The future need not be a repetition of the past because it is an open future, a way not yet projected. One can, of course, see in the Zapatista texts a contradiction between references to cyclic time that makes one come back always to the same situations, and to hope of a different future. But the contradiction is partially resolved in the measure that this cyclic iteration appears at the moment when the present situation is compared with the past. The proposal, then, is to amplify rhetorically political goals, despite the undeniable persistence of oppression and social injustice; while looking from the present toward the future, the political fight allows for the opening of unedited perspectives. Nevertheless, the issue is how to establish a positive alliance between past and future that would never lead to replication tomorrow of the old from yesterday? To look backward must be understood at the beginning as an appeal to historic knowledge. If, in the face of a nontraceable future, it is useful to see whatever has already been accomplished, principally to detect errors and to measure obstacles. The knowledge of the past permits once to take distance from it and avoid the risk of becoming its victim anew.

The question is also to recognize in the past some positive elements—understanding such expression, not as formulas of living or thinking which attempt to reproduce things as they were, but as seeds germinating inspiration, the starting points for present criticism to build a future. This trait is closely linked with the indigenous dimension of social subjugation. The valued Past is associated with the culture of the Indian peoples, descendants of the first inhabitants of American lands. In addition, the affirmation of a necessary alliance between Past and Future is another form of affirming the integration of indigenous peoples within Mexico, judged as indispensable for the nation’s stability. Therefore, that relation between Past and Future also takes on a more general value concerning humanity as a whole and commensurate with the critique of time dominating the contemporaneous world.

If the Perpetual Present bases its dominion on the oblivion of the Past and the denial of a Future, History must try to reestablish in the same initiative the memory of the past and the possibility of a future. Ridding ourselves of the tyranny of the Present only, Today as always, or total attention to the here and now, implies that historical
consciousness is indispensable to break the illusion of “the end of history” and reopen vision of a time to come that will not be merely an iteration of the present or complacency that “things have ever been thus.” Would this not be another poison, perhaps, distilled from the spirit of time, that would serve only to guarantee submission and resignation? History, on the contrary, going back into time shows that things taken today as inevitable, necessary, or natural, are no more than recent constructions, and, surely, no less transitory than former realities. In the Zapatista texts is identification of the Perpetual Present as a fundamental adversary, and instead its authors propose a strategic alliance between Past and Future. Looking forward to an anesthetized Present, a synonym of oblivion and hopelessness, it attempts to invert that sinister grammar of historic time as only something present, maintaining firmly “one foot in the past and the other in the future.”

Such imagery is sensibly distant from revolutionary traditions of this century, nourished with Marxist evolutionism, not to say Stalinist dogma about five phases in universal history, guaranteed by pretentious laws (Godelier, 1967). The interaction of Indian thought with reality appears to have favored such transformation. Maintaining and seeing the reactivation of community structures assures the presence of a social form that one can qualify as precapitalist or somewhat foreign to the logic of capitalist development even when neoliberal politics do their best to make it disappear. Such a situation has been commented upon by Marx himself, admitting the possibility of a melange of historic times, normally aligned with the conservative side of human evolution. In his letter of 1881 to Vera Zassoulitch, at least in his draft, he lightly criticized the imposition of any unique or universal historic scheme on all peoples, leaving open the possibility that the Russian rural communities and their collective forms of organization would be able to survive and integrate themselves into a Socialist system without being destroyed by capitalist logic of expropriation of workers. This possibility is only conditional and depends in great measure on external impulses coming from the Occident. And this hypothesis is formulated in a juncture that permitted Marx to imagine an imminent defeat of Czarism. However, twelve years later very unfavorable circumstances led Engels to consider with some scepticism the future of those Russian communities. The final evolution would never disqualify the conditional diagnosis made by Marx nor lessen his insistence on discarding the idea of a universal and predetermined historic evolution. On the contrary, the question here is to recognize that history can profit from circumstances unique each time, to destroy very simple schema and to open unpredictable and unforeseen vistas. In that case, it is the simultaneous existence of the capitalist present and of organizations inheriting older traditions that permits formulation of the hypothesis of a direct bridge between Past and a Future beyond capitalism. However, it is necessary to give account of and to be capable of thinking about “a contemporaneity of non-contemporaneity situations” (Koselleck’s expression, reframed by Bensaid, 1995: 42-45).

Without going to the absurd of identifying Russian communities from 1880 with those of present-day Mexico, assistance is possible nevertheless with narrations that analyze the alliance of Past and Future suggested in Zapatista texts. With this viewpoint, a future social transformation does not indispensably signify rejection or negation of passed social forms, apparently condemned by the notion of progress. To have one foot in the past to construct another future is not necessarily the mark of obtuse archaism, nor a conservative cult of tradition. It might be the mark of awareness of the discordance of historic times. If one admits that history does not advance uniformly as a whole, always marching in step across a straight line of ineluctable progress, then it is possible to entertain improbable reencounters between the past of Indian communities, survivors of the imposition of market economies, and the future destiny of their humanity that resists self-destruction. Far from being a straight line of unique and necessary development, history is made of multiple possibilities, adopted or abandoned, attempted or forgotten. It is at the same time woven with arrhythmia, with different temporalities that are interlacing themselves in the social process just so, and making impossible the unification of universal History under the form of a trajectory directed toward a predetermined future.

As a whole, Zapatista discourse meanders between three pre-existent times: (1) the cyclic time of past and present communities, (2) the linear time of Modernity and Marxism, and (3) the Perpetual Present of the contemporary world, and maybe even a fourth one which is still being elaborated. From indigenous time, they have redeemed the positive evaluation of certain aspects of the past, but without involving themselves in a cycle of repetition. They participate in
modernity in the hope for a future better than the present, discarding, however, any linear and finalist vision, but recognizing that this future remains open-ended, uncertain, and consequently neither predetermined nor in anticipation known for sure.

From the time that today dominates, Zapatista sources retain part of the postmodern critique on progress and the ineluctability of ringing in a turnaround, but affirming the necessity of reconstructing a conception of History radically opposed to the regime of Perpetual Present, to be able to integrate experience and expectation. By rejecting the postmodern desegregation of historical processes, and at the same time criticizing the evolutionist linearity of the Modern, these texts open the possibility of recognizing discordant times and bet on a recuperative conjuncture of Past and Future.

RESISTING THE PERPETUAL PRESENT

Some additional general remarks are necessary before concluding. As in the beginning, it is convenient to come back to the notion of the Perpetual Present. The term does not signify, evidently, the disappearance of every reference to the Past or to the Future. F. Hartog (1995: 1225-1227) maintains that Presentism is always unsettling in that it longs for memory but is at the same time anxious about knowing the future in a present form of previson. Historical knowledge is not dead itself, even when times of doubt succeed and those of resilient action give way to the contrary winds of rampant editorials (Noiriol, 1996). Apart from such internal difficulties, it is necessary to confront the diffusion of neoliberal versions of the “end of history” and put up with critiques of postmodern inspiration, to forward the cause of possible thinking about a unified historic perspective. These two viewpoints are certainly different, and largely contradict themselves. However, the Perpetual Present is, perhaps, precisely the common point of attraction that makes its effect felt on each other, leading to a disappearing horizon of expectation and immobilization in the present, idealized in one case, disillusioned in the other (Cabrera Acosta, 1993: 209-221; Lyotard, 1970; 1986).14

Far from the Social Sciences, other forms of relating to the Past exist, diverse recurrences of “the attraction to one’s roots” and of “memorial waves” or commemorations in succession, begin to amplify symptomatically. The invasion of celebrations and anniversa-

ries, whether actually benefiting from adequate historical research, marks the submission of knowledge of the past to a perspective that is literally those of actuality and the instant present (contributing as such to its commercialization). With regard to the Future, this at least has more space from which to benefit. Celebrations have their own place, even in anticipating the future, but here too, such as those celebrating the advent of 2000 and the turn of the millennium, seem somewhat pathetic and less moving than expected. In celebrating at present one’s own future, those in developed nations understand that they are glorifying themselves with more than impudent self-satisfaction. Thanks to a date lacking real historical significance, but where the residue of rekindled millennialism mingle in a century of futurist dreams, liberal democracies prepared a planetary production for their own eternal triumph. If the future is now present, it is so because this presence is the future of mankind. The Perpetual Present would never find a better godsend.

Experience and expectation—no longer absent, but ever more limited and repeatedly a sham—vanish at this takeover of the omnipresent. This logic, which must be understood as a tendenccial process—never totally realized, but continually reinforced—appears in a thousand forms in brief dictatorships and syncopated rhythms, the ideal of an immediacy and instantaneity, and in the denial of lapsed time and the consequent prohibition of aging, it dominates the sphere of modern information and communication. This imposes a regime of an Eternal Present, made of ephemeral instants reflecting the prestige of an illusive novelty, but, in fact, they cannot become more than a substitute, ever more rapidly, always the same. Of course, this is only one particular sector of the social activity, and it would be reductionist if one were to base analysis on this, as if the Present imposed itself everywhere as law, without resistance and therefore without limit. And so with the rest, e.g., the “tyranny of clocks” imposed on humans today as a form of oppression, except for open communication these tendencies find their foundation in the general logic of profit seeking and more and more demanding forms in which this is cloaked. The search for time-based economy, maximization of disposable time, and reduction of time necessary to perform operations, the attendant fluctuation and accelerated exchange of stocks, velocity in the movements of capital and profits originating in speculation; laws exacerbated by marketing, all struggle with rage against temporal parame-
ters. They adopt the measure of time, however, not to take its measure adequately, but to diminish it, to obtain constant advantage, and attempt triumph over it. Condemnation of elongated time, a long time or its duration (longue durée), cuts off the instantaneous present, separates it from its antecedents, and requires forgetfulness about long-term forces, sometimes with grave consequences in terms of continuing returns. It is for these reasons that the regime of Perpetual Present harmonizes with the economic logic of marketing and profit, and with the corresponding amnesiac and myopic discourses that pertain to it.

The Perpetual Present appears, then, as the confluence of two phenomena. One, already described, is no more than the accentuation of patterns of profit seeking and the effects of hourly measurement of work. Still, if the regime of the Perpetual Present supposes the amplification of that tyranny (i.e., of the instant) and overall extension into the dominion of culture and the assemblage of human life in every respect, even when subordinating reality under certain aspects thought to be old, there has never been a lack of literary or cinematographic works during this past century that denounce this. While this first aspect proceeds from a certain continuity between the past and modernity, the second confluence into the Perpetual Present clearly breaks with it. In fact, the breakup of any postmodern unified vision of History, together with the notions of progress and universal history, with other tendencies already discussed, all contribute to the destruction of the modern regimen of historicity. The convergence of these two aspects is not simple addition; it knits a necessary tie between the cult of velocity and the repetition of the same. One might establish a relation of proportionality with the immobilization in the Perpetual Present and the acceleration of activity and life's rhythms. Those that mask the return of the identical under the appearance of the new, and the velocity that the speed at which this is produced, assume that they experience time when in fact any vision of human and historic growth has been abolished. Finally, one might underscore that one of the fundamental results of this convergence—and, without doubt, a determining criterion for the Perpetual Present—is the resigned or nihilistic abandonment of every future issue. The "no future" slogan howled in a deafening hurly-bury by the punk group Sex Pistols in 1976 might well have inaugurated, beyond its diverse prefigurations, the reign of Perpetual Present, where 1989 appears to be the apotheosis.17

In a second set of remarks it would be useful to suggest—even if only in outline—a parallel between the questions of temporality and spatiality. The globalization of economy (i.e., essentially the liberalization of international commerce and the deregulation of finance markets) does not create a uniform world. It is articulated, on the contrary, in an unequal planetary development and is expressed by a growing duality between nations and also between regions of their interiors. In other words, these processes, by weakening the cadre of nation-states for the benefit of entwining relations and transnational interdependencies, are accompanied by antigmomization blockades and identity barriers, partitions and political fragmentation, based upon forms more or less fanatic in their nationalist or ethnic revindication (Bensaid, 1955: ch. 2). There is a double contradiction in the logic of globalization of capital and merchandise exchange, and of political, social, and human fragmentation. By employing these tensions, the market attempts to expand over these spheres of human existence that once had the advantage. Its work of spatial homogenization and banality, as engaged by the preceding century, brings about pressures toward uniformity that insidiously undermine the specificity of place. The technical possibilities of mobility and communication today sometimes make one forget about spatiality as an intrinsic dimension of human existence (i.e., making possible anywhere the experience of being there).18 If manufacturing and bureaucracy seem to move from developed countries to continents with cheap labor and prices, this indicates how displacement and delocalization will become a general characteristic of the contemporary world at such a level that, more and more, the spatial parameter of life will lose its determining character and the relationship with one's own place will cease being fundamental to human experience.

Facing this process of spatial uniformity and general delocalization, promoted by the globalization process, the need might be felt legitimately to recover a singularity of experience and an autonomy of place, capable of restoring the human beings and acting to reconstitute necessary conditions of a locale or localization, i.e., relations with specific qualities of a site that shelter one's life and contribute to giving people a sense of place and well-being. The difficulty here consists in fulfilling this basic need without letting the recreations be-
come identity enclosures fostering jealous particularism, or _a fortiori_ returning to the cellular locality and oppression of the “only place under the sun” characteristic of feudalism. There are no magic solutions here, and the only principle we can enunciate is that of moderating change, going back and forth between the particular and the general, the local and the universal. Contrarily, let me attempt to articulate, as the Zapatista experience suggests, the local (in this case, ethnic reindication), the universal (the concern for mankind), and, if possible, the national (dealing with a very patriotic culture, as is the case of Mexico). In fact, an exclusive fight for indigenous identity and autonomy may lead back to ethnocentrism and idealizations that often accompany it; to accept the frontiers of Mexico as a political horizon may bring with it nationalistic enclosure, seemingly xenophobic; and, last, retaining only a universal perspective may lead to denial of local particularities, nationality, and ethnicity that provide such a solid base for most social movements. The local, national, and intercontinental cannot be either opposed to each other or separated from each other. The prevailing thought here is that of inarticulation of such different hierarchic scales within each level that one cannot find relevance without ascertaining its relationship with the others.

The distinguishing criteria with the particularity of identity are now clear. They become threatening because they isolate and reify the local, particular, and ethnic, exalting them as supreme separate values and goals in themselves. On the other hand, they constitute assumed and reclaimed values, but inscribed in a prolonged perspective that leaves them behind and transforms their sense. That might be the basis for a new universalism which finally dismisses the abstract man defined by the Enlightenment and rejects the rubbish of international marketing in order to admit that access to the universal can be found in recognizing the specificity of places and the autonomy of experiences. In lieu of denying one for the other, the local and the universal may be accepted as two differentiated poles, each necessary for the other, finding their justification and legitimacy in the same measure where they are articulated one with the other. If such a crossing were possible in the spatial order, it might be believed that it can occur also in the temporal domain; it is in the terms of similar reasoning that it is necessary to search for a way that simultaneously disregards in turn the disaster of the contemporaneous and the feudal premoderni-

ty without thereby simply reproducing the Enlightenment concept of Modernity.

The Zapatista experience is not, evidently, the first attempt, nor the only possible basis to sketch out such a bypass. If this is a discerning approach, it might be possible to look out for other solutions. Particularly, note the effort of Walter Benjamin to elaborate a concept of historical materialism, getting rid of the myths of Modernity and the dogmas of global and unlimited progress, and renouncing particularly timelessness and the homogeneous time of Historicism. At the center of his tentative break with the gentle continuum of Historicism and the nullification of the instant which he suggests, Benjamin (1983: 205) writes about the glorification of the present, “a present that is not passage, but that remains immobile on the threshold of time” (cf. Bensaid, 1955; Agamben, 1978: 91-107). In an effort to open time for the messianic eruption of a revolutionary projection—and always articulating it with the hope of a future and with the necessary reappropriation of the past—W. Benjamin’s present is evidently without relation to the Perpetual Present of the contemporary world, as an eternal reiteration or repetition of the same. However, note that the adversary which W. Benjamin attacks in his _Theses_ is different from the one we have identified. He did his best to discard a linear and autogenous vision of history moving toward an inescapable progress, which ordinary Marxism shares with bourgeois ideology, while according to Lyotard we today confront a field in ruin without hope of reconstruction, left by the fall of Modernity and the proclaimed end of the “grand narratives” of emancipation. Even when recognizing a potential opening in the present, a possible point to passage from a “history that repeats itself” to a one that ceases such reiteration, remains necessary,20 there is henceforth some risk of taking the Present as a banner “as if each second were the narrow door through which a Messiah could pass” (Benjamin, XVIIIB, p. 207), and we have thousands of false messiahs created every day in the instantaneity of world communications. Faced with the tyranny of Today, the here and now, the abrupt extraction from the Present of all dynamic continuity, cannot be without danger; and the actual situation seems rather imposing as prior stake in the united recovery of the Past and the Future, even when Benjamin’s critique reminds us opportunely that this articulation must be thought in the present.
that deviation and the trajectory that is determined must cease to be taken for granted, as in the case of Modernity’s regime by the dynamics of progress and the laws of History. It is this overture itself that renders it vulnerable, and well explains its disappearance when others struggle to get a glimpse of future possibilities despite the fragility of such vision.

History will never fully explain the present, nor clarify the future. But, more than ever, it has as its mission the restoration of some movement across the space of experience necessary to comprehend the contemporary and provide a horizon of hope where the promise is certain even though nature remains undetermined.  

NOTES

1. Barros (1995: 109-111), notably: “Se tiende a sustituir el viejo paradigma pasado/presente/futuro por otra formulación, pasado/futuro/presente, en la que pasa a primer plano aquello que está por venir.” I thank Alain Guerreau, Michael Lowy, and Jacques Revel for their remarks and critique in the development of the present version of this essay.

2. See Pomian (1984: 40-57) for this gnawing process that in the seventeenth century expressly authorized the expression local in particular for domains in linear and cumulative time, in which at the heart of the dominant vision of history persists cyclic notions.

3. To follow this analysis, remember that the affirmation of Modernity has the take-off of Romanticism as a counterforce (Lowy and Sayre, 1992): the criticism of the Present in the name of a Past is judged humanly superior, which is the exact reverse of Modernity, and accompanies it like its shadow (note that the Romantic vision participates in the modern regime of historicity, since it recognizes—painfully—the rupture between past and present, expectation and experience).

4. There will be seen numerous parallels between hypotheses proposed here and those of F. Hartog (1995) that analyze the exhaustion of the modern regime of historicity (as defined by R. Koselleck), favoring instead “Presentism,” where the date 1989 symbolizes the triumph of the “Liens de mémoire” suggested by Pierre Nora (1984-1992) as the new dominant historiographic symptom. Some differences may be admitted, notably among the antecedents of the Perpetual Present where some historic manifestations considered by F. Hartog as figurations of Presentism are not retained.

5. Consider the example of Aby Warburg who momentarily would digress into Florentine feasts in the Renaissance to study the rituals of New Mexican Indians, and would convert his historic search into one of geographic displacement (Michaud, 1998: especially the introduction by G. Didi-Huberm). 

6. García de León (1985: 19) notes that in Chiapas “el tempo histórico es otro.” In the introduction for the second edition (1997: 24), he remarks “si Chiapas en su arquitectura material e inmaterial sigue siendo una reliquia de nuestro medioev
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fundador (la época colonial), no cabe duda tampoco de que sus ladrillos y cimientos son en su mayoría amasados con arena y argamasa de futuro, cualquier cosa que éste sea.

7. Recall the balance wanted by Marc Bloch (1993: 85-98) between the denomination of "l'âme des origines" ("jamais un phénomène historique ne s'explique pleinement en dehors de l'étude de son moment") and intelligence in "l'incompréhension du présent n'a fait que l'ignorance du passé."

8. "En el mundo de la 'modernidad,' el culto al presente es arma y escudo. El 'hoy' es el nuevo altar en que se sacrifican principios, lealtades, convicciones, vergüenzas, dignidades, memorias y verdades. El pasado no es ya, para los tecnócratas que nuestro país padece como gobernantes, un referente a asimilar y sobre el cual crecer. El futuro no puede ser, para estos profesionales del olvido, nada más que un alargamiento temporal del presente. Para destruir a la historia se le niega a ésta un horizonte que vaya más allá del 'ahora y aquí' neoliberal. No hay 'antes' ni 'después' del hoy. La búsqueda de la eternidad es por fin satisfecha: el mundo del dinero no es tan sólo el mejor de los mundos posibles, es el único necesario." La Mesa de San Andrés: entre los olvidos de arriba y la memoria de abajo (March, 1998), reproduced (pp. 208-209), as all the other texts mentioned here, in CIACH (1999).

9. The first is suggested by a text of Lewis Carroll translated as "Como Alicia descubre que para alcanzar la Reina Roja debe caminar hacia atrás, nosotros debemos volar al pasado para caminar adelante y hacernos mejores. En el pasado, podemos encontrar caminos hacia el futuro"; other articles affirm "somos la necia historia que se repite para ya no repetirse, el mirar atrás para poder caminar hacia adelante", where the crabs are cited as an example because they know that "la mejor forma de avanzar es para atrás" (pp. 198, 219-220).

10. It is therefore necessary to take care against the tendency to look Indian peoples in an identity of the past. The neo-Zapatista texts resist such folklorization of the indigenous and mere transformation into museum objects: "No ofrecan un rincón más bonito en el museo de la historia" (CIACH, 1999: 22); and "Son seres vivos, no los fósiles que quisiera la propaganda del poder global" (BESN, 1999:263). In other passages, Indian culture in its more traditionalists sectors does not disdain images of modernity, and shows itself sometimes in the most improbable combinations of custom and futurism. According to the Tezcalis, the inhabitants of Cuauhtemoc lead a double life (ch'utele) in the interior away from the mountains, but the region bastilles with such signs of Western modernity as cell phones, video cameras, helicopters, jets, etc. (Pitárac Ramón, 1996).

11. "... una rebelión con sangre mayoritariamente indígena ha desafiado el desencanto presente poniendo un pie en el pasado y otro en el futuro" (CIACH, La revuelta de la memoria, p. 205).

12. Letter to Vera Zassoulkha (draft 1): "because in Russia, thanks to a combination of unique circumstances, the rural community, established at a national level, can gradually lose its primitive characters and develop itself directly as element of the collective production at a national level; it is precisely thanks to the contemporaneity of capitalist production that it can appropriate all positive acquisitions and without going through its horrible episodes," cited and commented upon by Bensaid (1955: 42-43). See the collection of texts about the Russian community in Marx and Engels (1980).

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13. I express gratitude to Michael Löwy who pointed out that Zapatista logic is in this viewpoint very comparable with that of "romantismo revolucionario," but in a different form than reconstituted Romanticism that tries to restore the premodern past; this does not wish "un retour au passé, mais un départ par le passé," and it evokes nostalgia to project itself as it moves forward to a new utopian future (Löwy and Starey, 1992: 300-303). Therefore, it must be recognized perhaps that Zapatista discourse has a configuration specific in two parts: if in certain cases it appears to be the reverse of modernity, it speaks both to a world partially premodern, and at the same time it is written critically in the context of the Perpetual Present belonging to the postmodernism.

14. For a collection of contrasting definitions of postmodernity, see Casullo (1993) for texts of M. Berman, P. Anderson, J. Habermas, J-P. Lyotard, P. Burge, F. Crespi, A. Huyssen, etc. Nietzsche already denounced the cult of Perpetual Present taught by "legionaries of the present instant," and he attacked "this admiration of the potency of history which at every instant transforms into pure admiration of success leading to an idolatry of the real." Hegel (1990: 147) bequeathed to following generations the suggestion of "the end of history" without having proclaimed it himself (see comments of Anderson, 1995: 59).

15. The premises of the first aspect are to be found at the heart of Modernity, while the antecedents of the second proceed in part from a Romantic critique of the modern world. It is important to maintain a clear distinction between the themes of Postmodern inspiration that comprised the take-off of the Perpetual Present and the Romantic critique of Modernity, because their similarity is only superficial. On the other hand, it is understandable that the triumph of the Perpetual Present is associated with the good health of modernizing discourse (but it is modernization that looses its civilizing pretension and tends to be a reversion in its strict economic dimension). Assuming the downfall of the Modernity project, the Postmodern opens the world to modernization without plan.

16. "Only the universal triumph of the rhythm of mechanic production and reproduction grants that nothing changes, that nothing amazing were produced" (T. Adorno and H. Horkheimer, 1974).

17. Note that the formula was taken as emblematic of a resigned epoch only because of the paradoxical deviation of a radical contestation that condemns at the same time past, present, and future, and that has signified for their authors an almost general anachronism in England. Among other invasions in the second half of the 1970s, one must recognize the crisis of 1974 and an aggregate of oscillations in the intellectual field during the years 1976-1979 (the theorization of Postmodernism was only one of those aspects). Further, the apogee of 1989 was provoked by a conservative decade, the growth of the neoliberal politics, and expansion of the ideology of enterprises and delegitimization of almost all of the ideas about radical social change.

18. Cf. A. Berque (1996), who underscores the fundamental link between human existence and its place and proposes a logic of "mediance" under which there is no being without place, no existence without localization. In this perspective, neither place nor biosphere may be considered as universal space, homogenous and without difference. The relation between humans and their environs, on the contrary, obliges one to recognize the singularity of place, as a condition of human existence for all those living in that place.
19. This abstraction of a process permitting an equivalences among the heterogeneous is central also to the critique of Enlightenment thinking by T. Adorno and H. Horkheimer (1974). By underscoring that the reconciliation of universal and particular loses all validity when both poles touch and are founded upon discreet identity, they invite us to think of them as an articulation resulting from an effort to reconcile such differences and put them into relationships with specific places.

20. The articulation of this double contradictory dimension of history becomes conspicuous in the neo-Zapatista texts, for example, in this formula: “somos la nación historia que se repite para ju no repetirse” (La revuelta, p. 162).

One might suggest questions about the implications of these remarks for the writing of History and practical method. Without doubt the case here refutes the finalist vision of a linear and unified history, going onward in the direction of its end according to the ineluctable and narrowly determinate logic of a monolithic discourse, and at the same time argues against the atomization of a microhistory approach exacerbated by the destruction of social constraints and denial of massive evidence of evolution. Undoubtedly this is a case of pleading for a nonlinear and probabilistic History, coherent however, and defined as a science, which treats changing times and change over long durations, and is able to actualize a logic of social transformation. It is also a history that is at the same time both global and pluralistic: global in the measure by which it aims to apprehend the coherence of everything social, as a whole and of its dynamics; plural because it recognizes the diversification and the relative autonomy of spheres that comprise society, the possibility of differential evolutions, and gaps capable of breaking any social system. Global and plural, both, in the sense that one does not leave this or those fragment out of the picture, but one thinks about its specific relationship with the totality of society and all admissible possibilities of linkage within it. Plural and global, both, in the sense that it resists pronouncements about or forced unification of an epoch under the spectrum of a unity in style or every other variant of the “Spirit of the Age,” and thinking that evolution is uniquely a straight line, and that such History never ceases, therefore, to attempt as its aim an intelligibility of the entirety of human history.

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Chapter 8

Recent Trends in U.S. Social History

Hal S. Barron

INTRODUCTION: “NEW” SOCIAL HISTORY

The theme of the second HaD conference on twentieth-century historiographies can be elucidated by some reflections on the development of U.S. Social History over the past several decades. The following comments provide an introduction to the field for those who are not familiar with U.S. Social History and some useful insights for those acquainted with the subject. Comparisons between trends in U.S. Social History and those in other fields represented at HaD will provide interesting further discussion.

Perhaps the paradigmatic event for my generation of U.S. historians was the rise of the “New” Social History more than thirty years ago. In contrast to the predominant thrust of historical scholarship at the time, which focused primarily on political history and elites, the New Social History endeavored to reconstruct the lives of ordinary people. In contrast to the then prevailing view of Social History, which was simply whatever remained after treating Political History, the New Social History introduced new theories and methods to the discipline, and it captured the center stage of scholarship and the profession. Not the least of these were the use of quantitative methods and social scientific theories as well as the influence of European scholars from the Annales school and the British Marxist historians.

More important, New Social History was animated by the political and cultural climate of the 1960s, which in turn contributed to those new sensibilities. In a direct sense, the emergence of the civil rights movement stimulated investigations into African-American history, particularly the history of slavery. That, however, was part of a more general decline of the post–World War II liberal consensus that had
dominated American letters and social thought. The liberal consensus celebrated democracy and the material and economic accomplishments of U.S. society (implicitly, if not explicitly, counterposed against the Soviet Union), and it touted the broad-based middle-class nature of American society. In addition, the struggles of African Americans, growing opposition to the war in Vietnam, increasing dissatisfaction with the sterility and lack of community in consumer society, and the rise of feminism, all helped to challenge those assumptions and shatter those beliefs. The new scholarship resonated with these more fundamental shifts by emphasizing a multiplicity of perspectives and a history of conflict instead of consensus. It stressed history "from the bottom up" as opposed to the top down and exposed the so-called "underside" of U.S. history. Indeed, the various links between the new scholarship and the real political concerns and developments of the period gave the field a dynamism and a sense of purpose that many find lacking today.

For U.S. history, the key early text of this historiographical revolution was Stephen Thernstrom's 1964 analysis of poor Irish laborers in nineteenth-century Newburyport, Massachusetts, Poverty and Progress, which spawned a host of similar studies. Using the manuscript U.S. census returns, which provide demographic and socioeconomic information on individuals, Thernstrom traced the careers of the poorest members of that community, unskilled Irish laborers, and reconstructed patterns of social mobility over several decades. Moreover, he embraced the theories and methods of sociologists and used the computer to run statistical analyses of his data. Indeed, one of Thernstrom's rationales for his study was to correct the ahistorical portrayals of the same community in a series of classic sociological studies of Newburyport by William Lloyd Warner (1962). Thernstrom's findings were at the time just as exciting as his methods. He refined our understanding of the extent and meanings of social mobility in American society by finding only limited movement between occupational strata, but a significant trend toward property ownership. For poor Irish immigrants, then, the story was not one of "rags to riches," but of "rags to respectability." Owning a modest home provided just enough of a stakehold in society, according to Thernstrom's argument, to head off more radical critiques due to the dislocations of industrialization, and to allow for a new and stable social order after a period of profound social transformation.

Thernstrom was not the first historian to employ these methods or sources—an earlier work by Merle Curti (1967), for example, traced patterns of mobility in a frontier community. A number of scholars criticized his methodology: Newburyport was a way station for migration between Canada and Boston, and therefore its population was less representative; the laborers he focused on were not typical because they were the ones who stayed and, therefore, were more successful; its economy was stagnant rather than dynamic, etc. Still, social historians seized upon the manuscript census returns and other quantifiable sources as well as the substantive problem of social mobility, and conducted variants of Thernstrom's study for a range of other cities and social groups. A number of these projects were quite labor and capital intensive, involving teams of researchers and large amounts of government and foundation funding—a model of research familiar in the physical and social sciences, but terra incognita for historians. New journals and new professional organizations also grew out of the "New" Social History as well as similar movements toward more quantitative and theory-driven approaches in political history and economic history. One new journal, Historical Methods, specialized in a detailed analysis of the pitfalls and possibilities of working with such sources, and the Social Science History Association became a leading forum for the new work. The summer workshops in quantitative history at the Newberry Library in Chicago and the University of Michigan introduced a new generation of scholars to these approaches.

Looking back on those heady days, it is hard to convey the extent of the excitement and even missionary zeal that accompanied these efforts. There were, of course, detractors and critics of the various "new" histories—"it will never be literature" it was contended was—but social history was on the rise, and it was becoming the dominant field in U.S. history.

As the "New" Social History aged, however, its shortcomings became more apparent. Quantitative approaches were well suited to reconstructing past social structures and patterns in spite of the extensive methodological conundrums of working with imperfect sources, but they were less successful in yielding substantial insight into what those structures actually meant to the historical actors who lived within them. Historical audiences also grew tired of the increasingly burdensome methodological discussions that weighed down much of
the scholarship as well as the relatively unliterary quality of much of the writing. Certain things, it seems, were simply not quantifiable, and, increasingly, successful scholarship had to employ qualitative as well as quantitative sources, to use so-called "soft" data as well as the "hard" stuff.

In many ways, the publication in 1973 of Torenstrom's second book, The Other Bostonians, marked the beginning of the end of the very historiographical trend he had started. A much more ambitious study of social mobility in the larger population of Boston, it addressed many of the methodological shortcomings that characterized his earlier work. Even so, more rigorous quantifiers criticized it for not being methodologically sophisticated enough—Torenstrom did not use multivariate analysis, for example. The more telling complaints, however, had to do with the almost exclusive reliance on statistics to the exclusion of other kinds of sources and approaches. Historians now demanded some flesh and blood to put on these statistical skeletons.

CULTURE AND SOCIETY

Such sentiments and dissatisfactions resulted in a new emphasis on the role of culture—the most important of the nonquantifiable, yet essential, elements in social historical understanding. During the late 1970s and 1980s, culture assumed a more central position in the writing of U.S. Social History—not Cultural History or cultural studies, which are such important trends today, but rather the sorts of attitudes and sensibilities captured by the term mentalité.

In particular, the work of cultural anthropologist Clifford Geertz helped U.S. social historians to think about the subject in new ways. His two seminal essays, "Thick Description: Toward an Interpretive Theory of Culture," and "Deep Play: Notes on the Balinese Cockfight" (in his collected essays, 1973), suggested fresh methodologies as well as novel kinds of sources or "texts" for historical analysis. Instead of relying only on written texts or records, social and cultural rituals as well as patterns of folk and popular behavior came to be seen as legitimate repositories of historical meaning. In this way, the appeal of Geertz' work built on and continued aspects of the Annales school's influence on U.S. scholarship.

LABOR HISTORY

E. P. Thompson's (1963) classic tome The Making of the English Working Class was also one of the most important factors behind the embrace of a "softer" mode of social historical analysis. Thompson's notion of class as historically evolving, of being "made" principally by the members of the working class themselves, as well as his concepts of moral economy and time-work discipline, held sway over an entire cohort of U.S. labor historians who sought to reconstruct the world of America's working people. In contrast to earlier studies in the field, this newer generation of scholars eschewed the traditional focus on the history of labor unions and the role of organized labor in politics, and moved away from relations in the factory and into the homes, communities, and mentalité of the working class. As Herbert Gutman (1976), Alan Dawley (1976), Tom Dublin (1979), and others demonstrated, working men and women drew on a rich political legacy of Republican ideology that dated back to the American Revolution as well as the support of their own communities to resist the centralizations of economic and political power that attended the rise of industrial capitalism. In other words, they were part of an oppositional culture. These works were simply the most visible of a whole host of monographs on working-class culture and community that formed the "New" Labor History. Significantly, most of these studies employed some quantitative and social structural analyses, but they also looked into the more existential and experiential dimensions of working-class life.

As this field developed, however, some of the limitations of the working-class culture and community paradigm became more obvious. In particular, labor historians began to confront the often implicit assumptions in their work that working-class culture evolved autonomously irrespective of other classes or the relations of power in the larger society, and that it developed independently from conditions in the workplace. Instead, they began to reemphasize those relations of power, both on the shop floor at the point of production, and in the larger political arena.

Throughout the 1970s, the studies of the working class and urban and industrial communities dominated the field of U.S. social history, almost to the exclusion of other subjects. One response to this dominance was to look at the formation of other social classes, and in addi-
tion to the working class and history "from the bottom up," U.S. social historians began to apply new methods and concepts to the study of the middle class in Victorian America—a kind of history "from the middle out." Paul Johnson's (1978) study *A Shopkeeper's Millenium*, for example, analyzed the social bases of evangelical Protestantism during the 1820s and 1830s as one of the defining attributes of middle-class identity. Focusing on religious revivals and the Second Great Awakening in Rochester, New York, Johnson showed how the new religious enthusiasms grew out of more fundamental economic and social transformations caused by the completion of the Erie Canal and the extension of the market economy. Rapid economic growth created something of a "boomtown" atmosphere in Rochester, and it severed the links between master craftsmen and their apprentices, which had maintained social order. Whereas the pre-Canal social order was based on bonds of mutual interdependence between employer and employee, in the new society, those employees became free economic agents and no longer lived under the supervision of their superiors. Significantly, the new theology of the Second Great Awakening rejected Calvinist notions of predestination and made them moral free agents as well. In Johnson's argument, Rochester shopkeepers were particularly attracted to this new set of beliefs, because these freed them from their older sense of moral responsibility for their "underlings." At the same time, however, the new theology also provided a rationale for the new society by establishing a strict moral code of behavior, including abstinence from liquor, among other things, which helped to reestablish social order.

The removal of women from the processes of production and the emergence of a distinct and separate sphere of influence for them in the home is another defining attribute of nineteenth-century U.S. middle-class culture, and this was the focus of Mary Ryan's (1981) study of Utica, New York, *Cradle of the Middle Class*. This cult of domesticity or the doctrine of separate spheres represented a departure from older forms of patriarchy, and it vested middle-class women with authority over the operations of the household and rearing and educating children, and made them responsible for setting the proper religious and moral tone for the family. Such concerns also became a rationale for women's activism in the larger society. As Ryan showed, it was their very responsibility for educating their children and providing a proper environment that caused these middle-class women to move out of their private domains and into the public sphere to advocate a series of moral reforms, providing a basis for the rise of the feminist movement.

**WOMEN'S HISTORY**

As the example of Ryan's book suggests, Women's History was another important dimension of the development of U.S. Social History during this period. A number of the early studies in this field focused on the history of the women's movement and the lives of famous women. But after these, scholars began to reconstruct the experiences of more ordinary women, and the notion of separate spheres was the most important paradigm for this work. Not all women were informed by this domestic ideology, however. Nancy Hewitt's (1984) analysis of the varieties of women's activism in antebellum Rochester, New York, showed that women reformers were motivated by a range of considerations that included, but were not limited to, the cult of domesticity. Poor women and women who worked outside the home were also not subject to the more middle-class ideology of domesticity, as Christine Stansell's (1987) study of working-class women in New York City argued. And, studies of rural women, such as Nancy Gray Osterud's (1991) *Bonds of Community*, demonstrated that women were still part of the productive processes on the farm and had relationships with their spouses that were more integrated and mutual than their nonfarm counterparts. More recently, scholars have moved beyond analyzing the experiences of middle-class, working-class, and rural women to considerations of the history of sex roles and gender identities more generally, including the cultural construction of notions of masculinity and homosexuality in addition to femininity.

**RURAL HISTORY**

Social historians also branched out from studying the working class and the city by focusing on the countryside, and a "New Rural" History developed as well. Rather than concentrating on the histories of agricultural production and the state's policies for agriculture,
which were the traditional subjects of agricultural historians, this new subfield used many of the same methods and sources as other social historians to deal with the social dimensions of rural life. My own first book, for example (Barron, 1984), used both quantitative and qualitative sources to reconstruct the social, economic, and demographic processes that characterized a settled rural community. What happened to those country people who did not move to the frontier or to the city during the nineteenth century? In contrast to the rapid population turnover and social instability that characterized the frontier or urban and industrial society, I argued that older, settled rural communities became much more homogeneous and integrated over time. Steve Hahn’s (1984) important work The Roots of Southern Populism emulated studies of working-class culture and detailed rural resistance to the spread of the market economy in up-country Georgia after the civil war that was animated by collective traditions and Republican ideology.

Indeed, the question of rural responses to the rise of a market economy and the commercialization of agriculture is one of the central issues in the field, and it has fueled a heated debate between historians who argue that preindustrial farmers had values different from and in opposition to those of an emerging industrial society and scholars who regard them essentially as capitalists motivated by a spirit of liberal individualism. These are the so-called "social" and "market" perspectives, and their two most recent exemplars are, respectively, Christopher Clark’s (1990) study The Roots of Rural Capitalism: Western Massachusetts, 1780-1860 and Winifred Rothenberg’s (1992) book From Market Places to a Market Economy: The Transformation of Rural Massachusetts, 1750-1850.

IMMIGRATION AND SOCIAL IDENTITY

In addition to class and gender, and the differences and similarities between the city and the countryside, race and ethnicity have also been core concerns for U.S. social historians, and these are most directly related to the politics of identity that are so prevalent in contemporary U.S. society. Indeed, the study of the history of immigration and ethnicity is one of the most dynamic subfields in U.S. Social History, and it, too, has undergone a significant development. The inspiration for much of the recent work in this field dates back to Frank Thistlethwaite’s (1960) seminal article, which placed immigration to the United States in the broader context of an Atlantic economy, comparing it to other countries that also received immigrants. One of Thistlethwaite’s key contributions was to decenter the American focus of this history by stressing the need to consider the preimmigration experiences and conditions of the immigrants in their home countries and to recognize that immigrants often moved to destinations other than the United States and often returned to their countries of origin. Immigration, in other words, had less to do with the supposed unique character and attractions of American society and much more with the relative stages of development throughout the Atlantic world, which the immigrants themselves knew how to take advantage of for their own purposes. This strikes us now as commonsensical, but it was a significant departure from previous approaches that took a very American-centered view of the process, and depicted immigration mainly in terms of a linear and inevitable acculturation to American society.

Thus, an important feature in recent work on the history of immigrants to the United States has been the reconstruction of their experiences prior to immigration in order to understand the cultural baggage that they brought with them, and which shaped their encounters with American society. The important concept here, as it is in so much of U.S. social history, is that of agency—that the immigrants had their own agenda and understanding of what they were doing, which it is the historian’s responsibility to recognize and incorporate. Indeed, rather than assume that immigrants inevitably jettisoned this cultural baggage after arrival in order to adjust to life in America, a number of studies stress their desires and abilities to continue Old World values and behaviors. Virginia Yans-McLaughlin’s (1977) study of Italian immigrants in Buffalo, New York, for example, chronicled the way southern Italian attitudes toward women and the family persisted in American industrial society and influenced choices about domestic life and under what conditions women worked outside of the home.

More recent studies have moved beyond these models of either the abandonment or preservation of Old World values and have adopted a notion with greater nuance about a dynamic interaction between the old and the new and the creation of a new sense of ethnic identity that is distinct from either. John Bodnar’s (1985) synthesis of immigra-
tion history, The Transplanted, is the most important delineation of this perspective. The title itself is deliberately counterposed against Oscar Handlin's (1973) classic earlier overview of the subject, The Uprooted. Unlike Handlin's immigrants, Bodnar's were not ignorant peasants who were torn from their roots and at the mercy of forces beyond their control. Rather, they were, in his phrase, the "children of capitalism," who already had experiences with migration and economic transformations, and who approached the prospect and reality of migration to the United States in terms of their own priorities.

ETHNIC IDENTITIES AND SOCIAL MINORITIES

The concept of agency and the exploration of change and continuity also undergird one of the most important works on the African-American experience in the United States, Lawrence Levine's (1978) Black Culture and Black Consciousness. In a departure from more traditional source materials, Levine used mostly folkloric materials, such as music and folktales, to reconstruct the changing mentalité of African Americans. He began with the experience of slavery and the creation of what he described as a sacred and communal worldview that represented a mixture of African and Western cultural influences. With respect to the latter, however, slaves refashioned white cultural forms, such as Christianity, in ways that served their own needs and not those of their masters. After Emancipation and the great black migration to northern cities, the communal and the sacred gave way to a culture that was more secular and individualistic. Yet, as Levine brilliantly demonstrated in his discussion of the emergence of the "blues," that new sensibility built on the previous culture and retained some of its important elements. The blues was certainly a secular and an individualistic form of musical performance, but the back and forth between the singer and the music incorporated a kind of call and response that evoked older, more communal forms of song.

As the example of Levine's book suggests, the social history of African Americans has developed substantially over the past few decades. Although the earliest studies concentrated primarily on the slave experience, more recent work deals with the process of emancipation after slavery and experiences in the postbellum South as well as the great migration to northern cities during the twentieth century.

Again, one of the central lessons of this scholarship is that of agency—that blacks were not simply the victims of horrendous conditions beyond their control, but played an active role in shaping their own history in spite of severe constraints. This is particularly evident in Neil McMillen's (1989) recent book Dark Journey: Black Mississippians in the Age of Jim Crow, which chronicles black achievement in the face of some of the most draconian racial restrictions in the country.

Perhaps one of the most important recent developments in U.S. ethnic history has been a focus on other non-European groups, particularly immigrants from Asia and Mexico. Like African-American history, this new work also has links to the different liberation and social justice movements of the 1960s, but it is also part of a more general reconsideration of the history of the U.S. West, known as the New Western History. Frederick Jackson Turner's frontier thesis, which dominated the historical understanding of the U.S. West for the better part of the twentieth century, is plagued by some crucial oversights. Essentially a triumphalist master narrative of the settlement and conquest of the West by white men, Turner's vision fails to include the experiences of women, indigenous peoples, and other people of color. This is particularly striking because the region, even more than other regions of the United States, was a zone of interaction between Native Americans, Anglo-Americans, Mexican Americans, Asian Americans, and, increasingly, African Americans. Indeed, a focus on the West substantially modifies the black-white dichotomy that dominates our understanding of the dynamics of race in American society.

George Sánchez's much-praised 1993 book Becoming Mexican American: Ethnicity, Culture and Identity in Chicano Los Angeles, 1900-1945 is, perhaps, the best single study of the Chicano experience. Operating very much in the paradigm of the new immigration history, Sánchez first reconstructs preimmigration experiences in Mexico and analyzes the process of migration across the border itself. He then discusses the adjustment of Mexican immigrants to Los Angeles along a number of different lines—patterns of employment and economic adaptation, the changing role of religion and Mexican culture in their lives, encounters with American popular culture as well as more deliberate efforts at Americanization by white social reformers, and the effects of anti-Mexican prejudice and discrimination, in-
cluding the massive deportations back to Mexico during the Great Depression of the 1930s. As his title implies, Sánchez demonstrates the hybrid nature of an emerging Mexican-American sense of ethnicity, in keeping with other recent studies of different immigrant groups.

Anti-Asian sentiment is also an important factor in the social historiography of the American West, and quite a number of studies chronicle the various manifestations and effects of this form of racism. Alexander Saxton's (1971) classic study *The Indispensable Enemy* showed how anti-Chinese sentiment was instrumental in the formation of the white working class in nineteenth-century California. Roger Daniels (1981) has analyzed similar sentiments directed against the Japanese that culminated in their internment during World War II. More recent work has moved away from a depiction of Asian immigrants mainly as the victims of white racism and has presented a more multidimensional picture of their experiences that emphasizes their own agency and ability to shape their history. Such as Chang's (1986) *This Bittersweet Soil* examines the history of the Chinese in California agriculture, and Valerie Matsumoto's (1993) *Farming the Home Place* is a community study of a Japanese-American farming community through three generations.

As these studies illustrate, although much of the work on the different minority groups had its initial inspiration in the liberation movements of the 1960s, the best of it has moved beyond the celebratory ethnic nationalism that often characterized that early scholarship. Just as it is difficult to understand the history of the working class or of women in isolation from their relationships to other classes or to men, it is also a shortsighted strategy to deal with ethnic history without considering the relationships between the different groups or to the dominant culture. Indeed, the central challenges facing ethnic history are to consider precisely those interrelationships as well as the processes of acculturation and cultural change, as they affected not only the first generation of immigrants, but their children and grandchildren as well. As these scholarly efforts have matured, historians have become more attuned to the nuances of cultural change and continuity instead of insisting on the unalloyed perpetuation of a single vision of ethnic identity.

An important development along these lines has been the growing attention to the history of "whiteness," which sees the racial identity of the dominant group as historically constructed just as the identities of minority groups were. How and when white people came to see themselves as white, and to what effect, are questions that have undergirded a plethora of recent studies, ranging from analyses of interracial relations between whites, blacks, and Indians during the Colonial period to studies set in the more recent past on how the Irish became "white" or how the Jews became "white." As an important article by James Barrett and David Roediger (1997: 3-44) suggests, many European immigrants initially occupied a kind of in-between status in the racial hierarchy of American society, and the processes of Americanization and acculturation were intertwined with a developing sense of a white racial identity, both from their own perspective and from the perspectives of other groups in society.

**TWENTIETH-CENTURY SOCIAL HISTORY**

Although the field of U.S. Social History first cut its teeth on the nineteenth century, its center of gravity has shifted increasingly into the twentieth century, as the many studies of more recent immigrant groups demonstrate. At the Claremont Graduate University, I regularly teach two graduate seminars, one on nineteenth-century U.S. social history and one on twentieth-century U.S. social history, and I have been startled over the past decade by how much stronger the list of readings in the twentieth century has become. One reason for this has been the growing interest in the characteristics of consumer culture that is one of the hallmarks of modern American society. In contrast to the nineteenth century, which was dominated by the production of staples and the manufacture of producer's goods and characterized by an ethos of scarcity, the twentieth century witnessed the rise of new consumer goods as well as the economic wherewithal to purchase them. New forms of technology and communications, such as electricity, motion pictures, the radio, and the automobile, epitomized this new consumer economy, but they also provided additional momentum to spend through advertising and the powerful appeal of mass culture. The rise of consumer culture represented a sea change for American values and attitudes; a marked departure from older Victorian emphases on duty, self-restraint, and building character to a
culture of enjoyment, instant gratification, and the centrality of image and personality.

A number of important studies have focused on key agents of this change. In his 1985 book Advertising the American Dream: Making Way for Modernity, 1920-1940, the late Roland Marchand reconstructed the modernist cultural assumptions of advertising executives as they switched from representational advertising to more psychologically charged ways to sell their products during the 1920s. Susan Porter Benson’s (1986) Counter Cultures: Saleswomen, Managers, and Customers in American Department Stores, 1890-1940 portrays department stores as arenas of complicated class and gender relationships between male managers, middle-class women customers, and working-class salesgirls; while William Leach’s (1993) Land of Desire: Merchants, Power, and the Rise of a New American Culture sees them as creators of a whole new set of dreams and aspirations for American culture.

Not everyone embraced mass and consumer culture or was affected by it in the same ways, however. Steve Ross’s (1998) new study, Working Class Hollywood, shows how early motion pictures before the rise of the large studios presented alternative views of working-class life and politics, including some films that were made by leftist and labor organizations. My own recent book, Mixed Harvest: The Second Great Transformation in the Rural North, 1870-1930 (Barron, 1997), considers, among other things, how rural people did not completely accept the urban visions inherent in much popular culture, but negotiated the rise of mail-order buying and the consumer culture of the 1920s in ways that were consistent with their own values, even if this led them in directions that they did not anticipate.

Still, consumer culture and popular culture were extremely powerful forces in early twentieth-century America, and as we know from a number of studies of different ethnic groups, they exerted significant influence on the second generation—the children of immigrants. This is a central theme of Lizabeth Cohen’s (1990) prize-winning study Making a New Deal: Industrial Workers in Chicago, 1919-1939, which is one of the best and most influential works on twentieth-century U.S. social history. Cohen begins with a portrayal of Chicago immediately after World War I as a city divided into separate ethnic enclaves of different European immigrant groups and African Americans that were dominated by ethnic institutions and associations. Even their embrace of consumer culture was shaped by an ethnic perspective. Working-class Chicagoans shopped in neighborhood stores owned by their compatriots rather than the larger downtown department stores; when they bought phonographs, they typically bought records that reflected their own culture rather than more mainstream fare; and when they went to the movies, it was not at the movie palace downtown, but at the neighborhood theater, which was an extension of their ethnically bounded community. Indeed, the bonds of ethnicity were so strong that they even withstood industrial employers’ attempts to displace them and inculcate loyalty to the company through the institution of additional benefits and social welfare programs at the factory.

The onset of the Great Depression, however, changed the situation dramatically. As the severity of the Depression deepened, ethnic banks, mutual aid associations, and neighborhood stores went under. At the plant, employers retreated from the array of benefits that they had offered during the 1920s. This crisis led the workers to make a new deal for themselves by turning to electoral politics and voting for FDR, and by forging a new kind of industrial organization based on the industrial unionism of the CIO. Significantly, their common experiences with American popular culture as well as their common sense of entitlement to the benefits that had been withdrawn by their employers enabled them to transcend ethnic divisions and achieve their goals. More than most studies, then, Cohen’s uses the insights of social history to explain some of the most fundamental political and institutional transformations in twentieth-century U.S. History—the creation of the modern welfare state and the rise of the CIO.

Indeed, this fusion of Social History with the more traditional narrative of U.S. Political History is one of the most compelling attributes of Cohen’s work, and it provides a model to be emulated. There are other efforts along similar lines. Civil War historians, for example, are reanalyzing that mid-nineteenth-century conflict from a social historical perspective, as exemplified by Iver Bernstein’s (1990) book about the New York City draft riots and Drew Faust’s (1996) recent look at the experiences of Southern women during the war. Still other social historians are reorienting politics by tackling subjects that have direct implications for social policy. In particular, Thomas J. Sugrue’s (1996) book The Origins of the Urban Crisis: Race and In-
equality in Postwar Detroit picks up chronologically where Lizabeth Cohen left off and tries to explain why the promise of the New Deal and the CIO gave way to the seemingly intractable problems of the urban ghetto and the inner city.

CONCLUSION

As this brief overview indicates, the field of U.S. Social History is an inclusive one that has ranged quite broadly, considering a wide variety of class, race, ethnic, and gender issues. In fact, the social history of different groups in American society has been extremely important in facilitating both the sense of identity and the sense of empowerment that have been so central to recent political discourse in the United States. In some ways, however, that particular historiographic imperative has run its course, and it is no longer sufficient to consider the history of any single group in isolation. Instead, the key questions now revolve around the interactions between different groups and with the larger culture. Such an approach not only allows for a more nuanced view of the upsetting experiences in the American population, but it also more clearly demonstrates the impact that they have had on the larger thrust of U.S. History. This larger framed, integrative approach is the direction that current and future work in this field is likely to follow.

REFERENCES


Chapter 9

Historical Information Science: History in Information Science; Information Science in History

Lawrence J. McCrank

INTRODUCTION

Historical Computing and Information Science

Historical Information Science (HIS) is a hybrid of (1) History's theory, methods, and principles applied as metadata for description and classification in documentation (especially archival, but also museum and library special/historical collections) for information storage and retrieval, the organization of knowledge, computer-assisted data analysis, and interpretation; and, conversely, (2) Information Science (IS) applied to archives, libraries, museums, and digital source banks to assist History in searching domain literatures and research in primary materials through cataloging, indexing, and abstracting, provision of an overarching framework, bridges across disciplines and subjects, and both manual and automated access to historical sources. IS might also assist sociocultural History, especially of organizations, through a systems approach and in interpretation of such issues as ideological and technical diffusion, source gen-

A different version of this chapter, titled "Historical Information Science: A Unidiscipline at the Intersections of History, Computing, and Information Science," was originally presented at the Historia a Debate II Conference at Santiago de Compostela and published in English in those proceedings (2001). This chapter is an unpublished version of the same presentation prepared for the American Historical Association; it is included in this book because it presents a counter force to the thinking dominant in the History Under Debate forum.
eration and impact, networks and communications." This is a more embracing concept than merely quantification in History. Indeed, it is both quantitative and qualitative.

Both dimensions of HIS may be applied to a historian's personal endeavors in strategic information searching, documentation, project management, and in research or the analysis, synthesis, and interpretation of data, texts, sounds, and images. Note that searching and research are indeed two distinctive intellectual and technical processes, which often seem confused in writing about and teaching historical methods. Moreover, HIS is distinct from Historiography, the writing about History's secondary literature, except for the historiography of tracking information, its dissemination and transformation across space and in time, and its influence. A parallel feature in HIS with Historiography would be the study of historians as information users and their information-seeking behavior. Nearly fifty such studies exist from the past two decades, some highly critical, but they are seldom cited by historians, who generally do not venture into the IS domain.

History and IS have different terminologies, techniques, and styles, since the former remains closed to the Humanities and the latter operates more as a Social Science and is heavily, but not always, computer assisted. However, they share concepts, approaches to common endeavors, and social science methodologies, and both would benefit each other in designing information systems based on historical data; developing history tools for information storage and retrieval, especially in large digital source collections; and using new technologies like Geographic Information Systems (GIS), simulation, and three-dimensional visualization. All kinds of future research possibilities beckon computer-literate historians and historically minded information scientists into a common endeavor, Historical Information Science.

The history of Information Science or, more ecumenically, the Information Sciences (any of the various forms defined by tools, applications, settings, and professional affinities—e.g., Computer Science, Library Science [and the mainstream therein of scientific studies about communications and information systems use by professions and disciplines or specific domain literatures], Archival Science, Museology, etc.) is something decidedly different from the history of information technology or the institutional history of information organizations (e.g., printing and publishing, the computing and telecommunications industry, computer centers, libraries, archives, and museums). These are the common associations of History with anniversaries, as when commemorations like the fiftieth anniversary of the foundation of the American Society for Information Science (ASIS) sparked attention to an otherwise largely forgotten past. Anglo-American Information Science has evolved largely as an ahistorical discipline, and in some cases with an antagonism toward History, especially anything smacking of antiquarianism or old-style bibliography, and toward historians who have been slow in adoption of information technology and may be viewed hypercritically, therefore, as backward. This is thankfully not so much the case today, but these attitudinal barriers have kept the fields apart. Indeed, IS has a history, but this is different from the use of History in (not of) Information Science or, conversely, IS in History and the interplay between these mutually reflexive roles, which lie at the heart of Historical Information Science. In many ways History may be regarded as an Information Science: historian J. Tosh lists "to inform" as one of the cardinal roles of History with "to orient and socialize," so one might study how and how well this is done as part of the HIS agenda. Both History and IS are concerned with education and instructional technology, so here too lies some common ground. HIS, however, would function with even greater multidisciplinarity and should appropriate whatever tools new information technologies provide and contribute to their development as part of its agenda, because its practitioners operate in the largest domain of all—the infinitely expansive past.

The most common role history plays in IS literature is the customary literature review before presenting one's case study—a historiographic overview to provide a context for the research question, to demonstrate continuity with the field's primary literature, and to set up a conclusion where authors posit some significance for their own contributions. Such retrospective prologues are seldom understood as history, however, and the word history itself is little used. Historical reasoning and use of historical data are appropriated under any number of names—anything other than History: e.g., time-event analysis, temporal and memory-based reasoning, retrospective study, longitudinal research, cognitive mapping, and even belief systems, and, in education, experience-based learning. Few of the core journals, including History and Theory, The Journal of Interdisciplinary
History, Historical Methods, Social Science History, etc., are ever cited in IS primary literature, not even highly relevant work in historical computing (e.g., *Computing in the Humanities* and its *Social Sciences* counterpart, or *History and Computing*, or, for that matter, *Microcomputer History Review*). Indeed, few studies in IS form a genuine historical series or a continuous thread of revision by re-examining the data upon which prior studies were based in light of new contextual evidence, gleanings from other studies, or additional data to enlarge the original sample and thereby contribute to infinitely expandable corpora. While methodologies may be shared between History and Information Science, standards and expectations differ and, most important, the demarcation between information and evidence in the two fields is remarkable. In fact, few data archives exist for Information Science per se; manufactured data sets from research projects are seldom retained, are not commonly made available as part of the critical apparatus of publications which consist mostly of mathematical proofs and bibliographic citations, and are not routinely accessed by archives as electronic records or data sets. Indeed, what in History would be considered its secondary literature is considered primary in Information Science (making reviewing standards different as well, as noted by one HIS practitioner, M. Stieg Dalton), so that the raw data are not routinely preserved except if they are longitudinal databases, i.e., bibliographic, indexing, and abstracting services or catalogs that retain retrospective files.

At the onset, therefore, History and Information Science would seem very different. Commonality lies, not simply in retrospect, but where scientific historicism, as in Social Science History, shares similar analytic methods with Information Science; where information technology is employed, as in historical computing, for information storage and retrieval and analysis; and in the development of large data, text, and image bases, especially digital sources.

The former applications of the history of someone or something for memory's sake, cultural appreciation, and general enrichment and even entertainment—all legitimate roles for History to play—are nonetheless distinct from the application of IS in History or the use of History in IS and Computer Science (CS) applications, i.e., Information Systems Management (ISM) or, more specifically, H[istorical]ISM in a variety of endeavors, including business and particularly Management Science. The overlap is in history as social psychology and organizational behavior, change management, and collective or cultural memory. These issues in such divergent fields as History and Administrative Sciences pertain also to judgmental and subjective concerns inherent in such topics as relevance, which IS normally treats as an ostensibly objective issue. The subject, to borrow Samuel Johnson's famous dichotomy of two forms of knowledge (substantive and investigative), is less the content or events of history than knowledge discovery, use, transformation, and preservation. Stated in another way, using Jack Hexter's words, "the doing" of History, a methodological and practical expertise which might be paraphrased as historical information processing and analysis, is different from content mastery. The praxis of history is paramount in the HIS mentality, not as an endeavor for History alone, but for the historical dimension of all information in human affairs.

This rubric, Historical Information Science, can be used to distinguish such research related to methodologies—the investigative, analytic, and representational aspects of History—from purely descriptive and narrative History construed primarily as part of the Humanities for its reflective qualities, or from the ahistorical analytic IS common in the United States. It may appear to ally itself methodologically more with the Social Sciences, or with Linguistics more than with Literature, but it is no longer entirely quantitative or numeric, but is qualitative as well, and, again, it pertains to data, text, image, and sound bases viewed as electronic archives. Whereas modern Information Science has limited itself to current domains and their secondary literatures, the scope of Historical Information Science must necessarily be larger, almost all-encompassing, and relate secondary literatures to primary sources of all kinds. It is hence mediated rather than only text based.

The historical interest within IS is most evident when History itself is studied, either as a domain literature (which is not often in contrast to studies of the Sciences) or when historians are investigated in user studies. Nearly fifty of these studies exist (cf. the notable works of M. Bates, E. Blakewell, D. Case, B. Cronin, P. Conway, W. G. Jones, J. Raben, S. Siegfried, M. Stieg Dalton, H. Tibbo, S. E. Wiberley, among others), but they are seldom cited by historians, even when so germane to Historiography or especially to the history of History's professionalization in the same vein as W. Rundell's *In Pursuit of American History*. The historical element in information studies
seems more pronounced when the information to be retrieved is serialized because then time and intervals play a significant role; but it is also more apparent when retrieval pertains to visual and oral sources, cultural and social literatures, the humanities of course, and in the recent trend to blend quantitative and qualitative approaches to research. But little has been done by information scientists to develop operational procedures, formalized concepts, or research projects that are explicitly historical. Most studies, like case studies unconnected by any historical thread, are like snapshots, one case at a time, rather than a continuous motion picture; they consist of flat, however broad, survey analyses that to the historian would seem superficial, without the depth, trends analysis, or long-range perspective associated with History. Even research syntheses in Information Science as epitomized in _Annual Review of Information Science and Technology (ARIST)_ tend to be short-range, culturally defined, and limited to English and translations, and pertain primarily to the academic elite and socially and economically advantaged. The multigenerational, -class, -cultural, and -lingual embrace of History is lacking. History could provide IS more depth, breadth, and complexity, and a continual synthesis where hindsight aids future research in information studies. But to do so, historical research operations must be developed more explicitly and formally by historians who too often lump everything under “historical methods” which are seldom identified and defined operationally. Even the indexing in _Historical Methods_ fails to do so, and reviewing in the _American Historical Review_ and other journals largely ignores the issue.

Professional collaboration might remedy this problem. Consider possible exchanges between the AHA, SAA, and ASIS, for example. If ASIS were the American Society for Information Science, as its name indicates, it could promote the integration of History and IS as Historical Information Science in addition to the history of Information Science, information technology and the IT industry, and information organizations and institutions. Recently a cohort within this latter association is recovering the IS discipline’s history, but efforts toward the latter objective are difficult to identify in the field. European examples in both historical and information studies are more plentiful. In any case, History has so much more to offer than cultural enrichment, and, reciprocally, IS has much to offer History. The case for symbiosis can be argued in a variety of ways.

The term _Historical Information Science_ has not been used often in the United States in either History or Information Science, and was perhaps first introduced generally to the ASIS community in my benchmark review for _ARIST_ (1995). Its editors understandably balked then at using the term as the title of this review because _ARIST_’s readers might not understand what it meant. While some have used the term _adisciplinary_ to describe activities above and beyond a core discipline, I prefer the Analects concept of a unidiscipline to stress the integrating character of HIS. One cannot assume a lack of discipline in integrated studies or that these are only general studies. What might be included? The hybrid envisioned here is described more fully in my current _Historical Information Science_, which concentrates on developments since the advent of personal computing rather than the earlier controversial Cliometric movement. It surveys the historiography relating to the move from scientific historicism to historical discourse in the twentieth century and what this means for the notion of Historical Information Science, but its recent focus is on the impact of information technology on History; history, memory, and organizational culture; library and archives user studies of historians and bibliometric studies of History’s literature; archival science and electronic archives especially; New History, socioeconomic research methods, and historical computing; organizational behavior and culture, especially as this aids in large-scale, collaborative project management; the integration of text, image, and databases; interactive media for simulation and visualization; and current information technology issues, such as obsolescence, “fixing” data and security, and electronic record preservation; and History education and the technical training of historians. This attempts to describe HIS as something more than traditional interdisciplinary intellectual borrowing across established borders, one discipline from another, but as a dissolution of such boundaries and something actually more multidisciplinary in character. It might be described aptly as “interstitial,” as did Drexel University’s information scientists Howard White and Katherine McCain (1998), for studies that fit poorly into the “home paradigm,” i.e., one of those hybrid activities lying at the interstices of traditional domains.
HIS may be seen as an extension of the older concept of "Historical Informatics" used throughout the 1980s to describe History computing (cf. the bibliographic coverage of History and computing by the Association for History and Computing [AHC, 1993-], and such compilations as by N. Fitch, G. D. Garson, C. L. Crosby, S. R. Grossbart, A. Greenstein; J. Raben, H. Tibbo, J. Reiff, and myself, among others). Informatics has been used commonly to describe interdisciplinary computing and documentation, but is not always synonymous with Information Science, as Hans Wellisch has shown. Informatics in History still resonates with older scientific historicism and empiricism, although in a less doctrinaire fashion. The term has become simply synonymous with any historical computing.

Usage

The application of Informatics to computing in History, as something more than quantification or the Cliometrics of U.S. History during the late 1960s and early 1970s, is discernible in Europe from the foundation in 1962 of the Société pour l'Informatique et Applique (SIA) by Philippe Dreyfus and his colleagues, and Aleksandr I. Mikhailov's use of Informatica to describe Informatic Abstracts (1963) and subsequently to expand its scope beyond the hard sciences. In French, informatique came to mean the modern science and techniques of electronic information processing. If the scientific connotation were retained, it is in connection with History as a Social Science, or what in the United States came to be called Social Science History (again, distinct from the history of the Social Sciences).

In Paris Annoniste medievalists employed the term Informatics by 1977 in their Informatique et histoire medievale (today see Le Medieviste et l'Ordinateur). French computing historians like Jean-Philippe Genet (1978 and most recently in 1995) have continued to interpret the term very broadly, as have French-Canadian demographic historians who adopted the term in the 1980s (e.g., Bouchard [1987], Charbonneau [1988], later J. Igartua, and Anglophone colleagues C. Gaffield, I. Winchester, etc.) Methodes informatiques were any historical methods using computers. It was used more empirically, however, by Soviet quantification historians led by Ivan Koval'chenko (1982). His collaborator Leonid Borodkin subsequently used the term istoricheskaia informatika (1986-) to relate mathematics and History and use of computers in historical research (partly because Russian does not have a verb form for computing, only the noun, i.e., History and Computers). Informatics was widely adopted as the preferred term thereafter in Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States by the national chapters of the international AHC. The idea has undergone continued refinement. Manfred Thuller, whose contributions are the most significant for his generation, in 1994 made a distinction in historische fachinformatik between source-oriented computing and scientific computing and modeling, which others, like Peter Doorn from the Netherlands Data Archives in 1996, rejected as a remnant of older debates about objectivity and determinism versus relativity and probabilism—one among many lingering "misunderstandings."

Recently, however, Historical Informatics has been perceived as more scientific than technical, requiring a larger intellectual framework than data processing alone afforded. The Austrian medievalist Ingo Kropac, for example, in 1987 (pp. 43-45) defined Historical Informatics as "the science of a formal processing of information out of and about historical source[s] and phenomena." Stemming from the acrimonious controversies surrounding early Cliometrics, historians remain cautious and sometimes hypercritical about quantification alone, so that combinations of quantified and qualitative approaches are more welcome. Some studies have begged the question of theory behind the technique. Moreover, rather than to emphasize computing as doing faster what had been done manually, as in IS, the emphasis shifts to doing History differently with greater innovation than number crunching of census data resembling old-style Cliometrics; perceiving of the past differently as a dual process more interactive with the present; using mediation, modeling, and reconstruction in addition to narration and connecting the past with the present through new technology, including digital data, new forms of representation, and visualization, combinations of sources and analytic methods, and knowledge discovery.

Concept Development

Increasingly such thinking led in the 1990s to further expansion of the concept beyond computing as data processing, combining quantitative and qualitative methods and a greater array of Social Science
methods and applications of Linguistics computing, whereby Historical Informatics was transformed into Historical Information Science. L. Borodkin (1992) and his circle therefore began translating istoricheskaia informatika as Historical Information Science to replace Informatics, and others have followed suit. Among these, Jan Oldervoll (1994) of Norway’s social data archives at Bergen, as AHC president speaking to the Organization of American Historians, attempted to make a sharp distinction between Information Science in History and its Library Science or its bibliometric counterpart in Information Science. The latter was seen as irrelevant—mistakenly, as I have argued elsewhere. Historians need to pay attention to Information Science, since IS techniques for information storage and retrieval are very applicable and information searching is a prerequisite for research, and analytic methods employed are essentially those of the Social Sciences which History shares. Conversely, information scientists need to understand History since it envelops a common form of personal and social cognition, creates identities and defines questions, frames and structures discourse, classifies (especially through geography and periodization, as in defining courses) and popularizes common historical rubrics (even if it decries vocabulary standardization and fails to develop thesauri or formal terminologies for information retrieval), and it acts as a pervasive form of dialectic and a forum for reflective criticism. But even more relevant to IS strategies and techniques, historical reasoning is fundamental to information processing in Western culture and its formalization in information work is more pervasive than is often recognized except for recall (i.e., history tools).

The 1996 conference of the IAHC at Lomonosov or Moscow State University addressed the need for and development of “a theory of historical computing.” There I. Kropač (1996 [1998]), more than any of his fellow European historians, elaborated upon Historical Informatics as Historical Information Science based on communication theory in a manner perhaps most conciliatory toward Information Science as represented in ASIS. In expanding upon Johann G. Droysen’s late nineteenth-century theories of communication and historical methodology (a classic of scientific historicism that anticipates thinking heralded a century later as something new in Information Science), Kropač defined historical research as “a process of cognition, in which we deduce and process information out of sources to put theory-based knowledge about the human past empirically into a concrete form.” History thereby is seen as almost synonymous with information transfer from past to present; historic cognition is established by the “diagnostic transmission of information” which entails historical signals (terms, descriptors, symbols, models, and even whole cognitive structures) in the contemporary reconstruction of historical views. One role of HIS is to assist with the discernment between legitimate forms of cognition based on authentic records and evidence, not just information, and certainly not mere opinion, and as distinct from the purely imaginative or simple illusion, e.g., history versus fiction. Both are creative constructs, but one is source-based evidential imitative reconstruction, the other source-influenced imaginative construction, and, hence, History, as distinct from Literature.

I have defined HIS in my Historical Information Science (2002) as the scientific study of historical information and of information and communication technologies, and the techniques, methods, and intellectual frameworks by which we extract meaning from historical sources. This includes the creation of sources and their use in original context, historical use, and current use in studying History. This broad, integrative, and unifying super-discipline concerns records of all kinds, but especially electronic sources and archives because of the application of modern information technology for their access and analysis; historical and contemporary information access and retrieval; meta-history and metadata in documentation; data-text-image analyses; forensics and computing applications; and all information technologies applied in historical research, communication, and instruction.

Here “historical information” means (1) information transfer through time, from the past to the present; (2) information diffusion or geographic spread; and (3) its reinterpretation that takes into account its origin and context, its transformation and changing contexts and reception, and the parallel histories of related meta-data, systems regeneration, and surrogation, as well as a continuous interpretative history or historiography. Such a multidimensional approach is far more complicated than is usually undertaken in Information Science for the study of recent and current information, as if this existed in a
historical vacuum. History, because of its irreducible complexity and resistance to simplification, limitation of repeated observation firsthand and reliance on mediated observation, and penchant to extol the unique and exceptional as much as follow the rule and describe the norm, is very complex Information Science.

As editor Martha Williams (1995, p. 211) conceded in reaction to my ARIST review, “there are commonalities of technique, methodology, and technology among history, archives, and information science,” but such commonalities are often hidden under different terminologies in the various disciplines. Real differences exist, such as the aforementioned standard of evidence imposed in History, that seem more akin to Law where documentation and especially archival records are seen as something far more concrete than how information is interpreted in Library-oriented Information Science. Evidential standards in History, as in the actuarial fields or as outlined in the Federal Judiciary Handbook for the submission of social science research into legal proceedings as evidence, seem to go beyond the methodological correctness of Information Science or the latter's explicit operations and efforts at precision and clarity in contrast to the former’s implicit sense or complexity, ubiquitous reliance on integrity as much as formal standards, and confusion of methods. The idea of “authentic records” in archival science, based on the older tradition of Diplomatics (recently resurrected in American Archival Science, due largely to archivist L. Duranti), is quite distinct from most definitions and interpretations of information in modern Information Science (unless these are totally embracing or “discipline independent,” as attempted in 1997 by R. Losee). The language problem in cross-disciplinary research is often difficult to overcome, but then so are attitudinal barriers that stifle such creative hybridization.

Where has historical computing evolved into something more than number crunching of census data, into what is described here as a nascent Historical Information Science? Are there any examples and models for such future research and development? Expert systems like Legia I-IV at the University of Leige and other decision support systems have been designed by C. Desama, S. Pasleau, and others, to correlate personal names with places, movements, and families, etc., to gauge the probabilities or confidence levels of identifications. Such methods have been replicated at historical research centers in Graz for medieval charters by I. Kropač; by G. Jaritz at Krems for art images; at the CNRS in Paris in a series of socio/ethnohistorical dissertations; and these have been incorporated into Kleu software developed specifically for historical research by M. Thaller at the Max Planck Institut für Geschichte at Göttingen (English version was developed at the University of London by P. Denley et al.), and in Social Data Archives such as that at Bergen, where Thaller now works. The Historical Informatics Laboratory at Lomonosov University in Moscow has pioneered in software development for the application of fuzzy logic to historical data (Fuzzylasts [1993] by the husband-wife team of I. Garshkova and L. Bordokin). As already mentioned, Canadian historical demographers in Montreal and other projects like that of C. Gaffield for Vancouver Island may be included in this select list of innovative research centers. The Los Angeles History project shows promise of joining this league, and perhaps the multidisciplinary project in formation for Chicago will likewise take advantage of these newer developments, but models in the United States for collaborative historical research that takes advantage of current progress in information technology are still difficult to identify. Historians take advantage of data archives such as the University of Michigan’s ICPSR and North Carolina State University’s data clearing house, but History is a minority interest in these social science research enterprises. Institutes for advanced historical research like those at Princeton, the Humanities Center in the North Carolina Research Triangle, or in our richest research libraries, have not developed such potential. An exception may be developments at the University of Virginia growing out of Ed Ayres’s innovative Civil War project. One can point to other centers for textual computing like that at Oxford University, at the universities of Chicago, California (Berkeley), South Carolina, etc., but these have been Literature based rather than History centered. Nothing for History exists on the scale of funding or impact in information systems and database development as the J. P. Getty Institute for Art History. Although think tanks like the Santa Fe Institute have experimented with new approaches to social and economic data, they have not addressed History directly or concentrated on the problems presented by historical research. The kind of thinking about historical and world systems represented by I. M. Wallenstein and his colleagues at the Fernand Braudel Center at Binghamton would seem to present challenge enough for those drawn to modern complexity theory, fractals, belief systems and computational pattern
ual information, and fuzzy computing to deal with imperfect data and historical ambiguity. Indeed, the European institutes that have concentrated on methodological and operational research and technical developments of historical information have no counterpart in the United States, not even those universities offering dual graduate-degree programs between History and Library, Archival, or Information Sciences, or those History Departments claiming specialization in historical methodology.

For all the talk about historical methodology in historiography and lead journals devoted to this subject in the United States today, operational definitions are lacking; case studies to try specific methods and techniques rather than explore a new subject are wanting also; reviewing allows methods to remain undefined except in dissertations; and the formal discipline of documentation, as in analytic bibliographic, archival, and codicological description, seems undeveloped despite lip service to source criticism. Few methodologies appear to be uniquely historical, few new methods are developed within History, the historical enterprise has devoted meager resources to methodological and operations research, and the means for the systematic evaluation of new methods and techniques in other fields or developments in information technology for applications in History rest on the good intentions of a few volunteers rather than any organizational foundation. The History profession could use the development of a cadre of historical information scientists and research institutes for scientific methodology, technique, and adoption of modern information technologies to historical research and teaching, which is a call for something more than historians using computers to pursue their individual research agendas or perpetual conferencing in person or through H-Net without collaborative production of standards, terminologies, formats, systems, and methods, etc., or more, truly interactive, comprehensive, and large-scale historical information systems.

Information from the past informs the present, but requires synthesis, interpretation, and assimilation. This is what historians do as an art, but ideally with evidence and a scientific basis. By definition, information does not exist in the future but at the present, and all IS subject matter becomes historical in time. Future historians will have no choice but to engage current information technology, or they will have to write fiction for lack of sources. As Marshall McLuhan artic-


Chapter 10

The Historian As Subject and Object

Adeline Rucquoi

Much has been said since the beginning of 1990s about the “crisis” of history (Noiriel, 1996). This has been defined occasionally as History in “shreds,” i.e., a discipline whose members no longer constitute a unified community and whose methods were no longer innovative and whose objectives were not developing further (Dossé, 1987). The greater part of the studies and analyses devoted to this question are therefore concerned either with (1) historiographic tendencies and their renewal or (2) the various aspects of the “profession” of the historian in the late twentieth century.

Little study has been dedicated, nonetheless, to those influences that might play an important role in the shaping of the future historian, in the availability of certain instruments for the apprehension of events, in the manner of interrelating such events, or even in the choice of the themes to which one would dedicate part of his or her professional life. This “basic” shaping process does not, however, pertain only to historians. History is not, in effect, the preserve solely of those who have made of this discipline a way of life, albeit that many studies of the “crisis” seem to confine their interest entirely to those who are professionals in the field. Every society has felt an interest in History and has recounted it differently, in accord with its own prevailing philosophy; dualism in the Persian civilization, the eternal return in the Greek view of the world, the concept of progression in the Jewish and Christian idea of things to come, the struggle between the barbarian and the civilized man in the thinking of Ibn-Khaldun, etc. History is indubitably a key element in the identity of

This chapter was translated by Warwick David Orr.
individuals and that of a collective which possesses an identity itself. Consider Jean-Philippe Genet’s (1997) observation that

"[the twofold function of history is, on the one hand, in constructing an image of the past, to fix the references which will allow one to judge and to situate the present, and on the other hand, in assuring the collective identity, to permit the individual to recognize and affirm himself as an integral member of a collective also possessed of a definite identity."

Even so, this social function of History was widely utilized by the fledgling republics of the nineteenth century. In France, with which I am most familiar, for example, the “history of France” bestowed on all the inhabitants of the country the same “Gallic” ancestors and exalted the figures of Charlemagne, St. Louis, Louis XIV, and Napoleon, and was one of the foundations of patriotism. This case is applicable to so many others; the subject may be particular, but the experience is commonplace. All this had a certain logic: by means of a generally chronological account of the facts, the history of France, as in other countries, showed a progression toward the nation and toward a “national” identity. Nonetheless, beyond its political ends, such relating of History to one’s history established a casual if not causal relationship between events and allowed them to be understood within a particular context.

As of the 1970s, however, the teaching of History in schools underwent a radical change. A History determined by chronology and geography—the Greek world of the fifth century B.C. preceded the Roman Empire, Spanish expansion in the sixteenth century succeeded the medieval centuries, the industrialization of England in the nineteenth century was studied after the American and French Revolutions—was replaced by a History conceived of as “areas of knowledge” out of context. Thus, several generations of schoolchildren set themselves to learning in discrete categories about “the peasant,” “warfare,” or “commerce,” etc., as if these had been or had occurred throughout time supposedly from their origins until the present, and in this way they touched on a History that was atemporal, fractured, and decontextualized. On the other hand, research in the immediate was well promoted by asking children and adolescents to turn themselves into their own historians and to write the history of their family, town, or other familiar terrain. The New History study plans in France continue this double pathway. Supporting his stance with Marc Bloch (1974: 56)—who, in fact, was quoting François Simiand to say that History is “une connaissance par traces”—a Secretary of Education in France went to the extent of requesting that History books for schoolchildren should supply them with such “traces.” The child would not read the “history” of Charlemagne, but rather would discover in this book, for example, a copy of a Carolingian capitular list, a photograph of a coin from the period, another of the palace at Aix-la-Chapelle, and extracts from a chronicle relating some event or another; and by means of such “clues,” it is supposed that each student should be able to “reconstruct” the history of the reign of Charlemagne. Work seen as demanding of the most sophisticated historian is thus reduced to child’s play and first impression is confused with the best learning because it is so individualized—and trivialized.

Within this system, the teaching of History ceases to be a chronological study (i.e., logical based on sequential time), to be turned into a series of dissociated and compartmentalized pieces of “knowledge” with no bearing on one another, and whose relation to the person acquiring them could hardly be more parochial, personal, or subjective. If one were a peasant’s son, one would feel a stronger inclination toward this “area of knowledge” or “the peasantry,” or if the subject of study were one’s own district, one would remember more distinctly what one has learned about it—but no other class or station in life, or other worlds.

Given that schooling is compulsory, education has a role relevant to each student, but therefore also to the shaping of the future historian. This notwithstanding, schools are not the sole influence configuring, informing, conforming, or even deforming him or her. Among the many ways in which historians are formed, the language and subject matter of the cinema and the television play a role which has not always been justly appraised, despite that sociologists have been analyzing for decades the impact of “images” on their contemporaries. The recurrent violence among youth in the United States has aroused debate between those who cast the blame onto the parents—that is, onto traditional education—and those who consider that television and the cinema are the culprits. Nobody doubts that the great superproductions of Hollywood during the 1950s-1960s, which range from the chivalrous _The Knights of the Round Table to Ivanhoe_ and a perennial _Robin Hood_ , inspired more than one vocation as a
medievalist, in the same way as the saga of Indiana Jones oriented certain young spectators toward Archaeology. Nevertheless, if cinematographic subjects are important and stimulate the imagination of viewers, the language used is nonetheless stimulating, nor is the manner of filming and transmitting what in former times was known as a “message.” Many years ago, Luis Suárez Fernández had some premonition about this situation and set about designing a cinema course at the University of Valladolid which he urged History students to attend.

The cinematographic language of the past decade or two is radically different from the one which prevailed in Hollywood’s heyday. Whether in a “cult film” of the type represented in Bram Stoker’s Dracula (Francis Ford Coppola, 1992), Seven (David Fincher, 1995), or The Matrix (Larry and Andy Wachowski, 1999), or in a television series such as The X-Files or Profiler, the language employed follows the norms of advertising and so-called “video-clips,” often accompanied by music and imposed over a series of rapid, shocking, and often provocative images. Anyone who has seen any of these films or television series will have reached the conclusion that, for instance, the change in media during the 1980s-1990s was much greater than anything offered in the 1950s. Scenes tend to be dark, allowing one to glimpse indefinite forms and characters who move about without ever becoming clearly perceptible. When a light is lit, it provides very localized focus which permits the spectator’s attention to be attracted, led really, to a single highlight of the overall scene. The brusque and irregular movements of the bearer of the light beam, on the other hand, give no leeway for this spectator to fix attention on a particular spot. Glimpses, rapid flashes, and impulses dominate over reflective viewing. This succession of medium shots, interspersed scenes, and close-ups all contribute to reinforcing the impact of disconnected and barely glimpsed images which are always surrounded by darkness. The objective is not, as it was in such detective genre films of the 1940s-1950s as The Maltese Falcon (John Huston, 1941), to sustain the mystery until the very end of the story, thereby awakening curiosity in the spectator and putting to the test one’s ability to interrelate the elements, whether visual or spoken, that might allow him to come to a conclusion. If in Laura (Otto Preminger, 1944) or To Catch a Thief (Alfred Hitchcock, 1955) the art of the filmmaker consisted in leaving the spectator in doubt as to the truth about the characters as a result of his or her being aware of only one point of view, e.g., the detective or the heroine, the films of today, in the language employed, seek before all else, or solely, to arouse in the viewer emotions, impressions, and sensations, but less to elicit curiosity, exercise logic, or develop language arts. Many present-day filmmakers do not attempt to offer audiences a comprehensible story: they no longer create an empathy with the tale but rather with the feelings of the characters, “feelings” which are primitive and irrepresible impulses of love, terror, or anguish. The prevailing cinematographic language, in never offering a complete image, in being immersed in obscurity, and in employing repeatedly brief and stuttering shots, blurs the distance between the protagonist of a film and the film’s spectator: henceforth, the viewer suffers with the protagonist, fears with the protagonist, and undergoes terror or delight in a game in which the tale related is no longer of any great moment.

The relationship between the filmmaker and spectator is not, therefore, established on a rational footing. The former no longer recounts to the latter a logical and “comprehensible” story. The latter, in turn, does not use the power of reasoning to “understand” what the author means, or, when appropriate, to derive from the narrated story a “moral” or certain general human and social consequences. Through the cryptic language used, the film authors or those of television series address the viewer individually, and as an irrational individual at that. No analytical means are supplied that might allow a viewer to evaluate facts as presented and raise into a social dimension the particular case being narrated. Instead the goal is to evoke certain primal and emotive reactions, a flush of sensations like terror, anguish, or delight, but never a logical and rational response, because it is assumed that entertainment need not educate. Moreover, many of the subjects in present-day cinema come from the unreal and the irrational. They are articulated as the tales of vampires, alien life-forms, mummies which rise from the dead, unexplained events, the plotings of mysterious persons with affinities to certain governments, angels that dwell with mortals, and even the immortals themselves. Times have changed—so too has culture. Whereas The Body Snatchers (Don Siegel, 1956) was a fable seeking to warn about the peril from communism in capitalist societies, Independence Day (Roland Emmerich, 1996) was a mere spectacle aspiring to exalt individual heroism and fustigate personal collaborationism and cowardice.
Presented with a factionalized view of History in schools and bombarded by such impressions in popular entertainment, one is besieged by the impression that he or she has neither the capacity nor the desire to analyze, immersed in a tide of images that are elusive to thought because they are dissociated, the individual today is reduced to himself or herself, to personal capacity as a sensitive being, while at the same time losing sight of the existence of an organized and comprehensible society. There no longer exists anything beyond oneself or sensations, drives, feelings, desires, or impressions in such a cultural and social milieu. Teaching in schools a history as only personal and individual, over which one has “proprietorship,” because this epitomizes relevance, is tantamount to the same short-sightedness in the entertainment industry, when no account of an elaborated and logical kind concerning the past of a society is provided as heritage and as the individual’s inheritance larger than his or her personal and immediate experience. In both cases little is done than addition to a popular current in which the necessary distance between subject and object has been totally confused. Seeing oneself as a “victim” is a natural response of an individual overwhelmed by events all around which make no sense and for which no perspective is framed historically or experientially; the individual is unable to analyze these precisely because he or she merely suffers them. Such reactions are increasingly understandable given the aforementioned tendencies in education and popular culture.

Paul Freedman and Gabriele Spiegel pointed out in 1998 the increased interest in “altery” on the part of the younger generation of North American medievalists. The fruit of postmodernism, feminist discourse, and deconstruction, this altery, according to these authors, took shape as the Middle Ages, rediscovered as grotesque, essentially different, and finally incomprehensible. Forsaking the pathways opened by the historians of the first half of the twentieth century, who sought to underline continuity between the Middle Ages that had invented both centralized and authoritarian governments and individual liberties, and the United States of their time, these North American medievalists of recent decades have evinced interest in the excrement forms of religious devotion, in sexuality and sexual deviations, heresy, death, blood and bodily humors, violence and intolerance, and the manifold appearances of marginality. The medieval period, which could well seem remarkably “exotic” to a young North American, is not so to a European who sees all around the proof of its existence: Romanesque and Gothic churches, civic buildings, and the layout of cities, bridges, castles, and so forth. The specialist in modern history will also discover the material vestiges of the period that interests him or her and will thereby be able to situate himself or herself more readily within a historical continuity, in which events may be “understood” and causal relationships established even when instances of rupture are detected.

The most recent tendencies among younger historians do not seem, however, to accord with what Marc Bloch (1974: 117-160) asked of the historian: that one should (1) “comprehend” and not “judge”; (2) control one’s passions to not be carried away or caught up in the object of study; (3) be able to “abstract [one]self” to apprehend a society; and (4) should employ “causal relationships as a tool of historical knowledge.” If Freedman and Spiegel’s characterization is right, the historian no longer this thinking subject endowed with logic and capable of making use of a critical spirit for the analysis of a given object or, if a “professional” in the discipline, no longer capable of elaborate discourse in which the present is explained by the past and the past is understood from the present. Is the historian to become an irrational individual at the mercy of emotions and desires, feelings and impressions, like a person merely in search of [one]self. The “return of the subject” is not the return of the individual as the object of study, but rather that of the subject who takes oneself as the object of one’s own study (Le Goff, 1995: 157-165).

The first consequence of this profound “individualization” of History is to be found in the choice for study of the contemporary period by the vast majority of those who enroll in History department courses. A number of explanations can be advanced for this “interest” in contemporary History, this being in many cases a “history of the present time,” among which are the volume and accessibility of available documentation. It is supposed from the beginning that, for instance, twentieth-century newspapers are more easily read than a Byzantine text from the seventh century A.D. or a court case of the seventeenth century. Another factor is the greater variety and number of opportunities for employment supposedly presented by study of the contemporary, with allusions to professional opportunities in the fields of journalism, politics, “heritage” fields like museums, or publishing (Bédarida, 1988: 283-290). One also hears of a “demand” on
the part of the “wider public” for subjects from contemporary history. A journal like *L'Histoire* founded in France twenty years ago, which has some 20,000 copies printed monthly, gives pride of place to the history of the past hundred years, with issues dedicated almost entirely to “The Genesis of the Cold War,” “The Explosion of Nationalism,” “The Period of Class Struggle,” or “Les trente glorieuses, 1945-1975,” as if all such subjects were contemporary only.

Might we not think that the younger historian choosing the contemporary for immediate or lifetime study, far from thinking practically about possible employment opportunities or social “demand” for mass coverage of miniscule aspects of recent human history, may be simply searching for oneself? This choice on the part of the grandson of a World War II resistance fighter by any study relative over the policies of the Communist Party in the period 1940-1945, to the networks of the Resistance in a given region, or to German propaganda throughout the war, etc., is probably a means to understanding himself through a history envisaged, above all, as enlarged family history. The same may be the case for the son of a combatant in the war in Algeria, or of an activist against that war. Any historian knows that traditional memory covers three generations: (1) that of the witness and of his father and grandfather; (2) these latter provide knowledge to inform the instance of the former. Beyond the third generation all memory not previously committed to writing is lost. The systematic study of the past hundred years offers a view of History that is an astonishing correspondence with traditional memory: one studies the history of one’s family to the point to which oral memory reaches, namely, three generations, or some one hundred years. In short, one studies oneself. Subject and object are the same.

The “interest” in contemporary history, which seems to be not so much in History itself as in the writing of one’s own history, and which is an undeniable phenomenon in view of the proportion of History students who in any university choose that period, may be taken, therefore, as a manifestation of the individual in search of oneself, of the subject who takes self and its immediate context as the object of investigation. This tendency is also to be found in another characteristic of present-day historical study. The political and social vindication of minorities, and in the case of women of nonminorities, dictated in the name of equity, fairness, and inclusion, but under a policy of “quotas” for the bestowal of equal opportunity on all, soci-

ety as a whole is submitted to the interests of the individual—an influence seen as partial to and disseminating from the United States of America. It is therefore appropriate to place within the anguished search for oneself, characteristic of too many younger historians, this other individual history, i.e., that of the “group,” the “clan,” or the “minority” to which the subject may belong.

Consider a controversial example from a vast array where controversy abounds because of the close identification of self as both subject and object resulting in a proprietization of History. The representatives of certain currents in feminism have proclaimed on more than one occasion that the History of Women is a field proper to women themselves: by virtue of being a woman, any member of the female sex is capable of studying the History of Women, whether this be as Gender History or as an avatar of the class struggle, while males, as men, are disqualified from this particular branch of knowledge. Such History as that which privileges the individual or one group over the other, in the name of specialization or needed emphasis because of past omission, is exclusionary, closed, inbred, and insider in nature. In this vein, the history of Jews should be restricted to Jews, that of the Muslims to Muslims, and that of homosexuals to homosexuals, etc. If a woman, in her capacity as woman, were bound to study a history which becomes her own—and because it is “her own”—then would not the practicing Catholic devote himself or herself only to the history of the Church? Would a Breton have to focus analysis on themes relating to Brittany? Should not a Corsican dedicate himself or herself exclusively to the history of Corsica? And would Alsatians limit their horizons to the Rhine in the east and the Vosges in the west? The problem here does not arise from the fact that a woman may study a subject relevant to the history of women, or that an Alsatian may devote his or her intellectual energies to the development of urban life in Strasbourg. It arises from the more and more patent obvious identification established between the subject studying and the object studied. The problem is undisciplined subjectivity and confusion in popular education and entertainment between self-development and self-gratification and History.

We discover in such dilemmas of choice and vision the same “empathy” that cinematographic language arouses between the real spectator and the protagonists of fiction when the historian, as student or practitioner, no longer engages in science in the terms set out by Marc Bloch at the beginning of his *Apologie pour l’histoire*, but rather
writes and rewrites, untringly, the same history of the same object, himself or herself, thereby abolishing the distance or objectivity that the word science introduces into the discipline. "History" disappears in favor of "memory" in such cases, with limited scope and vision, and all the subjectivity that such self-focus entails instead of that objective stance devoid of passion, embued comprehensiveness, or broad understanding, which ought to be the hallmark of the historian.

Cinematographic language does not constitute the only influence on young people and the future supply of historians. The subjects in fashion in films and television series, together with the proliferation of special effects, nurture surrealism and ahistorical if not anti-historical tendencies, such as those already discussed, and continue to blur the distinction between the real and unreal, thereby giving credence to what now goes under the name of "virtual reality." Nobody doubts that fantasy may be more appealing than statistics, or novels more pleasurable reading than treatises on law. The historical genre, when romances and novels appeared in the Middle Ages, belonged to the field of moral philosophy in which the relating of acts and deeds, facts of the past, had to place models of behavior on view and serve as a "lesson" (Brezzi, 1991: 235-241). The drama—or the felicity—of Don Quixote resides precisely in his inability to distinguish "which of the two books is the more truthful" or his inability to separate history from the novel. In principle, the former belongs presently to the Sciences—not to fiction.

The choice of subject, the scope of study, and the distance one imposes in historical research as a matter of objectivity remain significant for the minority which, leaving contemporary history to others, dedicates itself to the medieval or early modern periods which are not seen popularly as relevant fields of inquiry. Just as Paul Freedman and Gabrielle Spiegel were able to show the rediscovery of a grotesque Middle Ages replete with the most vile of human biological manifestations—blood, pus, and disease—so one discerns in the choice of subject by students in France an inclination toward the irrational, the supernatural, and, as a general norm, all that eludes the exercise of reasoned analysis. At Lyon II University, for instance, where students could choose in Medieval History between options dedicated to "The Medieval City" and another titled "Religious History: Practices and Deviations," almost 90 percent choose this latter, and more for the "deviations" than past "practices." It is not that religious history is in itself an irrational subject unsuusceptible to the application of the same scientific criteria as those applicable in any other historical field; the History of Mentalities and Cultural History are, with the appropriate incorporation of analytical methods derived from Anthropology, Philosophy, and Psychology, branches of historical knowledge. The problem emerges, nonetheless, when the young historian who chooses "deviations" in religion instead of the study of urban history has no prior religious training or, in choosing personalized interests, any experience with deviance of any kind. Is it not probable that as the product of a secular society and education system such a historian might treat the study of heresies, the belief in angels, accounts of specters, etc., as if the matter were one concerning vampires or alien life-forms, because this is the extent of the fore-knowledge brought to such study, and will do so with a corresponding lack of detachment.

The taste for the irrational (popular cults, apparitions, representations of Hell or Heaven, accounts of miracles, the presence of witches, and so forth) is linked in France as it is in the United States to an interest in the most "animal" manifestations of humans: e.g., violence and suffering, as the case with the Inquisition and multitudinous other accounts of torture, rape, and mutilation; sex, as in the control over or inhibition of sexual drives, accepted and rejected forms of sexuality, menstruation, sexual continence, and impotence; and irrational conduct, as with anorexia, self-mutilation, and insanity, etc. Here again may be observed a certain influence of theiconographic models offered in films. The Middle Ages and Early Modern periods are directly inspired by and re-created from the most brilliant miniatures more than any paintings—recall once more The Knights of the Round Table, Robin Hood, Ivanhoe, or The Cid (Anthony Mann, 1961)—succeeded by images that aspired to be more "realistic" in representing bygone times. From The Canterbury Tales and The Decameron of Pier Paolo Pasolini to The Lion in Winter (1968), The Return of Martin Guerre (1983), The Name of the Rose (Jean-Jacques Annaud, 1986) and Henry V (Kenneth Branagh, 1989), and Braveheart (Mel Gibson, 1995) in the interim, an aesthetic of wretchedness was imposed, in which the distance separating humans from animals is shortened as much as possible, and humans themselves, appurled in ding-colored filthy rags, live only to suffer brutality, extremes of cold and heat, and starvation. This more recent re-creation of past epochs, as far removed from real-
ity in its own way as the previous series in the opposite vein, belongs to an aesthetic current at the end of the twentieth century. The cultural context is not irrelevant, in that each person constructs an impression of the period colored by one's own, and the range of one's experience similarly delimits the subjects that person chooses for study unless the choice is influenced by someone else's experience and knowledge that extends beyond the student's.

Younger historians seem no longer interested in History of the economic or social caste that was in fashion during the 1960s-1970s. Neither statistics, which once purported to offer the only "scientific" means of studying history, nor topics like taxation, historical demography, economics and commerce, artisans or other specific social groups, seem to be able to attract their interest. Several branches of rational knowledge seem to suffer even more neglect, such as the History of Law, which is no longer even taught in Faculties of Law, and the history of various institutions ceased to be offered by History departments some time ago; the History of Philosophy or of Science has suffered a similar fate. The Middle Ages that attract interest are not those of accomplishment, such as application of the categories of Aristotle to the knowledge of the world, the calculation of the eclipses of the sun and the moon, or those of cataclysmic operations and the invention of eyeglasses for the improvement of sight. Nor are they the Middle Ages of the treatises on plagues and epidemics, or the preoccupation with classification in the sciences or elaboration in law of such concepts as that of the moral person. Instead, popular "theology" in its religious and supernatural aspects draws ample attention, and studies consequently dwell on purification, the virginity of Mary in the iconographic tradition, sanctity, devotion, the devils, and Heaven and Hell, and juridical texts serve only for the highlighting of physical or verbal violence. These aspects were present in medieval life, but it is the current emphasis and swings in their contemporary that is in question here, where subjectivity reigns supreme. The surreal takes precedence over the more real, concrete aspects of medieval thought and behavior. Imbalance can be detected everywhere.

This argument for greater objectivity, breadth, balance, and integration does not deny that these speculative subjects belong to the sphere of History. Jacques Le Goff (1981) demonstrated that there was a "history" of Purgatory, in the same way that one can construct a history of the cult of saints (Brown, 1981; Vauchez, 1988; 1991), and that the beliefs concerning the end of the world and millenarian or messianic longings underwent changes over time (Carozzi, 1982; Verbeke, Verhelst, and Welkenhuysen, 1988; Delumeau, 1995; Gouguenheim, 1999). Nonetheless, proper "contextualization" of these matters is indispensable if one were to undertake genuinely historical study: In which society, at what time, in which particular place did this or that change come about, a belief appear or disappear, a cult develop, or anorexic holy women flourish? (Bell, 1985; Bynum, 1987). Students making such choices as these in topics to explore do not always desire to understand such phenomena from the past but more because of relationships and concepts they have at present. In more than one case a teacher needs to stress that the border between the real and unreal is not clearly drawn, and that subjects may be of interest more for themselves than for historical development. The novice historian without guidance in such troubled subject matter moves within a "virtual" reality, historical or present, fantasy in either case, in which one may find oneself to be the sole immutable reality.

Surrounded by a world incomprehensible because it comes under the guise of emotions, drives, sensations, and impressions, submerged in a realm that, in its inherent lack of any clear boundary lines, oscillates between the real and the unreal, the novice is reduced to the study of oneself. One's field of endeavor will not be a society or specific individuals from a particular time, with their characteristics, development, differences from society of today, and their similarities to present counterparts. The focus will be exclusively on a "familial" or "local" history, or history of one's "clan" and identity, with the aim of understanding of oneself rather than history. When such a personal aim is not in support of present claims of the family, town, or social group, one devotes energies to self alone, in a kind of fantasy world.

The shaping of future adults occurs in numerous ways which include the family, school, and one's dealings with others. Nevertheless, the concordance between study plans, which furnish the mind with multiple and variously laced, though dissociated and never fully developed pieces of knowledge, and cinematographic subject matter and language, which lean toward the irrational and appeal only to individual emotion, is not without significance.

History under these circumstances is a chronological science no more: it is a fantasy, the personal property of those subject-individuals who have taken themselves as their own object of study.
Chapter 11

Illusions About and Underestimation of the Role of Sentiment in the Historian’s Work

Hubert Watelet

A single chapter obviously cannot clarify the History crisis overall, because this involves many disciplines other than this one. At different times in 1933 and 1941, and for different reasons, Lucien Febvre (1953: 11-12, 25-29) had already considered that, if we could speak of a History crisis, we should do so in the much larger context of a crisis of thought. Things today are comparable in this respect. Yet, between the historical dimension of the current crisis and the underestimation of the role of sentiment in our practices since the creation of the Rankean paradigm, it seems that links exist. Consider this underestimation as a seemingly significant shortcoming in historians’ outlook, by focusing on the core of this paradigm, namely, the critical use of sources and the ideal of objectivity (Goldstein, 1990; Igers, 1990).

These reflections are limited to the period leading to the rise of Postmodernism in the field; after this, matters become too complex for brief treatment. If we compare the classical method that values the historian’s discipline and professional detachment with the widely differing Postmodernist positions, several links may be identified (e.g., Jenkins, 1997; Windschuttle, 1997). Consideration of them must keep the larger issue in the back of our minds; How could there have been such a drastic change in our ideas from Modernism to...

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This chapter was first presented at the session “The Crisis of History: A Change in Paradigms” during HaD II, held in July 1999 at Santiago de Compostela.
Postmodernism? Since an entire book would be needed to address the entire subject, this overview may be viewed as a general outline.

FROM OBJECTIVIST ILLUSIONS TO INITIAL DISILLUSIONS

Two types of consensus on objectivity were reached in France and the United States after the diffusion of awareness about proper methods, according to one of Gabriel Monod’s formulas (1909: 6). In 1938 when Raymond Aron defended his philosophic thesis on the limits of objectivity (1986) and the German approach to History (1987), the French historical practice was still fundamentally the same as the school of methodical and narrow Positivism aimed at simply establishing facts. Indeed, Charles Seignobos had greatly stressed in the Introduction to the Study of History (1897-1908; cf. Langlois and Seignobos, 1926) that a historian never observes “facts” directly. Historical criticism and the methodical doubt applied to documents (i.e., written evidence) would enable one to obtain only “exact” facts, and thereby reduce the influence of subjectivity. This is how Seignobos interpreted Ranke’s “famous expression” of 1824 wie es eigentlich gewesen (translated variously “as it really was” or “as it really happened”). The good historian was supposed to “imagine the facts as he would have seen them, if he had been able to observe them personally” (Langlois and Seignobos, 1926: 221-222).

Seignobos never defended an “objectivist” position; on the contrary, he did not shy away from showing how a series of constraints would render “the utilization of documents” and “historical construction” very subjective (1926: 217-224, 316-319). “History,” he considered, “is necessarily a subjective science” (p. 217). However, this aspect of the Introduction was never discussed in France, or elsewhere. Seignobos seems now to have been ahead of his time in this regard—even if he considered subjectivity to be a deficiency. It was as if his nonobjectivist realism was as cumbersome for critics of the methodical school as it had been for its promoters after the publication of the Study of History (cf. Prost, 1994; 1996).

Indeed, a much more widespread taboo has existed in France on this issue of objectivity versus subjectivity. If Monod in his early editorial in 1876 and later (1909: 4) preferred to speak of “impartiality” (Carbonell, 1976: 413-415; 1994: 152-153, 159-160), Louis Halphen (1914), Lucien Febvre (1953), and Marc Bloch (1964)—notwithstanding their divergent views—remained much more concerned about convincing others of the scientific nature of history than addressing the question of objectivity as such. The Annales d’histoire économique et sociale had existed for nearly ten years (1929) when Aron presented his theses. Undoubtedly, Febvre (1953: 7-8) had claimed with conviction (in 1933, for example) that the historian’s facts are constructed and that “history is all a matter of choice” (see also Bloch, 1964: 22, 64-66, on this point), but his point of view concerned problematization, not objectivity. What can be discerned in the founders of Annales is a rather implicit tension between scientificity, in general, and History. The scientific nature of research makes greater use of the “scholar’s” personality when the researcher is a historian. Bloch, unlike Febvre, did not use irony regarding Ranke’s dictum. Rather than the perception that the historian should “efface himself before the facts,” he “plainly read in it a counsel of integrity” (Bloch, 1964: 138; Febvre, 1982: 1-2; Watel, 1993: 235-236). Toward the end of his life (1946-1949), however, Febvre was somewhat preoccupied by practical inferences of objectivity (Burke, 1973: 42; Febvre, 1953: 438; Watel, 1974: 572-573, and Ricoeur, 1984: 95-96, for French historiography of the period in general). Fernand Braudel (1980: 66) rapidly set this subject aside, only to mention it anew ten years later (1958-1960) when he thought of it as “a weakness in the scientific approach”—using the same word infinïté as did Seignobos previously—but not specifically linked to History, all the while pleading with Henri Marrou not to exaggerate its impact on the discipline. Marrou (1966: 23) wrote that one had to wait for Aron’s theses for critical philosophy of history to penetrate into French thinking. He had been aware of this since 1939 when he wrote a review for Esprit (1995). However, it certainly was not so simple for historians (1966: 23) and was it not natural in a country with the Higher Doctoral Thesis that there be resistance to relativism? Particularly thanks to Marrou, not only was the silence broken, but he also proposed a solution to the problem of objectivity in The Meaning of History (1954-1975). Nonetheless, during the 1970s, he pointed out the extent his concepts contradicted current trends leaning toward a more formal scientificity, i.e., quantitative, structuralist, etc. Even though there were several editions, this publication’s impact had yet to be felt (Marrou, 1975: 299-302); and one cannot forget Aron’s and
Marrou’s contributions to the Encyclopédie française (Berger and Renouvin, 1960: 4: 1-10, 18: 7-16) and to L’histoire et ses méthodes (Samaran, ed., 1961: 1465-1540) on historical methods.

Aron, who had shocked historians some thirty years earlier by calling attention to what he called Positivist “illusions,” stated that the historian is always personally committed and is influenced by his or her own philosophy (1986: 441, 449). Aron felt compelled to react to the swiftness with which one forgot these illusions and adopted perspectivist positions. He wrote this on-the-spot analysis of the May 1968 crisis (Aron, 1969: 110, 125):

Many higher intellectuals have an incredible scorn for facts. The formula “there are no facts” is much acclaimed in Parisian circles. Of course, I am aware that in a sense this formula is philosophically true. There are no facts which have not been constructed—what a physician regards as a fact, exists as such only within an intellectual system which has been created by science. But at times I am tempted to state that every society is subject to the constraints of fact.

Even though Michel Foucault was part of the new trend, he had yet to have any significant impact on historians.

The essential trend in the United States has been traced by Georg G. Iggers (1962) and Peter Novick (1988). Two caesuras during the 1930s and near the end of the 1960s may be noted, which were not as dimmed and quieted as in France. Two astounding presidential addresses before the American Historical Association by Europeanist Carl L. Becker (1931) and by Americanist Charles A. Beard (1933) were events comparable—mutatis mutandis, obviously—to Aron’s doctoral theses in France. Prior to these addresses published in the American Historical Review in 1932 and 1934, respectively, the ideal of historical objectivity was based primarily on the American image of Ranke that had crystallized in the early 1880s. This was that Leopold von Ranke (1795-1886), the “father of historical science” who advocated the objective establishment of facts (Iggers, 1962: 19), whose dictum were es eigentlich gewesen was so often taken out of context. This sufficed to guarantee that the historians all understood one another and ensured that the imperative of objectivity was being transmitted (Iggers, 1962: 17-27; Novick, 1988: 1-29, 141, 252-253). Sometimes disagreements of sorts surfaced; for instance, the “new historians” of the early twentieth century objected that the need to generalize went beyond the simple establishment of facts. In any case, such debate failed to unhang the presumed Rankean concept of objectivity (Iggers, 1962: 23-25).

Relativism and the questioning of Becker and Beard encouraged American historians to ask themselves about the personal role of historians in various stages of research, starting with the selection of facts. Indeed, these two pioneers of “Relativism” did not necessarily share the same concepts, but for both, the truth became “social” in that it was also a generational problem. In general, historians began to divide themselves into two groups. While the “objectivists” hung on to their ideal, the “relativists,” slowly increasing in number after 1945, admitted the notion that History also depended on the writer’s personality and ideology (Novick, 1988: 239-278). Yet, if the ideal of objectivity became more uncertain and the aim of a universal conception of truth tended to be forsaken, the majority of historians had not really abandoned these values (Novick, 1988: 276-278, 468-470). Some historians still had not renounced the traditional ideal of objectivity, but most slowly began to reconsider Ranke’s image at the end of the 1950s and at the beginning of the 1960s. They needed not only to relocate themselves in relation to the rise of Relativism, but also to take into consideration the substantial contribution of German scholars who had fled the Nazi regime (Iggers, 1962: 38-40). It was the gap between American thinking with the persistence of the taboo in France against objectivity that brought Serge Gagnon to write his Man and His Past (1982).

As in France near the end of the 1960s, things changed radically in the United States. With the growing popularity of Black History and Black Studies, Women’s History and Women’s Studies, Native History and other studies, principles considered as “universalist” or inclusive until then were rejected in many university circles to express specifically divergent cultural and ethnic sensitivities and to assert new types of group identity requirements (Novick, 1988: 471, 478, 491, 496). According to Novick, reaction to the works of Foucault seemed to come prior to their publication in the mid-1970s, as in the case of Surveiller et punir or La volonté de savoir. The aforementioned circles could substitute a more “subjectifying” type of discourse used on their own level, for their own social groups, and no longer focused on the self. This discourse replaced the power/knowl-
edge relationships which made the group, like the individual, a case or object of research that might be identified as “objectifying” (Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1983: 158-165, 178-183).

Two or three generations in France and the United States passed before historians questioned there the respective consensus about objectivity. Neither American historians nor the French really gave it much thought. They began to discover, in the case of the United States but not yet in France, that Ranke’s thinking could not be summarized in four or five words. Keeping in mind the French taboo, how could one describe the American illusion pertaining to objectivity? In psychological terms, the issue is one of metacognition—an appropriate term, as my colleague Richard Clément of the University of Ottawa’s School of Psychology suggested. In any case, American thought went well beyond Ranke’s thinking on the subject. Essentially, it was more a matter of belief.

In England, the need for objectivity was slowly being confirmed simultaneously with the emergence of the Rankean paradigm. At the outset, Lord Acton in 1895 (1967: 332-333) and Frederick Y. Powell in 1898 spoke about impartiality (Goldstein, 1990: 145). However, Acton’s emphasis (1967: 335-338) was already very strong, based specifically on a living portrait of Ranke’s neutral attitude—his first master, as he liked to put it—as teacher and researcher. From then on, it seems, starting with George P. Gooch (1913), the Rankean dictum became increasingly important. Gooch (1965: 74) quoted the phrase, in the foreword to the Geschichten der romanischen und germanischen Völker: “History has had assigned to it the task of judging the past, of instructing the present for the benefit of the ages to come. To such lofty functions this work does not aspire. Its aim is merely to show how things actually were.” However, Gooch simply links this reflection to the early stage that the book represents from the objectivity viewpoint. After him, writers tended merely to repeat Ranke’s words out of context, until Geoffroy R. Elton (1967: 56, 73-74) could use it simply as part of the general language without attribution to Ranke. Robin George Collingwood (1968: 130, 246) had prepared the way for such general usage. Edward H. Carr (1961: 5) states with deliberate exaggeration, “Three generations of . . . British historians marched into battle [of facts and objectivity] intoning the magic words [of Ranke].” Acton’s concepts did not fall back on “minute facts,” according to Collingwood’s expression (1968: 131). Was

Acton not also the founder of the Cambridge Modern History with its sweeping panorama? Michael Oakeshott (1933), and even more so Collingwood (1940-1946), strongly criticized what the latter would dub the “scissors-and-paste history” (1968: 257-266). At times, Collingwood (1968: 153-155, 232-249) recalled Fevre’s “battles” against “historicizing History,” but actually he went much further than Fevre in historiographic interpretations in History (see Ricoeur, 1988: 144-147, 306-308). A final indicator: George Clark in 1957 in the “General Introduction” (p. xxv) to the New Cambridge Modern History commented on “some impatient scholars . . . since all historical judgements involve persons and points of view, one is as good as another and there is no ‘objective’ historical truth.” Finally, one must not forget the relatively precocious English economic History (ca. 1888) and the Economic History Review (1927). Altogether, we could ask if the Rankean paradigm, which was in crisis as early as the turn of the century as maintained by Georg Iggers (1990), was in crisis more so in England than anywhere else. At the end of the 1950s and beginning of the 1960s, English historians were undoubtedly well aware of two extremes: those who believed in a so-called Rankean objectivity, similar to metacognition, and a small group of radical relativists who surfaced there earlier than in France, and perhaps even earlier than in the United States.

EMOTION IN OBJECTIVITY
AND MISCONCEPTIONS ABOUT RANKE

Reexamination today of the undoubtedly wide occidental perception of the Rankean notion of objectivity is surprising. Indeed, German historians were never content with the magic formula—according to Carr’s expression (1961: 5)—and did not use only it. The richness of German thought in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries most certainly protected them from this type of oversimplification. However, no relationship west of Germany had ever been established between Rankean concepts and the philosophical universe around them. Ranke’s thinking should be situated in the context of German historical tradition, impregnated with empathy and attention to the unity of phenomena: from German idealism, which strove to emphasize problems in linking “facts about realities”—in opposition
to positivist inclinations—and also of the spirit of universality of the eighteenth century, to which Ranke remained faithful despite the growing interest during the nineteenth century in national phenomena and the mounting crisis of Historismus at the end of the century (cf. Ringer, 1969: 92-102, 298-300; Igers, 1983: 63-89; Antoni, 1963: 4-7, 78-79). Moreover, Ranke was also a man of faith, of Lutheran inspiration (Igers and Moltke, 1973: xxi-xxiii).

Thus, German historians continued to reflect on Ranke’s contribution in his history of Roman and German peoples as the initiator of scientifically oriented history (Igers, 1990: 172; Igers, 1962: 17, 21). They also knew that Ranke had not written the expression *wie es eigentlich gewesen ist* to be followed literally; instead, it was originally aimed at the attitude of people like Hegel who dared “to judge the past” and, in Ranke’s mind, to oversimplify according to their own conceptions (Ringer, 1969: 98; Ricoeur, 1988: 151, 309-310). Ranke’s German heritage, as observed by Georg Igers, was multifaceted. It is amazing, when considering Ranke, to have judged him only on this famous expression taken out of context. German writers recognized fairly early, of course, the Rankean emphasis on the critical use of sources, but they also noticed that even if he would have liked to reject all a priori supposition, Ranke knew full well that objectivity was relative and that history evolved with the passing generations. And if, as a whole, Ranke’s image was that of a historian who started from the observation of the particular to attain the general, it was also that of a man who had espoused ideas and spiritual forces while being wary of abstractions (Igers, 1962: 27-38).

Was Rankean thought simply misunderstood outside Germany, or was it also a lack of interest? As Igers and von Moltke (1973: xv-xvii) have observed, no republication of either of the German historian’s major works, neither in English nor in French, occurred from 1910 to 1960. Becker and Beard’s questioning of Relativism in the United States (e.g., Stern, 1956: 315-328) helped reduce the scope of Ranke’s few words, but few seemed to make the effort to understand what the author had meant (Novick, 1988: 140-141). The meaning of *eigentlich* was not obvious; during the times and in the language of Ranke, “essentially” rather “actually” would have been a better translation (Igers and Moltke, 1973: xix-xx, 137). It would have sufficed to read the 1824 foreword, where Ranke’s expression is found, to realize that he clearly indicated how he had planned his book and had chosen facts according to a comprehensive conception of his *Geschichten*.

Ranke was of his times, both as a person and in his works, as Igers and von Moltke (1973: lxvii-lxx) have noted. Carlo Antoni (1935: 827), who seems to be an exception west of Germany but knew both Germany and the German historian, claimed that Ranke really did “succeed in transporting himself into the thoughts, the feelings, the remarks of individuals, peoples and times.” In 1935 and in 1938 at the International Congress of Historical Sciences in Zurich, Antoni not only described Ranke, who was insufficiently known, but also pointed out an emotional dimension of objectivity that resurfaced a generation later with Paul Ricoeur or with Marrou. Marrou (1966: 45) thought that the formula had been passed along “from hand to hand like a coin that becomes a little more worn and corroded each passing day.”

If more historians west of Germany had been interested in his understanding of History, they could have discovered the two Rankean “qualities . . . to form a true historian”: (1) a sense of the individual that entails a genuine affection for human beings “of which we ourselves are a part,” in all their great diversity; and (2) a preoccupation with the general which stems from the individual, focusing on relationships between peoples and their spiritual foundations—in both cases for better or worse. Ranke was fairly clear that he wanted to erect some barriers to avoid becoming partial. These reflections of 1830 were preserved in manuscripts published for the first time in Germany two years after his death in 1888 (Igers and Moltke, 1973: 28, 30-32; Stern, 1956: 59-60).

It is precisely in the name of objectivity that this misunderstanding of Ranke was perpetuated. How could historians have failed for decades to understand Ranke and his concept of objectivity, especially in England and the United States? The main reason is that for the researcher the quest for objectivity embraces a wide range of emotion. In “objectivist” circles, historians tend to go beyond the ideal to be “good” historians, Novick (1988: 4, 11) noted how much emotion was caught up in the notion of objectivity. It was once considered a vital quality, a key value of the historian’s craft. We would certainly not state, as did Marc Bloch in *Les rois thaumaturges*, that the belief in the royal miracle was the result of a collective error, since it was related to belief (see Le Goff’s preface to Bloch, 1983: xxvi, xxxvii).
The emulation of an ideal of objectivity attributed to Ranke was fundamentally a question of belief and sentiment. It was still a collective error to have postponed for so long a rereading of Ranke, to interpret him properly, and to gain better understanding of his thought.

**THE UNDERESTIMATED ROLE OF SUBJECTIVITY AND SENTIMENT**

Beginning with the *De re diplomatica* of Mabillon until the popularity of quantitative analysis, historians strove toward more rationality and scientficity, while slowly extending the significance of History (Ricoeur, 1965a: 38-39; 1965b: 186-188; Certeau, 1974: 32-33). This constitutes a broad evolution, undeniably rich in creativity and innovation with ramifications that have become very diversified. Such a movement was not damaging per se: methodologies for “family reconstitution” (automated or not) as well as Diplomatics, for example, have become part of the discipline’s fundamental assets. But this evolution involved serious illusions. A first error was to confound goal and methods: forgetting human beings, “human flesh” (Bloch, 1964: 26), in favor of gains in scientificity. This Feuvre and Bloch criticized in the context of “historicide History,” and later Marrou (1975: 299-302) and others extended such criticism to the scientific trends between 1950-1970 (Watelet, 1993: 229). A second error subject to the first was the confusion between scientificity and subjectivity, i.e., believing that gains in scientificity (e.g., in quantitative research) go hand in hand with reduction in subjectivity. Many historians tended to neglect the human, individual, or particular person in favor of more general movements—economic, demographic, or some other—in the objective of historical research.

During this so-called disciplinary reorientation, which is part of the general upsurge in scientific activity and spirit (Watelet, 1993, passim), some affirmed the role of subjectivity and sentiment, undoubtedly, in History or Philosophy, but also in history of the scientists themselves. These voices, however, were too often neglected or dismissed. Of course there comes to mind Jules Michelet, who was not afraid of such affirmation stated at the beginning of *The People* (1846): “This book comes from myself, my life and my heart” (1973: 3). He felt the need to be more explicit later in the 1869 preface to his *Histoire de France*:

My life was incorporated into this book, it passed within it. It was my only event. However, does this identity between author and book comprise certain dangers? Is the work not impregnated with the writer’s own sentiment and times? . . . If this is a fault, we must acknowledge that it is very useful to us. The historian, who does not have this fault, who endeavours to be self-effaced when writing, to not exist . . . is not a historian. . . . By penetrating the object more and more, we like it and begin to have an increased interest in it. The heart, moved, after the second sighting, sees a thousand things that are invisible to indifferent people. . . . (1974: 49-50)

This passage is well known, but could not bring about reflection in France because it went against the increased stress on objectivity. Michelet’s example was unconvincing because it represented the importance of sentiment in historical writings and revealed the fragility of his outlook. It was easy for Louis Halphen (1914: 84-89) to show the extremes to which Michelet went after 1850-1855, notably in the case of the Middle Ages, by uncontrolled aversions and a wild imagination, seemingly oblivious to methodology. Previously his works were enhanced by his intelligent affinity. Nevertheless, the issue of the role of subjectivity and sentiment in the historian’s work had been put forward some time ago. The issue remains.

Four years before the Foreword of 1869 by Michelet, Claude Bernard published *Introduction à l’étude de la médecine expérimentale*, which remains largely unknown (Carbonell, 1976: 309-313). For scientific research purposes, this *Introduction* remains a masterwork which Henri Bergson (1934: 257-258) in 1913 claimed was comparable in importance to Descartes’s *Discours de la Méthode* (however, about his concept of progress in science, see limitations as noted by Canguilhem, 1983: 169-171, 179-181, 185-186). Consider some passages on the role of sentiment in experimental research:

The experimental method, writes this true scholar . . . leans successively on the three divisions of that unchangeable tripod: sentiment, reason and experiment. In the search for truth by means of this method, feeling always takes the lead; it begets the *a priori* idea or intuition. . . . (Bernard, 1961: 54)
And the physiologist specifies in the same vein, explored later by Metzger (1930: 21):

Feeling gives rise to the experimental idea or hypothesis, i.e., the provisioned interpretation of natural phenomena. The whole experimental enterprise comes from the idea, for this it is which induces experiment. Reason or reasoning serves only to deduce the consequences of this idea and to submit them to experiment. (p. 58)

Even this early Bernard (p. 60) stresses that experimental method "gives birth to nothing. Certain philosophers have made the mistake of according too much power to method along these lines." He goes further: since scientific process stems from sentiment, this also shows its entire frailty. The researcher might be tempted by anything other than "the truth," e.g., the desire to contradict or destroy the theories of others; the need to obtain confirmation of one's ideas from experiments, rather than accept results as they arise; or inversely, the fear of having to contradict existing theories, etc.—every drift in human nature that we know about today, mutatis mutandis by specialists in any discipline. Then Bernard adds that, even if the role of sentiment is essential, a scientific person

must keep his mind free and calm, and if it be possible, never have his eye bedewed, as Bacon says, by human passions. . . . The idea must always remain independent, and we must no more chain it with scientific beliefs than with philosophic or religious beliefs . . . we have nothing to fear; for, as long as the idea is correct, we go on developing it; when it is wrong, experimentation is there to set it right. (p. 65)

In these passages about the researcher's role and that of sentiment in scientific work, and more specifically in experimental research, he shows how our ways of representing exactitude and objectivity in Natural and Life Sciences can be inadequate and even excessive (cf. also Watelet, 1988). The core of a scientist's activities depends solely on oneself and ability: it is "the art of scientific investigation," as Bernard says (1961: 39; 1966: 42). Disciplines imagined as hard, as all scientifically oriented research, encompass much frailty.

While some might object that Bernard is now outdated and that scientific research has changed, his line of critique has been continued into contemporary times. In 1957-1961, for instance, William I. B. Beveridge, professor of animal pathology at Cambridge, gave us The Art of Scientific Investigation, which is inspired by Bernard. Beveridge, who quotes the French physiologist, also acknowledges the scientist's role and personality in experimental research, e.g., the difficulty for the researcher to keep an open mind when considering the temporary nature of initial hypotheses, etc. He (1961: 53-80) describes the potential fertility as well as the frailty of the imagination; conditions of a possibly enlightened intuition, but also perhaps erroneous; or the part played by chance, or more precisely the necessity of being "on the lookout for the unexpected" in experimentation and discovery (p. 32). As for the experimental process per se in Biology, for example, it is not always as rigorous as generally thought. Excluding possible technical errors, notes Beveridge, it is not easy, as we tend to forget too often in History and Social Sciences, to reproduce identical experimental conditions from one case to the next when studying living things. Such experimentation is quite an art, he maintains (pp. 20-26). "In any event," Beveridge wrote, "the great scientist must be regarded as a creative artist and it is quite false to think of the scientist as a man who merely follows rules of logic and experiment" (p. 76). In his book's epigraph, he recalled an earlier remark by William H. George (1938: 29), a physicist at Sheffield University: "Scientific research is not itself a science; it is still an art or craft." These scientists all warn against underestimating the importance of subjectivity in scientific research.

Two Nobel Prize winners in Chemistry, Ilya Prigogine (1977) from the University of Brussels and the University of Texas, and John Polanyi (1986) from the University of Toronto, more recently remind us of this same importance. Indeed, even if research were conducted by formal and rigorous experimentation protocols, by highly specialized teams, and with increasingly precise equipment (Leprince-Ringuet, 1969: 81-89), the role of subjectivity with its motor and creative dimensions and its potential weaknesses, remains crucial. Trying to convince ourselves otherwise is pure illusion:

Experimentation interrogates nature . . . wrote Prigogine, as would a judge, as to the stated principles. Nature's response is recorded with the utmost precision, but its pertinence is evalu-
ated according to the hypothetical idealisation that guides the experiment. . . . Nature can refute the theoretical hypothesis at issue, however it nonetheless constitutes the criteria with which the scope and tendency of the response is measured, be it what it may. The experimental process therefore includes an art, in other words, it is based on know-how and not on general rules . . . no method can eliminate the risk of persevering, for example, in an irrelevant interrogation. (Prigogine and Stengers, 1979: 49)

Later, Polanyi (1995: 7) maintained: “There is no machinery of proof that supersedes human judgement . . . . Science is done by scientists, and since scientists are people, the progress of science depends more on scientific judgement than on scientific instruments.” His caution rectifies the idea of G. Bachelard, who wrote that science thinks with apparatuses, not with organs of the senses (cf. Canguilhem, 1983: 179, 192). Polanyi expressed his concern on the occasion in 1994 of an extraordinary meeting in his honor with eleven other Nobel Prize winners. This was to mark the founding of his Chair in Chemistry at the University of Toronto. While we generally tend to regard so-called “hard” and “exact” sciences as more important than others, it is easy to ignore personality and subjectivity in such scientific activity.

Do such expressions of concern by important figures in the hard sciences substantiate the claim that the role of a researcher’s personality in the historical process or other scientific activity would be comparable on the whole? They do provide clear indication that such a dimension, so obvious in History, as Bloch notes (1964: 147), exists also in the Natural and Life Sciences. Further, it might be beneficial to examine how this personal dimension exists in all disciplines, to various degrees, and thereby to realize that the emotional point of perspective, so crucial in the historian’s work, according to Michelet, is also present in Science, in the strict sense of the word, experimental as it may be—an idea specifically raised by Claude Bernard. The sentiment would be recognized in all scientific research from Physics to History, i.e., mutatis mutandis.

We no longer contest the historians’ profession, therefore, the natural and omnipresent integration of subjectivity in History (e.g., Prost, 1996: chapters 4, 7). History, as a whole, is a matter of choice, and we recognize that historians move with their times, participate in their culture, and often espouse an ideology (cf. Marrou, 1960: 11; Certeau, 1974: 7-16) even when remaining more tempered than Collingwood (1968: 231-249), who granted primary importance to historical imagination. Allusions in francophone works on methodology that followed Langlois and Seignobos often referred to the sympathy that the historian should have for one’s object, but nothing more—no reflection on the issue reminiscent of Bernard’s treatment. Only Marc Bloch had shown genuine concern regarding the issue. In 1935 he wrote to Henri Pirenne: “For a long time, I have always told my students that the historian’s most important virtue is to be surprised. I am more and more convinced of this. Damn those of us who believe everything to be normal!” (quoted by Lyon and Lyon, 1991: 175). In his The Historian’s Craft Bloch (1964: 65) commented on the questioning of the historian: “We are never quite so receptive as we should like to believe. . . . The method of cross-examination must be very elastic . . . so that it may . . . improvise freely for any contingency.” Not long afterward, in a chapter on “Historical Criticism,” an almost unnoticed passage (pp. 143-144) deserves greater attention: “‘understanding’ . . . Moreover, it is a friendly word . . . History . . . includes a vast experience of human diversities, a continuous contact with men. Life, like science, has everything to gain from it, if only these contacts be friendly” (see Oexle’s comment in Atsma and Burguiere, 1990: 429). Bloch had stopped there, however, most likely leaving a reader like Marrou unsatisfied in this regard.

**REVIVAL OF LUCIDITY IN FRANCE ON THE EVE OF POSTMODERNISM**

In The Meaning of History (first French edition, 1954), Marrou had indeed proposed a truly remarkable reflection on subject-object relationships in a historian’s mind. It is this reflection that enables us to reconnect with Michelet—as well as with Seignobos, in contrast to what Marrou himself thought—and to consider the parallel reflections about subjectivity by such lucid scientists as those just mentioned. For Marrou, like Bloch, but much more openly and explicitly, the historian’s attitude should be ever more sympathetic toward documents, and the humans for whom they bear testimonies and provide traces. For both of them, the subject must establish a relationship of fraternal friendship with human beings who make up its object so as
to be able to discover and understand them as much as possible. Whereas for Bloch and Seignobos, whose criticism of testimony—the "methodological distrust" of the latter—preceded interpretation, Marrou (1966: 103-111) reversed the process: friendship comes first, while critical attitude, rather than being active a priori, should intervene a posteriori when doubt creeps in despite attachment. Comprehension must be accomplished wholeheartedly.

Marrou, however, is more conscious than others of the frailty in the historian's work. Thus, it is precisely because of an insufficiently founded impression and a narrow understanding that he later considered his thesis on the subject of St. Augustine's writings to be mistaken. In 1938, what he had regarded as "decadent unskillfulness" turned out to be, in his view, the complete opposite: an "incomparable mastery" or "refinement of an art." This he said ten years later in 1949 with the modesty of a true scholar, when he was "a little better informed about classical rhetoric" (1966: 108). Once again, it was this famous historian of Education in Antiquity who pointed out the frailty of sentiment regarding Henri Pirenne:

The line of my research, he wrote, once crossed his apropos of the... lay education in the Merovingian epoch. . . . The "Mohammed and Charlemagne" theory required that ancient education continued after the barbarian invasions, therefore one must find "lay" schools of the Roman type under the Franks. Pirenne was convinced that he had found them, but all the texts he invokes to this end he has understood in a mistaken sense, for they really concern "clerical" schools of the medieval type. (1966: 201-202)

Did Pirenne feel hard-pressed to complete his research near the end of his life? Possibly, but Claude Bernard (1961: 63) had another theory: "If we trust too much, the mind... no longer has freedom of action, and so lacks the power to break away from that blind faith in theories."

One final example of the shifting regard for sentiment, this time where a group is concerned. It completes Marrou's idea and it determined the orientation of Annales according to what Braudel himself in 1985 admitted in Chateauneuf (Une leçon, 1986: 221-222):

We must understand well, he said, what is the lesson from the Annales, from the Annales school, and also from the "new, nou-

elle histoire," that is, all human sciences are incorporated into history and become auxiliary sciences.

The phrase expressed a pretense that went well beyond the desire to renew historical knowledge per se. It was then rectified by Jacques Le Goff (1992: 214):

If men discuss and experiment, again according to Bernard... to prove a preconceived idea in spite of everything, they no longer have freedom of mind, and they no longer search for truth. Theirs is a narrow science, mingled with personal vanity or the diverse passions of man. (Bernard, 1961: 64)

This ambition did not necessarily prevent any of the movement's leaders, such as Bloch, from being motivated by the ideal of knowledge first and foremost (Mastrogregori, 1995: 277). The impact of this orientation on the Annales movement as a whole, the concept of historical knowledge, and interdisciplinary relationships must be examined one day (including hegemonic pretenses of the Annales addressed by Coutau-Begarie, 1989: 263-365; Noireil, 1996: 92-106). "Truth" is no longer mentioned with Claude Bernard's assurance. Marrou (1975: 298) had already observed this in his generation. At the same time, however, scientific research is not "pure science." It is the scientific environment that acts as a regulator in the end (Morin, 1990: 50-58; Polanyi, 1995: 7).

The essential aspect of Marrou's contribution (1966: 76-78, 289; 1960: 12, 14; 1961: 1507) is that if there is art—or savoir faire, if we prefer the other expression by Prigogine—where the problematic is concerned in all disciplines, in History this dimension is very present. It exists in most aspects of the elaboration of knowledge, that is, from the "questionnaire" to the synthesis via heuristic investigation, or the method of dealing with answers and uncertainties.

"The very essence of historical knowledge," notes Marrou (1966: 143), "when it bears fully upon... all the richness of human reality... is what we believe to be true... Critical analysis, however profound it may be, will never get beyond the examination of reasons for credibility" (p. 151). Paul Veyne (1979: 43-44) stresses that historians frequently use the expression "that's interesting," but the most profound expression would be instead "I believe." The phrase is often implicit, but here again, it is a question of degree. John Polanyi (1995: 7) ex-
plains to what extent scientific discovery is also, especially in the initial steps, knowledge based on faith:

The scientist is in the position of a lawyer trying to convince a jury of his peers that certain events, alleged to have taken place in his laboratory, establish the identity of a guilty fact. The scientist has doubts, the jury of peers has doubts, but the judge (who also has doubts) makes a ruling good for the present. That is scientific proof.

These observations certainly underscore Marrou’s regard for subjectivity in the historian’s work. However, Seignobos had already beautifully highlighted this dimension. In a way, by emphasizing the role of imagination in the reading of sources, the historian, he said, must conjure up “historical images” that are obviously more complete than the images of facts provided by observers. If much later the rise in perspectivism helped break down persistent illusions and increased historians’ awareness, Seignobos had mentioned long before that we raise images based on other images (Langlois and Seignobos, 1926: 221). Because the latter images must be richer than the former, he was quick to add, “Every historical image contains a large part of fancy” (p. 222). Furthermore, he indicated long before Bloch that the historian must work with a “questionnaire.” We attribute to Seignobos—as Marrou (1966: 62) himself had him say—the opposite of his thought: “History is constructed with documents” when in fact he said that “historical construction is not work that can be done with documents” (1926: 231). However, whereas Langlois and Seignobos (1926: 224; 1992, 184) saw historical subjectivity as a necessary “defect” (infrimmé) in relation to “the sciences of direct observation” or “the established sciences,” for Marrou (1966: 237), to the contrary, it is a very positive subjectivity that enables the historian “to comprehend all that he is himself capable of attaining.”

FROM Marrou TO RICOEUR AND RETURN TO RanKre REVISITED

The core of historical knowledge resides, according to Marrou, in the merging, or better yet, the “indissoluble mixture” of the human otherness of fruitful thought and the historian’s personality. As in fig-

urative art and portraiture as well, he suggests, the more successful the works, the more they tell us about their authors, their times, and the painter’s model. Of course, these works—historical or strictly artistic—are not flawless, but they take on a convincing degree of “truth,” of “human substance” (Marrou, 1966: 69-70, 237-242). However, if this comparison were to explain the richness of the aforementioned mixture and the main element of subjectivity in historical practice, it undoubtedly has its limits. See on this point the comparison of literary works with historical reconstruction (e.g., Marrou, 1966: 242; Collingwood, 1968: 246; Youcenar, 1980: 62-63). Artistic creativity cannot exclude the aforementioned scientific effort. Furthermore, Marrou wanted us to understand that this effort was in the interest of “reality” and of human values to be addressed (cf. also Barzun, 1974). Finally, in his mind, it is clear that History is both objective and subjective (Marrou, 1961: 1526).

Paul Ricoeur, while being in “substantial agreement” with The Meaning of History, seems to have provided the most precise meaning of “endeavour for objectivity,” or “objectivity as a project” in the historian’s work. Some years later, Foucault, overlooking Ricoeur and Marrou, perceived things very differently (Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1983: 108, 117, 120, 204). For Ricoeur (1965a: 21-22), all objectivity is sui generis because it relies on research and methodical procedures. For instance, according to physicist Bernard d’Espagnat (1994: 34-36, 324-325, 374), the only objectivity that Physics can claim is coined by him as “weak objectivity,” which corresponds to statements referring to what is observable, which does not normally pose a consensus problem. Indeed, he shows how “strong objectivity,” which might refer to an independent reality from the observers, would give rise to serious difficulties or even incompatibilities, either with reference to quantum mechanics, or to the coexistence between quantum mechanics and relativity, and would therefore become indefensible. Ricoeur writes that, in the case of History, objectivity implies the intervention of the researcher’s subjectivity on several levels: judgments of importance and of causality, and the ability to project himself or herself and the reader, too, into another present, with an imagination that implies duality of distance and closeness at the same time. This suggests pertains to temporal distance, but a spatial dimension as well (Ricoeur, 1965a: 25-28, 176; Dhondt, 1963: 827-29). Social distance is still another matter.
The social is most essential in human experience because this is where, according to Ricoeur, the values of past men (and women) interact with the present, i.e., an extension by the historian into another subjectivity which involves the dual task of “sympathy” and distance, of “the suspended adoption” rather than real sharing of these experiences and values. The historian’s objectivity thereby assumes a significant degree of an “investigative subjectivity” according to Ricoeur (1965a: 28-29, 31), rather than a “passional subjectivity.” He observes that (1) “[h]istory makes the historian as much as the historian makes history,” as Michelet had already sensed; and (2) rationality crosses into “the very heart of feeling and imagination” by striving to remove impassioned subjectivity from the investigative subjectivity. Moreover, the historian’s objectivity supposes (1) a degree of coherence in each historic study, even though the researcher must be able to resist excesses in this direction because of the complexity of human “realities”; and (2) a complementarity between the one and other studies, even when discussions and treatments are unfinished or create a need for reconstruction when the questions raised are complex. This second level of coherence clearly differentiates History from Literature since literary works, especially historical novels, while needing a certain internal coherence, nevertheless have great autonomy in regard to external coherence (Watele, 1988: 148-150; Marrou, 1966: 235-237; Ricoeur, 1965b: 175-176; 1984: 176; Collingwood, 1968: 246).

Remember that Ranke considered the genuine fondness for humans as a prerequisite for historians to write about their subjects. In this regard, Rankean objectivity, according to Antoni (1935: 827), already foreshadowed Ricoeur’s concepts, not only concerning intention, but also relating to the works themselves. The German historian advocated in his own way both sympathy and distance in historical research, or “investigative subjectivity” as Ricoeur called it. He did so by recalling that a researcher is part of the same humanity as the human beings studied, which is the very starting point for a good historian to people encountered in sources with “a real fondness” no matter their roles, character, station, etc. This does not contradict the true distancing that has occurred, but recognizes sympathy, basic sentiment, spontaneous feelings that these beings inspire in their historian. For or against Robespierre, as Marc Bloch (1964: 140, 144) would say, “simply tell us what Robespierre was,” while advising us nevertheless that our contacts “be friendly” with men (and women), Bloch basically shared the same idea as Ranke: remove impassionate subjectivity, while developing investigative subjectivity. Although this concept required Ricoeur’s clarity, nonetheless we are at the opposite of what has been believed for so long concerning objectivity as attributed to Ranke’s wie es eigentlich gewesen even as late as the 1990s (Carbonell, 1994: 117).

Paul Ricoeur’s concept of objectivity in the historian’s work is a significant development but it is still often overlooked in France and the United States (e.g., Chartier, 1998; Appleby, Hunt, and Jacob, 1994), partially because Ricoeur (1995: 119) himself continued to write without referencing his own earlier works. French historians today and some Postmodern historians exploring concepts of narrative after Ricoeur’s Time and Narrative (1984; 1988) write as if awareness of narration has eclipsed the question of objectivity. Now such difficult problems for the historian as the extermination of Jews, Gypsies, Slovaks, men, women, and children under the Nazi Regime, maybe handled more successfully if we were inspired by Ricoeur’s thinking—but also that of Ranke—about the historian’s objectivity.

CONCLUSION

Two last thoughts ground this theoretical discussion in some of the most difficult examples of source interpretation historians could ever tackle. It seems that the historian feels a triple sense of humanity in the presence of a human catastrophe of the magnitude as those which evoke the most intense passion and subjectivity in historiography: humility regarding those who experienced such horror as extermination camps, whether they were able to testify or not, and also in regard to those who have lived in the past and who still live with the disappearance of their loved ones in the “unthinkable,” to quote the word of Hannah Arendt; simultaneously, this feeling overtakes us as well, as Primo Levi said (1988: 396), when we think of the well-known personalities who abandoned trying to understand anti-Semitism and the horror of the death camps (see also Friedlander, 1993: 103). Hence, emotion is ever present, notwithstanding the base instinctive feelings about Nazi leaders or the fate of their victims, because historians cannot themselves elude as people that this past reality was of human
making, and they are of the same human race as the protagonists and victims in the horror. I imagine that old Ranke would have remained true to himself if he could have explained his thoughts on such a subject. It is precisely because of our common human identity that Genevieve Decop (Hoess, 1995: ii, iv) highlights the proximity of the ordinary and the exceptional—and in this case of the ordinary and the monstrous—that emerges from a testimony like that of Rudolf Hoess (1995).

The historian cannot circumvent his or her subjectivity when confronting such a topic as mass extermination that was thought out, willed, and executed by the Nazis, especially when, as Levi (1988: 396) has already said what others suspect, “what happened could happen again.” However, should we address this issue with an attitude and mindfulness about historical objectivity advocated by Ricoeur, by striving—in this particular instance—to remove impassioned subjectivity and be open to all possibilities of investigative subjectivity. To attempt understanding in this way does not mean, as Levi thought (1988: 395), to identify with it; instead, it means going into the matter rather than ignoring it, but rather than becoming immersed, keeping in mind one’s distance. In such cases (see also Ferro, 1999), as in others which could be used as examples, the historian’s rationality crosses into “the very heart of feeling and imagination.”

REFERENCES


Illusions About and Underestimation of the Role of Sentiment


Chapter 12

"The End of History": Looking Back and Thinking Ahead

Israel Sanmartín

INTRODUCTION

Carlos Barros (1995: 117) argued in the essay "History Ahead" at the First International Conference of History Under Debate (July 7-11, 1990) that the 1990s would be favorable for History and the Social Sciences. His paper purported to demonstrate that this was so regardless of specific issues surrounding the prediction of the "end of History," i.e., the well-known theory espoused by Francis Fukuyama in 1989 before the fall of the Berlin Wall. At that moment, apart from being a senior official at the U.S. State Department in the Bush administration, Fukuyama was undergoing a change in his own intellectual odyssey, as one of the many advisors on issues from the Cold War and concerns over the Middle East. Specifically, he was an expert on the relations between the former Soviet Union and the Third World and Middle East countries. The Cold War being over, Fukuyama, like many other investigators, was trying to decide whether to fall into a nostalgia for the past, as many had done, or to open new areas for research. Obviously, he chose the latter, opting first for philosophy-related themes of History to approach a more sociologically oriented line of thought, always from a neoconservative stance which positions his ideology and places him among others in historical revisionism (Sanmartín, 1999: 193-206).

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To illustrate how History has fared after its supposed end, one can tackle "the end of History" first by looking back, reviewing the theory from its origins in 1989 to the present; second, by thinking ahead of reflecting on the worldwide debate over Fukuyama’s theory; and, third, by arriving at some conclusions.

**LOOKING BACK**

Both the surname “Fukuyama” and his rubric “the end of History” have been used widely both in journal articles and more rigorous treatments in Political Science, Philosophy, Political Philosophy, and History. More often than not, citations refer to the author or his fashionable phrase rather than to any real content of his theory. A general lack of familiarity with the thesis in detail or its real implications, rather than just lip service to the idea or catchphrase, requires some review here of the evolution of Fukuyama’s thought and the evolution of his theorizing after 1989 (Sanmartin, 1996; 1998a,b).

**Euphoria**

The theory of “the end of History” appeared in 1989 in a lecture, before it became a paper. The latter (Fukuyama, 1989: 3-18; and its controversial translation into Spanish, 1990: 85-96) was commissioned by the publishers of a neconservative journal on international relations, The National Interest. One of the most interesting points of the article is that it anticipated the events of 1989, especially the fall of the Berlin wall and the toppling of regimes in countries under so-called Real Socialism. Its anticipation, together with hype to be expected only for a real blockbuster, coupled with his being in the Bush administration, made Fukuyama a staple in intellectual circles and the talk of the time—so much so that some months later, Fukuyama (1989/1990) felt compelled to write a rebuttal, “A Reply to My Critics.”

Considering the theory on a global scale, the phrase the end of History became euphoric. Thus, in two articles Fukuyama glossed the triumph of the Western world, proclaimed the superiority and globalization of economic and political liberalism, and defended the Western Liberal Democracy as the ultimate form of government most everywhere. Every country would or should achieve political freedom as a necessary condition for economic liberalism and free trade.

Another issue clarified by Fukuyama in his euphoria was that he never meant history with a small “h” or the history of events, but History capitalized and construed as the ideological evolution of human-kind, i.e., Universal History. This notion, together with the type of “end of History” thinking in the works of Marx and Hegel (Kojève, 1947), is from where Fukuyama draws basically three notions: (1) the desire of recognition; (2) the dialectic of the master and the slave; and (3) the domination of nature. Kojève offers an anthropological reading of Hegel that does some violence to the original, but his interpretation is influential nonetheless.

Other components of this “euphoric phrase” concern the potential alternatives to liberal democracy, i.e., the Asiatic, which is the most serious in Fukuyama’s appraisal; nationalism; and Islam. He also was concerned with international relations among posthistorical countries (where liberal democracy has become the form of government), where economic relations are preeminent. Through his thinking, Fukuyama is nostalgic about History and he posits that in posthistorical History there may be no art or philosophy, and citizens will be solely concerned about consumer needs and goods. Finally, note that he always used the editorial “we” in his writing, identifying “us” with the United States as whole. He never came out of his insider frame of reference.

**Digestion**

This early phase of “the end of History” is delineated in Fukuyama’s book The End of History and the Last Man (1992), where the author unfolds in a detailed and clear way all the ideas advanced in his first two papers. This integration period might be seen as a “digestive phase” because every argument is illustrated and every opinion qualified and documented. He claims that liberal democracy is the final point of the ideological evolution of humankind which marks the end of History. He believes, in short, in a directional and coherent History.

Fukuyama seeks to develop a Universal History with two defining moments or universal histories, depending on one’s stance. Nonetheless, his notion of Universal History proves too Western and does not
take into account the natural earthly and animal agents of the world. The two components of his notion of Universal History are as follows:

1. A Universal History that relies on Science as a cumulative and orienting activity. The practical example given is technology, which has provoked a homogenization of all human societies, creating a centralized state and promoting universal education. Fukuyama calls this a Universal History as understood by Marx, but he fails to find any connection between economic welfare and advanced industrialization and liberal democracy. For that reason, he resorts to a second universal in History or more than something passing, a second lasting trend.

2. A Universal History that seeks to recover man as a whole and not just his economic affairs, so as to recover the Hegelian, non-materialistic interpretation of History (via Kojève), based on the “struggle for recognition.” This struggle indicates that humankind needs to be acknowledged as being human: emotions like anger and wrath, shame, pride, etc., that are parts of personality are critical also in political life. This can be related to the instances of putting one’s life at risk for prestige’s sake. For Kojève and Fukuyama, this is what often sets the historical process in motion.

The struggle for recognition has led to bloody fights for prominence. The result has been the division of society into a class of masters, willing to risk their lives, and another of slaves, who conceded on the face of things for their natural fear of death. None of them was acknowledged; indeed, slaves were not acknowledged as human beings by masters, and masters were not often acknowledged by other masters. The democratic revolutions abolished the distinctions between slaves and masters by making former slaves into their own masters and establishing popular sovereignty. The unequal acknowledgment of masters and slaves was substituted with universal recognition, where every citizen acknowledges the dignity and humanity of all others. Fukuyama, like Hegel, claimed that History ended because the engine of History, the struggle for prominence and its recognition, shut down. It was overpowered by universal and reciprocal recognition in a liberal democratic society. Thus, this age-old struggle ceased to link economics and policy. Liberal democracy was chosen because economic development teaches the slave the concept of mastery.

These ideas have had great repercussions in international relations. Liberal democracy implies, in Fukuyama’s opinion, a peaceful world order (as conceived by Kant) because all the other nations will reciprocally acknowledge their legitimacy. He claims that liberal democracies do not need to fight each other for prestige, prominence, or other kinds of scalable recognition, although some other obstacles remain (religious, cultural, and ethnic in origin) before some countries actually attain liberal democracy.

Undercurrents

Fukuyama continued his re-elaboration of his theory, taking advantage of the opportunity provided by the review of political analyst Timothy Burns, in his book After History (1994). So five years after the full disclosure of his ideas, Fukuyama (1995) penned a paper titled “Reflections on the End of History.” It is an undertow, like the movement of waves in the sea of ideas and political discourse, rolling over and returning to shore. It implies that his is a reflection of what went on after his 1989 papers, and expresses some disenchantment in that his current review would not produce much that was really new. In this paper Fukuyama despises all critics who referred to History as a succession of events, and he even criticizes historians who, in his view, seemed to hold out for intolerant empiricism. Apart from these considerations, he insisted that liberal democracy and the free market are the best regimen, that is, the best way to organize human society. On the other hand, Fukuyama provides an important “clarification of ideas” in respect to his End of History and the Last Man. He reformulates his two universal histories under new names. For the Universal History based on economic modernization and Science, he assigns the rubric “empirical argument,” and that based on “the struggle for recognition” is referred to as a “normative argument.”

The “empirical argument,” he admits, could collapse should any of the following contingencies occur: (1) if liberal democracies themselves collapse; (2) if a different political system triumphs (here referring to the “weak authoritarian Asian system”); and (3) if any core principle is lost, for instance, the right to vote. Concerning the “nor-
nomic liberalism; and (2) he opposes a purely liberal order and proposes a synthetic order somewhere between the traditional and communal. In his view, democracy and liberalism work better when they originate from a nonliberal source (religious, cultural, familial, association, and the ethics of work). He ultimately contends that modernity and tradition can coexist for long periods of time.

Fukuyama's book confirms that he is behind the wake of events and as a historian he cannot keep up with them. The political situation in the world had changed considerably since his bold entrance into the political history field. The coming of the Democrats into power in the United States with Clinton in the presidency and dramatic changes in the international arena forced Fukuyama to qualify his original arguments. In 1995 he was in favor of certain kinds of state intervention and he gave utmost importance to culture and tradition. In other words, History had acquired a new role in Fukuyama's political and economic categories. Now, in this thematic turn, he emphasized in his work such themes as "Confucianism and Democracy" when discussing the relationship of culture to economic politics (Fukuyama, 1995: 20-34).

Turning His Back on Reality?

In the late 1990s Fukuyama’s work took a definitive turn. He devoted time in 1997-1998 to include the role of women in international relations (Fukuyama, 1998: 24-40) and social change evolving from family behavior (Fukuyama, 1997). He delivered three lectures about the latter at Oxford in 1997, under the titles "The Great Disruption," "Technology, Hierarchy and Networks," and "The Origin of Order," which were subsequently drawn together in the book The End of Order (1997). In the journal Foreign Affairs, for which he is a book review editor, he wondered, "What if women ran the world?" and then he proceeded to explore in depth a feminist school of thought about international relations which called for more cooperation, and envisioned a matriarchal world less prone to conflict. In spite of this, Fukuyama believes that masculine politics will prove essential, even in a world run by women. He argues that everyone must accept what he or she is biologically, and not attempt some utopian scheme of transformation.
In *The End of Order* Fukuyama analyzes the disruption in the nuclear family of the United States and Europe, which, to his mind, took place in the period from 1960 to 1967. Illegitimacy, crime, alcoholism, child abuse, etc., are the causes for the "great disruption." Two large changes also account for this shift: birth control and the integration of women in the labor market. The argument is never presented from a sexist point of view, but from one which is well documented and developed. Whether we agree or not with his conclusions (Vidal, 1997: 11), this thinking is different from that of his earliest works.

**The Triumph of History: Sensitivity to Events**

During the "black August" of 1998, the phrase *the end of History* was heard again throughout Washington, DC. According to two well-known American newspapers, our theorist admitted that he might be wrong in his predictions about the end of History. The August 30 *New York Times* (Kristof, 1998) reported that Fukuyama, when asked by a reporter in a telephone interview about the latest political events, answered that "the last few months have been the first time since the beginning of the decade that I actually believe that it could be proven that I was wrong in the argument I presented in *The End of History.*"

"I think there are two things in the horizon that are worrying: that the Asian crisis could become a global depression, something that seems unlikely; and essentially that Russia could fail in its attempt to go Western and seriously go back in its steps. Both scenarios could take place." These words were carried as well by Michael Kelly's column in *The Washington Post* (September 2, 1998).

What is the importance of these words? By admitting this, Fukuyama might have given a fatal blow to his theory on the "end of History" and thereby do away with the most controversial intellectual proposals in recent years. Dozens of critics "rubbed their hands" while Fukuyama proved sensitive to events evidencing his intellectual honesty. It was the first time that he had ever doubted his famous assertions in public.

**Debate Reactivated**

In 1999, when Fukuyama was again invited by *The National Interest* to review his thinking a decade after his original speculations, he submitted a paper titled "Second Thoughts: The Last Man in a Bott..." (1999: 16-33). Its publication was accompanied by responses from six critics, in the same fashion as in 1989: Harvey Mansfield, E. O. Wilson, Gertrude Himmelfarb (who responded in 1989 as well), Robin Fox, Robert J. Samuelson, and Joseph S. Nye (1999: 34-44). They were chosen by Owen Harries and Irving Kristol to reply to Fukuyama. The tenth anniversary celebration of "the end of History" closed with a curious quotation by George Orwell (1999: 44) from a talk at the BBAC in 1942 on the "return" to History. The whole affair attempted to revive the debate, which had really never ceased totally.

Fukuyama's anniversary work began with a reaffirmation of liberal democracy and market economy as the only valid options in modern societies. This assertion allowed him to recover the arguments of his original thesis. He added as innovation a practical dimension regarding U.S. foreign policy, which confirmed the important political aspects of his paper. He focused on three points: (1) liberal democracies tend not to fight each other, thus creating a peace zone (1999: 18); (2) the best way of promoting the idea of democracy is through economic development, so a high correlation exists between the level of development and of democracy; and (3) the most suitable means of stimulating economic growth is to integrate a country into capitalist business and a regime of inversion: "Countries would grow faster by bringing down duties, putting an end to subsidies, privatizing public companies, opening up domestic capital markets to foreign capital" (Fukuyama, 1998: 18-19).

After affirming the political usefulness of his thesis in regard to U.S. foreign policy, Fukuyama (1999: 20) tiptoes around the controversy between him and Samuel Huntington in the latter's 1996 book *The Clash of Civilizations*, saying merely that he did not esteem highly enough the power of economic modernization and technological change. Later he summarized his opinion on the Russian and the Asian economic crises, stating that although both created considerable instability, the "end of History" would triumph.

Fukuyama (1999) depended on the concept of globalization and its implications of equality and progress, which in 1989 had not yet been fully conceptualized nor the term well assigned to the array of ideas associated with it ten years later (Samuelson, 1999: 41; the Spanish version in *El Mundo* of the *Washington Post* column is wrong in asserting that the term does not appear, however). He explained three lessons he had learned in the interim decade: (1) American politicians
made a mistake when they defended at great lengths the economists and forsook politics, government, and institutions as a priority in their thinking; and (2) American politicians underestimated cultural obstacles to development; and (3) a set of lessons relates to investment markets and programs to liberalize the economies of countries in transition, i.e., developing countries. A great debate broke out among economists, like Jeffrey Sachs and Martin Feldstein versus Larry Summers and Paul Krugman, about the complicity of Western international institutions (like the International Monetary Fund) in the Asian economic crisis. In this sense, Fukuyama (1999: 25-26) considers that this does not represent any criticism of capitalism, as maintained by George Soros.

However, the main point of his 1999 paper is to admit that his original “end of History” thesis was wrong—the first such admission in ten years. Indeed, history cannot end because the sciences of nature have no end and they will achieve new scientific advances, which may end up abolishing humankind as such (Fukuyama, 1999: 17). Biotechnology is the science with the potential to alter human nature through genetic manipulation. Consider the change of attitude in men taking Ritalin, which makes them less anxious and less violent people, and the effect of Prozac, which makes one’s mood less depressive.

Fukuyama concludes by underscoring the two revolutions which, in his opinion, are now underway: (1) Information Technology and (2) Biology. As in his 1989 essay, he ends in 1999 with an enigmatic paragraph: “The open nature of the modern Natural Sciences suggests that in the next two generations we shall have the knowledge and the technology that will lead us to achieve what social engineers of the past failed to do. At this point, human history will have definitively ended for we shall have abolished human beings as such. The, a new, post-human history will begin.”

Simultaneously American bookstores carried Fukuyama’s opuscule The End of Order under the title The Great Disruption: Human Nature and the Reconstruction of Social Order (Fukuyama, 1999), where he investigates the “conditions of social deterioration in most of the industrialized world from the mid-sixties to the early nineties, due to (among other things) crime, divorce, illegitimate children and the decline in fertility” (paraphrased by Gottlieb, 1999).

Ten years later, should we not have a unique perspective on the theory of “the end of History”? Having summarized the debate and perspectives during this time, now the thesis may be analyzed by thinking ahead, by taking into account the development of representation, and pointing toward the future. In all, eleven points will be considered.

1. Fukuyama’s thesis was for U.S. foreign policy in the 1990s, as Fukuyama confirmed in his “Second Thoughts,” or an equivalent to the diplomat G. Kennan’s famous essay as “Mr. X” (1947) on the Communist “contention,” which appeared in Foreign Affairs, that convinced Harry Truman that the American strategy should be to contest the Soviet Union. Foreign Affairs in 1989 announced that Fukuyama’s thesis would guide President George Bush as the ideological foundation for his Department of State. No sooner said than done, Bush proclaimed “the new world order” (which Fukuyama claimed was an attempted justification for the intervention into Kuwait) and announced the “recipe” for the market economy and free trade (ideas interestingly enough advocated by Clinton in his last visit to Russia).1 With this realization, we moved from the Cold War to the “Cold Peace” sometimes dubbed the “Cold Postwar” (meaning post–Cold War, with continuing cold). In this stasis, alternating from crisis to change, Americans still must reconsider their stance before the international community and revive debate over isolationist, collaborationist, or interventionist options.

With this new situation, international order has turned multipolar, although in the latest events in Kosovo where prohibitions have been breached one might detect a return to imperialism. On the one hand, the sovereignty of states was ignored, and, on the other, the United Nations’ statutes were not complied with, since the intervention took place without the explicit authorization of the UN Security Council (Ramonet, 1999: 1, 16). Likewise, it is noteworthy that the principle of “no casualties” supported NATO attacks. This situation might accelerate a revived United Nations that ignores History, acknowledges the fragmentation of society while clinging to the idea of a universal international society, but also conceives universalism as something other than homogeneity. International society, as Huntington (1996) said, shows diversity in every aspect of economy, society, and culture.
2. The fracture in the hegemony of liberal democracy might provoke a return to ideological confrontation, should class ideologies become a source of social and political identity. The loss of such identity has been at the core of many nationalist and religious programs. The latest developments in terrorism in the United States from Islamic factions, like the NATO involvement in Kosovo, have opened up old wounds, which Huntington (1993: 22-49) called the “struggle of civilizations” in both his Foreign Affairs articles (1993: 186-194) and his book (1996). Huntington, one of the most vehement critics of Fukuyama, points to the enduring differences between distinct civilizations that override political events and economics. Ideological warfare rooted in cultural elements could definitely evolve into another of the “engines” propelling history to bring about “the end of History.” Fukuyama accepted the importance of cultural differences and their influence, but he does not believe they are motivation enough for conflict (as in the case of Kosovo). Leaving cultural wars aside, together with the whole ideological spectrum subsumed under “globalization” (Barros, 1996: 223-242), nationalism ironically could still undermine the nation-state (Gellner, 1998; see Hroch, 1994: 229-247, for a more precise use of the term nation). Economic collapse, political disintegration, inflation and decreased savings, appearance of opportunistic and resentful new arrivals, national humiliation, the formidable transformation of the formerly dominant cultural group into minorities within new regimes, the moral disorientation or appearance of a centripetal and opportunistic nationalism, etc., are some of the causes, according to Ernest Gellner (1994: 13), that could bring to the surface ideologies opposing social democracy and the balance between liberalism and conservatism.

3. Many branded Fukuyama’s debate as “parochial,” forgetting that globalization is not merely an economic concept. Barros (1996: 223-242) uses this term to refer to world-scale economies and communication; he warned, “To reduce globalization to capitalism would be a mistake similar to that of the political and academic left when, in the past, it identified—and fought—democracy as a bourgeois phenomenon.” Moreover, the local has a way of becoming universal. It is interesting to note, as Perry Andersen (1992) does, that Fukuyama’s thesis is built on a philosophy of History based more on the historical and the political than the philosophical. It is clear that the thesis is sensitive to the variation brought about by daily events. This, in itself, represents a triumph of history as a succession of events, since this has a decisive influence on Universal History. It is a barometer that indicates whether the theory has validity or not. Fukuyama built a theory where history was not included, at least not in the sense of the old paradigm of past, present, and future. He substituted the present for everything else.

At least three empirical cases during the past decade force one to reconsider and reshape the “end of History” thesis. First, consider the ascension of gradualists to power in Russia. The possible approach of Russia toward nonaligned countries or their return to Communism would change the course of ideological evolution. The same would be true for movement by Asian countries, especially China, toward other ideological routes. This second possibility would force Fukuyama to reconsider his appraisal of the “Asian miracle,” which has been so overestimated by the United States since the 1970s, and the surge of the so-called “tigers” or “dragons.” Fukuyama excessively praises “democracies with a strong state control.” In his economically oriented sequel to The End of History, i.e., Trust, Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity, he waxed lyrically about Japanese civil society and the Korean industrial system induced by the state, chaebols, copied from Japan. Similarly, he was enthusiastic, like many other social scientists, about Confucian work ethics. In this sense an analytic, regional dissection of the Asiatic situation, with the political democracy fused with cultural and religious elements, seemed to be preferable now because of the “failure of global capitalism” when Western models were imposed on very different cultures. Asia, we are constantly reminded, does not have the same cultural, political, and economic characteristics or the social cohesion of Europe or the Western world. Such critical differences require studies that are country based or regional in scope. And, finally, no definitive assertion can be made now, but it is unlikely that Eastern Europe can give rise to economies and societies like the Western ones. Citizens there have seen the 1989 revolutions taken away from them (Garton Ash, 1992).

4. The unique use and appropriation by neoconservatives like Fukuyama of the term democracy seems to have come to an end. I would follow instead the definition by Robert A. Dahl (1999: 47-49) that “in the government of this association every member should be considered as politically equal” and “it is a system of government that offers opportunities for effective participation, equality in vote, ac-
cess to an illustrated comprehension, exertion of the ultimate control over the agenda and adult inclusion.” In neoconservative ideology democracy is not separated from liberalism and together they are considered as something empty and formal. 

Fukuyama collaborated in providing a “useful” language for the political discourse of globalization in an attempt to reduce reality to such discourse. Strictly speaking, democracy stops when encountering most of Asia and Africa. Held (1993: 340) has suggested the need to rethink democratic dogma when this is based on (1) reforming the power of the state and (2) restructuring civil society. We have seen too often the failure to introduce a social and institutional structure only from above, despite the trend for democracy to gain ground—with marked ups and downs—throughout the twentieth century until the 1990s. Although such development is not a clear, linear trajectory, more democracies exist now than previously in human history (Markoff, 1999).

5. Recent events have been accompanied by a certain return of Marxism and its reformulation. Political analyst Alex Callinicos anticipated, in his response to Fukuyama, a revitalization of Marxism, as in the 1994 Zapatista revolution in Mexico. In this vein, many argue that what collapsed in the USSR was not true Communism, but state capitalism.

Another debate about different political alternatives to political and economic liberalism has appeared, where several “third ways” have surfaced. British Labour Party leader Tony Blair (1998) has proposed (following the advice of sociologist Anthony Giddens [1999]) a synthesis between American Liberalism and British Social Democracy, which has sometimes been called the “radical center.” Blair intends slowly to widen the scope of his “third way,” with its substitution of “social inclusion” for equality, and reformulate it after the Kosovo failure and its lack of doctrine about international relations. In Spain kingship has been disputed by the two principal parties, with such a “third way” emerging from the friendship between Blair and José María Aznar of the Popular Party (PP) (note that Josep Borrel of the Spanish Worker’s Socialist Party (PSOE) wrote the prologue to Blair’s The Third Way). Another “way” has been formulated by German minister Oskar Lafontaine and his wife Christa Müller (1998: 14). Their book tries to integrate all the positive aspects of globalization with the sustenance of the welfare state and rights of the citizenry in all countries. This work is cited often in Germany, but as Martin Seco points out, it is applicable to all European countries due to the similarity of their policies.

Different stances are taken toward social democracy. Wolfgang Merkel (1995) contends that social democracy will be less and less a workers’ party position, but this does not mean renunciation of the ideal of a fair society. “In developed industrial societies over the last decades, social inequality has less to do with the dichotomy of workers’ class versus the rest of society. . . Nonetheless, some old problems, like economic cycles, unemployment, and social inequality continue to exist and are constantly reproduced. All these rifts mark different interests, conflicts and regulatory needs corrected by the social state of the future, thus guaranteeing the survival of social democracy,” explains Merkel. Another observer, John Roemer (1995), notes that after the fall of the Communist system in the USSR and eastern Europe, globally Socialism continues to be an ideal. He believes, however, in Socialism as a form of egalitarianism and not as the accomplishment of a particular property relationship. He also holds that modern capitalism provides several fertile experiences to design the new wave of socialist experimentation pertaining to private relationships and markets (Roemer, 1995: 168-177). In any case, the 1990s produced a number of alternatives to the traditional Left, and it remains to be seen how Communism fares when freed from authoritarianism.

6. The “end of History” is an intellectual key to globalization, which in turn is the main characteristic of neocapitalism. Economic globalization is that process whereby national economies are progressively integrated in the framework of the international economy in such a way that their evolutions are increasingly determined by international markets and less by government policies (Estefanía, 1996: 14). While some see the two terms as synonymous (Todd, 1998, cited by Beck, 1998), Estefanía (1996: 16) builds on the work of Alain Touraine (1998), who distinguishes “globalization” (a phenomenon that breaks with the past when nations cede power over their economies and societies to global and antidemocratic powers like commodities markets, credit-rating agencies, etc.) and “internationalization” (an element born of free-trade tendencies accelerated in the second half of the twentieth century). He does not think current transformations make a coherent whole that really constitutes globalization.
Three reasons are often posited for the trends toward globalization: (1) accelerated exchange; (2) freeing up of markets; and (3) the communications revolution. The theoretical origins of globalization belong to the 1980s’ conservative revolution centered in the United States and within Europe in Great Britain during the Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher administrations, respectively. Globalization can spread without a hegemonic political and economic power, however, and without a world state or government. Such circumstances bring to the surface several different problems, such as social exclusion, unemployment, education differences, international cooperation, or the establishment of new political, economic, and cultural alliances and objectives, etc. “Actually,” claims Ignacio Ramonet (1997: 73), “globalization, the triumph of markets, the magic invocation of integral free trade, the multimedia omnipotence, the sustained retreat of politics—all this is in every assurance part of a program that has to be termed ideological: that of unbridled liberalism, abandoned to its own power, which will bring about new inequalities and specific oppressions.” He further criticizes globalization by predicting that we are living through “a progressive dismantling of democratic achievements, an abandonment of the European social contract, a return to primitive nineteenth-century capitalism.” Hans-Peter Martin and Harald Schuman (1998) are even more radical. They contend that globalization tends to bring the world together but simultaneously tears it apart. “Politicians,” they say, “act as if their only thought went to giving carte blanche to the most brutal economic forces, renouncing any kind of regulation. The word is to bring expenses down and reduce labor costs to a minimum. We are heading toward a world of ghettos for the rich and huge cities for the poor.” In this regard, note the effort by the Association for a Tobin Tax in Support of Citizens (ATTSC) to promote debate about regulation in the movement of capital. The idea is to revive the thinking of 1972 Nobel Prize Laureate James Tobin, who advocated levying a reasonable tax on all economic transactions made in the exchange market with an intent to stabilize them and generate income for the international community. The initiative reappeared in 1998 at the behest of La Monde Diplomatique and on June 29, 1999, ATTSC convened a conference in Paris of over 1,000 from eighty countries (reviewed by Estefanía, 1999; 61).

The power of the economy seems like an illusion. The reduction of growth rates, the increase of inequities, and the monetary evolution are all economic phenomena, but they hide deeper cultural and anthropological realities, like substandard general education in sectors of the United States, and such aftereffects as the decreased production of scientists and engineers; the problematic decline in the fertility rate in the developed world counterbalanced by increases elsewhere; and new cultural stratification. Such elements make up what Emmanuel Todd (1998: 267-269) calls a “crisis of civilization.” The globalized world is one of disorder, stagnation, and regression.

7. The “end of History” debate has contributed significantly to the crystallization of so-called Unified Thinking—an intellectual rubric for universal vested interests of a set of economic powers in international capital (World Bank, International Monetary Fund, World Trade Organization, European Commission, etc.) that fund in their service numerous research centers in universities and foundations that shape and publicize their message in the bibles of investors and stock traders (The Wall Street Journal, The Financial Times, The Economist, the Far Eastern Economic Review, etc.). Unified Thinking responds to the maxim that “ideas have consequences” and centers on such principles as (1) “the economic” has preeminence over the political; (2) the importance of the invisible hand of the market; (3) the potential realization of competence and productivity; (4) free, unlimited trade; (5) globalization of production and financing; (6) international division of work; (7) strong currency; (8) deregulation, privatization, and liberalization; and (9) the elimination of state and ecological differences (Estefanía, 1996: 36-48). Two new superideas restructure new thinking: (1) “communication” is substituted for older notions of “progress,” which is sidelined with its ideas of advancement and equality; and (2) “the market” takes over mechanics, history, or movements in society, and individuals are categorized as either “solvent” or “insolvent,” depending on their ability to be integrated into the market economy (Ramonet, 1997: 87-89).

8. The two preceding points indicate a crisis of the nation-state (Ohmae, 1995), which is disintegrating because of globalization, supranational institutions, and different national tensions. The attack, or rather entrapment, of the nation-state leads to a loss of national identity. What lies between the local and global is largely ignored. Globalization has already killed the nationally bounded market, one
of the foundations of the modern nation-state, and this in turn is reflected in its inability to control its capital. Critics argue, therefore, that governments need to reestablish national identities, the idea of equality, and consider "intelligent protectionism" not just in economics, but in culture and society as well. The crisis of the nation-state, it is feared, could throw the current economic, political, and social situation into further confusion. All of this requires reformulation of the concepts of the nation-state and of democracy.

9. Fukuyama based his historical and political argumentation on what he conceptualized as posthistorical societies (those which had reached "the end of History" through liberal democracy), but he omitted "historical societies" in his analysis. For examples, he slighted the North-South debate and underplays the reality of the South. The so-called Third World exists as a terrible reality that threatens world stability. The new world order discriminates against more and more countries and marginalizes them, so that the planet seems doomed to a nightmare of injustice and inequality. The dependency of the South on the North will change only if the rule and structure that governs the international economy changes. Projects of regional integration and development have failed as the "Third World" is reduced by conflicts, social disruptions, and cheap labor.

10. The current situation could be diagnosed, as by George Soros (1998), as a general crisis of capitalism revolving around three issues: (1) deficiencies in the international banking system (the Russian crisis is a case in point); (2) many countries have abandoned the global capitalist system, like Indonesia or Russia, by returning to isolationism; and (3) the inability of the global capitalist system to stay united through its institutionalization (IMF, G7, etc.), which makes for centralization of capital in the center as it is drained from the periphery. A fourth point should be added to these, which pertains to the excessive business acquisitions, especially great world-class mergers in an ever-increasing competition to reduce cost and to achieve world-scale competitive capability.

Writers like Lester C. Thurow (1996: 324) argue that the problem of capitalism may not be in its collapse but in stagnation: "The intrinsic problems of capitalism in its origin (instability, increased inequalities, poor proletariat) are still waiting to be solved. But this is true of a new set of problems that originate in the growing dependency on both human capital and the man-made brainpower industries."

Thurow suggests that new solutions should be developed and risks should be taken to move beyond stagnation. David Schwickart (1997) has proposed an alternative to capitalism which he sees as provoking financial crises, generating dramatic increases in social inequality and harming the environment. He calls this alternative, where the influence of Marx is visible, "economic democracy," which consists of maintaining production of goods and services but also introducing democratic models into corporations. All such differing opinions among experts might be seen in the light of what many economics call the "New Economy," corresponding to the situation found in the American economy where traditional limitations to economic expansion no longer hold. Some theorize that the United States has become the leader and other countries must adapt their values and conform their institutions to compete. Paul Krugman (1998), among others, suggests such strident optimism should be tempered, lest the U.S. "economic bubble" burst in the foreseeable future.

11. Marketing language has impinged many current social realities, e.g., the conceptual distinctions between the useful and useless, salable and not, etc. Such determinations often exclude sectors of the population from achieving their own welfare and the benefits of globalization, as in the case of young people whose situation in some areas became critical in the 1990s when excluded from the labor market, forced into underemployment even after significant training, and stopped from career advancement because of the lack of adequate employment opportunities for their seniors. Douglas Coupland (1993) called this "the crisis of being twenty-five." Vicente Verdu, in his prelude to Coupland's Generation X, estimated that 45 million people in the United States are between 18 and 29 years old and there are some 5 million in Spain. Their plight has become the subject of literary works (cf. Mañás, 1994; Maestre, 1996). Many of these young people consider themselves alienated, they do not want to get involved, and they lack desire for achievement. "They are not identified for their ascription to a uniform like punks, or a community like hippies; neither do they constitute a group like Nike or Armani, nor do they follow hymns or the impulse of rhythms or leaders. There is a remembrance of 1960s hippies in their pacifism, but similarities stop there. They are more complex and subtle, better equipped with a critical apparatus to assess contemporariness." (Verdu, in Coupland, 1993: 10).
CONCLUSIONS

Fukuyama made a very long intellectual journey. He began with the political and philosophical, later turning to the economic, to end up with the social. At the onset he advocated market self-regulation; later he defended the intervention of the state into the economy almost in Asian fashion. He finally admitted that Asia and Russia had forced him to reconsider his assumptions. He now argues that posthuman history will negate his thesis. Which should we believe? Fukuyama has inherited Hegel through Kojève and through Bloom a certain ambiguity that makes him controversial and indefinite.

The theory of "the end of History" and its debate demonstrate the influence of the theoretical on the historical and vice versa. History spelled with a small "h," understood as a succession of events, is fundamental for theory, as this has greatly conditioned the degree of fulfillment in "the end of History." One of the most important conclusions is that theory and history are intimately related. They are indeed interdependent and inseparable.

The development of History, like Science, is not teleological. One may speak of progress as retrospective. From the viewpoint of the History of Science, we have achieved greater dominance over Nature. This is progress as seen while moving away from a starting point, but not regarding a hypothetical final destination (Barros, 1995: 95-118).

This discussion demonstrates that it is possible to open cooperation between the New Intellectual History, which seeks to study ideas in their contexts, and "present-time History," which considers how the present takes the past into account. It is possible and desirable to end in Spain the reticence in historiographic reflection, inbred study of the discipline, and a breakaway from what Gonzalo Pasamar (1997: 339-347; 1998: 13-48) calls a "dependency on external models." His review of reflection in Spanish historiography is encouraging. The peculiarity of present-time History and its difference from other History domains lies in its temporal starting point for study, but not a finality, because it is permanently open and subject to events as they unfold (Cuesta, 1993). This has been one of the themes in this discussion, so it is understandable that changes have had to be made in understanding Fukuyama's intellectual odyssey. This attempted synthesis seeks to adopt the notion expressed by Carlos Barros (1995) that "the future of our discipline depends on our ability to adapt to the deep, vertiginous changes that are occurring between the twentieth and twenty-first centuries." He points to the social demands deriving from globalization (novelty in fragmentation in the 1980s, the digital future as predicted, the new community of historians on the Internet, polycentric historiography, etc.), cultural and educational demands as conditions of this century; political and social demands of the new (and old) subjects and those from Science.

Fukuyama sought to animate the concept of Universal History in an attempt to provide it with credibility in the wake of Postmodern criticism which radically secularized modernity and attempted to make meta-portraits of a universal humanity superfluous (Vázquez, 1997: 73-75). In retrospect, of course, it can be argued that Postmodernism is a metaportrait of itself.

The evolution of "the end of History" theory contributes, from a European perspective, to a distinction between conservative ideas and liberal ones. Fukuyama is a proclaimed neocconservative, one of many in an ever larger conservative family (Nisbet, 1995).

NOTES

1. In 1990 "Mr. Z" (pseudonym of a general in a position close to Secretary of State James Baker) published an article in Daedalus which became a sort of new bible for diplomacy between Moscow and Washington. The central idea was the natural flow of events that led to dissolution of the Soviet system, regardless of rulers and policies, and also made possible cooperation between the United States, Russia, and its federation of independent states in transition (summary, el Vida, 1990: 14).

2. Barros (1993: 110): "We encounter references to the past and historical analyses which seek to have an influence on the present... through the future, which is what truly disturbs men and women today. Consequently, there is a tendency to substitute the old past/present/future paradigm with another formula of past/future/present, in which what is ahead is foreground. Against this new presentism, which does not want to hear from the future and which immobilizes what we have now as opposed to the uncertainties about the world ahead in the millennium, the diligent intellectual— the optimism of intelligence—looks for alternative perspectives reporting to the past, to the events at our disposal in the historical evolution—or in vivo—of societies and mentalities."

3. A certain incompatibility exists in the idea of "liberal democracy." The collective and universalist nature of the term democracy contrasts to the isolated meaning of the second ex-term. The Western world was liberal before being liberally democratic. "None of the models of liberal democracy is able to specify adequately the conditions which enable the political participation of every citizen and the set of government institutions able to regulate the forces that actually shape daily life on the other" (Held, 1993: 339). David Held points out, on the other hand, there are two
surprising historical facts to consider: (1) almost everyone today claims to be democratic regardless of the left, center, or right of their position; and (2) texts before the eighteenth century seldom mention democracy. This has been considered an appropriate way of organizing life for less than a century (Held, 1993: 15).

REFERENCES


“The End of History”: Looking Back and Thinking Ahead


Chapter 13

Globalization and Historiography

Juan Manuel Santana Pérez

History as a theoretical discipline is being conditioned by economic globalization that is fast becoming a new ideology. The French École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales and the British school of thought, which emphasize historic materialism, have had a considerable impact on world historiography. Many historians have studied in these two centers and either returned to their countries of origin or remained in the United States or Europe, continuing their research in related areas. Generally, historiography has developed a northwestern European theoretical bias. Correlations exist and positivist influences may be identified concerning historical materialism based on the French model developed in the Annals School.

At the close of the twentieth century, globalization seems to be the most widely held scientific perspective, thus reorienting all the History-related Social Sciences. Finance capital dominates this new scenario; rather than questioning such dominion, this may be seen as a long-sought panacea, as capital intervention freely crosses borders.

Some historians have rightly pointed out that by intensifying this shift toward globalization, historians are in danger of falling prey to the cold logic of hegemonically centered capital. This is not merely the threat of economic submission, but an attendant cultural overpowering that denies differences in the name of the globalizing process. In this process a select few dominate the many (Zárate, 1996: 3).

Ironically, along with globalization of discourse, major philosophical arguments in the 1990s arose to oppose any project aimed at shoring up inequalities in Europe, with two different speeds in devel-

This chapter was translated from Spanish by David Shea, Lecturer in Translation, Universidad de Las Palmas de Gran Canaria; revision by L. J. McCran.
opment. In the American sphere two independent worlds, each with their own benefits, were positioned in the north. Distinguished historians who support the notion of socialization, such as Santos Juliá (1990: 25-29), defend these same economies as possible reconstructions of an overall history. They predict that the future of the History profession depends on shedding coherent total interpretations, but also on being satisfied with partial explanations. Others (Barros, 1996: 69) maintain that History, to renew its social and scientific credibility, must recover “the principle of globality in the face of rampant fragmentation of the discipline.” Rather than true globalization, however, we seem to have a “McDonald’s-ization” or “Coca-Cola-ization” process. Historians need to recover an interpretative mode with a global attitude that explains the world as a whole, so it does not seem utterly incomprehensible.

This thought is linked to the approach taken by Michel Foucault (1981) approach to the particular. Systemic skepticism was vital in Foucaultian thinking in the face of anthropological generalities. He denied the existence of a single form of the human being, i.e., the universal “human” through which the historian could emphasize the contingency of different concepts of the human condition in terms of certain practices and technologies of one’s self. This negates the possibility of History and favors partial history or histories. Faced with the profound historicity of these ideas, the universalist stance defended by J. Habermas (1991) leads inevitably to a theory of society’s evolution without involving the species in hypostasis of individual behavior through the reality of human communication. Globalization needs to be questioned since it forms part of the global market system, with critical transnational sectors and infrastructures, and its privatization of public property. Globalization is not a transformation toward a general system, and so we believe it would be more prudent to speak of globalism rather than globalization.

At the close of the twentieth century, the economic politics of the state have taken a historical turn with far-reaching consequences (Echeverria, 1995: 40). We now have an economic model and an ideological base that justifies this, which perpetuates the dependency of poorer nations on richer ones. This situation divides countries further. Meanwhile international institutions do little but ratify the politics of capital. Continuance of such a situation tears at the political, cultural, and economic fabric of national societies, assimilating a small sector while exploiting the majority (Petra, 1997: 79).

An earlier era, at the beginning of the twentieth century, had been dominated by the idea of progress. Indeed, this period came to be known as Progressive and was related philosophically and historiographically to Positivism, which opposed revolution in favor of the triumphant bourgeois belief in scientific and technological advancements (Villar, 1964: 449-493; Carr, 1976: 11ff). Progressivism survives in the idea that History, to be a science, must emulate the Natural Sciences. It should be precise, have a real or experimental basis, and provide some process of verification. This has led to the idea that the only aspect of human subjectivity is historical fact.

Positivists aimed at constructing a rigorous History that adhered strictly to historical facts. From its beginnings, Positivism limited its range of study about the human past to those individual events that could be recognized through careful heuristic study. In other words, this had to be done through a consideration of objective, external sources (Carbonell, 1976). The foremost Positivist ideologue, Auguste Comte (1983 ed.), believed Capitalism would spell the end of history. To establish social harmony in this context, he proposed the formation of a new religion in which the worship of God was substituted by the veneration of an abstract superior Being. This erudite, conservative Positivism stemming from these early theories became widely accepted in academic circles and dominated historical interpretation for a generation or more. As historians limited themselves to facts based on historical documents, Positivism became entrenched and proved very restrictive, favoring such topics as Politics and Diplomatic History. The main characteristics of historical Positivism, then, include the favoring of political, diplomatic, and military facts; an almost exclusive focus on European and Western History; and, despite great erudition, an almost unquestioning reliance on fact without adequate interpretation.

This European-based, Western-style development has been taken to be the preferred model for civilization and progress, thus forming the ideological framework for History. This did not reproduce simple copies, because no two histories were the same, but there were similar characteristics in the intellectual underpinning of Positivism in most historiographic writing.
Within the limits of this fact-based history, the past serves as a model for the present. Such History does not present a well-developed notion of progress. Instead, the past is generally considered better than the present, and its history is taken as a point of reference for current generations. Our forebears were seen as those who forged the State, rather than focusing on the constant maintenance of the State or history to the present. Thus History became a chronicle of national heroes in the past. Moreover, the only acceptable historical subjects were those who took a leading role in politics or war. In this paradigm, the role of historians in such traditional historiographic work is thus limited because they reject anything that does not form part of the document-based description of events. They are left to transmitting historical events as taken from accepted sources. They narrate history without interfering in its course.

When this model entered a period of insurmountable crisis, another clearly articulated system came into being which provided coherent justification for the dominant social relations. This “Developmentalism” maintained that all countries could and should develop; thus, all poor nations were said to be developing. Any rejection of the notion was scant because of an unspoken or assumed imperative that everyone needed to push forward with development, to a stage where everyone would be happy, and problems would cease to exist. This era saw great migrations from the country to the city, where people looked for their place in this development scheme. Even the most advanced sectors were convinced that by tightening their belts their problems would soon be over. They would be developed, because they were developing. CEPAL was thus established, replete with its theories of inequalities of development. In historiography, this same socioeconomic thinking led to the academic dominance of the Annales School.

A new general approach to History also meant a new theoretical and methodological conception. The événementielle mentalité or event-centered view of History and the factual scientism of Positivism were thus rejected when historical thought became more developmental in perspective. More historical synthesis was proposed, along with a logical tendency toward interdisciplinary study, particularly regarding Sociology. Historic causality began to be accepted, as structural causality replaced the genetic causality associated with Positivism. Whereas Historicism’s chronological concatenation of events went no further than immediate, superficial causes, new trends in History would beckon reinvestigation of these causes in the basic and more profound structures of the historic process.

There seems little doubt that these historiographic changes, intellectual revolutions really, were stimulated by simultaneous transformations in European and world society at large. Industrial advances, the growing significance of social struggle that led to the Russian revolution, and the consolidation of the Socialist movement are all elements that explain the renewed interest in Historicism at the start of the twentieth century. Increasing economic concern, particularly in the wake of the 1929 stock market crash, followed changes in the social and economic order. Furthermore, a certain level of apolitical intellectualism led to the rejection of traditional History based only in Politics (Dossé, 1988: 16). The Annales school in France was undertaken by the Rockefeller Foundation. This support was justified by the expressed belief that better knowledge of the world’s problems “would provide better social control for the good of all” (Mazon, 1988).

The Annales school endeavored to place structures into a historical framework to formalize the concept of “Civilization” to capture the essential features of social formation at the highest level. From this definition, disparate cultures and economic systems could be compared to fashion an overall historical picture. Regional studies also came into vogue. In these studies, through the analytical demarcation of regions, historians attempted to group different historical planes into a single study. Such an approach was championed by European social democrats who sought to reconcile social classes. They relied on external funding such as Rockefeller and Ford Foundation grants, Marc Bloch Association support, and Guggenheim scholarships.

In the 1980s, these hopes for total conciliation were dashed. Indeed, the crisis was of such magnitude that these years came to be known as the “lost decade.” Many historians had been searching for a panacea that did not exist, and History was left in ruins. The unifying concept of continuous “Development” became as mythically elusive as El Dorado (Rivero, 1988: 158).

Globalization, or Globalism, appeared in the 1990s with encouragement for everyone to create a globalized world. This process would make the so-called Third World nations richer for themselves
and as markets, so that no one would be left out of this global scenario. Everyone would advance together to the same level. Crisis signs in modern capitalism have already appeared, however, indicating that the benefits derived from production do not find sufficient investment to develop greater productive capacity (Amin, 1999, provides seven essays on the capitalist management of the current crisis). The language employed to describe this situation continues to be a euphemism for differing forms of national and social exploitation. Globalization rhetoric ideologically masks the growing power of United States-based multinationals and their directors who are getting richer and whose companies are exploiting the world market on an unprecedented scale. Thus, globalization has become a key word for the progressive hegemony of U.S. imperialism (Petra, 1999). This is little more than the globalization of Capitalism, far beyond mere economic considerations (Chesnais, 1994).

Historiography has been affected significantly by social and political conditions in recent years. The fall of the Soviet system, ending the bipolar world, has spelled a setback for all left-wing movements in the so-called Third World, whose strategies were based on the fragile balance between the two superpowers. A powerful nation to counterbalance the United States was crucial for the development of revolutionary movements throughout the world.

Political corruption and the unethical behavior of government leaders have disheartened those who once sought to effect social revolution through bourgeois democracy. Their very institutions are being discredited. The dizzying rate of technological advance has also affected the means of production. These events have caused a crisis in the Left, with significant historiographic consequences. The versions of History produced by the USSR’s Academy of Social Sciences, for example, eliminated or misrepresented entire episodes of the past— with pernicious results. Indeed, almost nothing remains of that model that once sought to transform human beings.

All this has been accompanied by political and economic changes. Gone are any attempts at state intervention or control aimed at a more humane form of Capitalism, as with a social welfare system, at least among wealthy nations. Now governments assume the Chicago School’s model of economic Neoliberalism as most desirable. Even the Social Democrats, with their conservative “third way,” have wholeheartedly embraced Neoliberalism. This has become the theoretical basis for their ideological conversion. British Prime Minister Tony Blair (1998: 129) stated that “free trade has proved itself the engine for economic development.”

Philosophically, we have also seen the advent of Postmodernism taking over where the Modern period ceased. This Postmodern emphasis is characterized by the triumph of both individualism and conservatism. Postmodernity disregards any overall historic vision or project. There are no universal values and Postmodernity vanquishes any conception of History as a single or unified development. Thus, Historiography is going through a crisis precisely because of the diverse intellectual and cultural currents presently being forwarded, resulting in disunity and nonconsensus.

According to one of the leading Postmodern ideologues in 1979, Jean-François Lyotard (1984), the “great struggles for emancipation” which once formed overall identities are now gone. By “great struggle” he refers to an aim that justifies any means. There are no more ultimate values, he claims, although adding that cultural context is crucial, marked by historical development. However, he recognizes that the study of such historical context suggests relativism. In another book Lyotard (1987: 35-50) denies the possibility of understanding History as a single development. He suggests abandoning meta-histories which have lasted for centuries, marked by the idea of indefinite economic development and by the ideal of bourgeois democracy. Lyotard believes that the aspirations dating from May 1968 are dead.

Lipovetsky (1986: 50, 52) has analyzed this line of thought and speaks of an Age of Narcissus with reference to the contemporary individual—an emblematic characteristic of today’s society. He defends the notion that an anthropological mutation is taking place, transforming the very nature of the individual. This permissive, hedonistic capitalism (as opposed to authoritarian capitalism) manifests itself in the current popularity of bodybuilding and psychotherapies.

Whereas modernity embraces the spirit of industriousness and a positive view of the future, it seems from historical inference that this narcissism heralds the postmodern era. This collective narcissism lacks any notion of tragic nihilism, but is characterized by frivolous apathy, despite the terrible calamities served up daily by the mass media. Perhaps the repetitive nature of these messages has desensitized us to these phenomena. There has been an apparent decline in our val-
uncesses, which might be related to the writings of Nietzsche, but for him, this was tragedy, and for many today, it is not.

The preceding period could best be described by what Albert Camus (1988) called the “myth of Sisyphus” (as studied by Oviedo Perez, 1992). It is the case of the workers who go to work each day without hope of changing their situation, forever destined simply to “carry the can.” Knowledge of this destiny was the antidote for avoiding suicidal tendencies, because they could try to change things through the transformation of their relationship with the means of production. In recent years, life continues to have the same sense of the working classes, but no one commits suicide because the meaning of life is found in the image, the paradigm of contemporary aestheticism, with the increase of beauty and fitness centers.

Today the rage is to live in and for the present: the future does not exist. Only the present is real; the past is simply abandoned. Consequently, some historians now focus their attention on the most immediate History. A new trend involves specializing in the History of the Present—a certain contradiction when speaking of time frames. If we accept the present as a product of the past, this new History would have to date back to the prehistorical era. If the world cannot be considered in its totality, then historical development lacks any universal sense. The same people are fragmented and off-centered, incapable of projecting into the future (Larrain, 1996: 244). Rorty (1991: 253-276) criticizes postmodernist thinkers whose inability to conceive of an “us” leads to political apathy. The future has lost all interest, and so “prophetic history” is also abandoned. The exaggerations of this thinking bring on the triumph of living for the moment, total relativism, and political passivity, which may paradoxically lead to a cultural essence. However, society’s postmodern fragmentation fits perfectly into the free-market workings of advanced capitalism.

We are bombarded by messages assuring us that this is the best possible world, as Leibniz (1977 ed.) maintained in his day, although he was subsequently in 1759 ridiculed with Voltairean irony (Voltaire, 1976 ed.). With equal irony, we need only look at Parmenides for assurance that movement does not exist. However, the world does turn, everything changes, and the historian’s task is arduous indeed. These campaigns are effective because they have taken on a normative aspect. Any proposal to posit the need for a transformation of a unifying, synthetic, or “single thought” is cast aside. Under such circum-

stances, how can one provide a worldview, a global perspective, a sense of continuity, or, for that matter, History? This new situation disintegrates the processes of social and political grouping of the oppressed and forces them into a complete crisis of social identity, with all its social implications concerning memory, consciousness, and discourse. It uses current technological powers in communication and transport to try to impose a world recolonization of the imaginary (Quijano, 1996: 3).

In terms of historiography, note that traditional History is becoming accepted again: biographies, narrative histories, military history, diplomatic histories, and politically centered history in the study of power and its relationship with social and symbolic aspects. Of course, this historiographic reaffirmation even of “the military version” also serves to justify spending on armaments, particularly when these industries play an important role in funding the “global market.” Diplomacy is replaced by militarism in the relationship that rich nations maintain with the rest of the world. Such developments also have repercussions on methodology and epistemology. Depth seems to substitute for structural considerations in the language of New History. When situated in the world of the mind, it seems less reflexive and more reckless. Some histories try to find a place for politics to explain society while making politics the center of the explanation (Mina, 1993: 63).

Since the mid-1980s, historiography has become enmeshed in a polemic concerning which path to follow: social and economic history have been abandoned in favor of histories of the mind, anthropological and cultural constructs, sometimes known as tourant critique, from the name of the publishing house of Annales (1988: 291-293). This coincides with the history of the imaginary, that is, imaginary representations (images, symbols, and invented realities) that displace previous interests in other mental functions (Barros, 1993: 121). This in itself is not necessarily negative, because from this perspective one can develop Globalism.

For the most part, problem history has also been abandoned, explanatory analysis is vociferously refuted, Sociology is rejected (replaced by Anthropology), and History has been redirected at the description of daily life, of the world of feelings and of the ideological attitudes, leading to Neopositivist factualism even though developed in new fields of study. History is reduced, therefore, in more and more
cases, merely to the transcription of cultural representations with contextual references.

Some historians, myself included, believe that an enduring description, a minute reconstruction, and presentation of the past for the present consumption do not by themselves constitute historical work. This thinking is connected with the Anglo-Saxon world with a trend that puts social and political events above any cultural phenomena. In this way, we would highlight the conservative intellectual groups, such as represented by Daniel Bell (1969), who see the individual in current society as immersed in the cultural contradictions of capitalism, in which three forms of logic are reconciled: hedonism, efficiency, and equality. The only escape envisioned by Bell is taking recourse in the discarded tradition, the only thing that can provide the individual with existential security currently lacking (Klappenback, 1991). In this context note the most recent work of Francis Fukuyama (1998), where he compares the economies of China, Japan, South Korea, France, Italy, Germany, and the United States with their cultural correlates and maintains that the dependence between the economy and the State depends on trust relationships created through culture.

Sexual relations, attitudes toward children, death and aging, fear, privacy and intimacy, insanity, and, in more than one case, the risqué and leisure have all been incorporated, overwhelmingly so, into the study of History. They seem constrained by epistemological limitations and often are reduced to curiosity status, as the past presented for the general diversion of consumer society.

The crisis of historiography at the end of this past century has left a mark on many things. Today there is a total lack of politics and ideology, and hence an absence of theories, while empirical methodologies and professionalism flourish, where a crisis has developed in paradigms, once strong, which are now weak. Some historian who would, in other times, be noted for their affinity toward historical materialism, are today writing fiction and questioning whether History is any more than that. Historian-novelists Garavaglia and Fradkin (1992: 11), for example, recognize only a "thin line" separating the two genre. However, certain glimmers of optimism can be discerned which should theoretically and methodologically strengthen the historiographer's task (Villarruel, 1996: 89-98).

In many current historiographic trends, History loses its concrete references. Local history practically disappears as imported schemes from dominant nations are favored. When these models are adapted to and overlaid on other histories, very different realities are substituted for the local. There is tendency to favor long-term History, in which time seems to stand still. This completely eliminates other time periods and shows general rejection of the possibility of historical change in context. Uprooted from the rest of society, culture is seen as almost unchanging, immune to historical change, constant over time, and, therefore, directly associated to an assumed almost eternal human nature. This has been accompanied by a new Positivism and a throwback to narrative and political history, disregarding the social essence of History. Pour une histoire politique, edited by René Rémond (1988), provides the clearest presentation of such hypotheses. This subject was analyzed by María Cruz Mina (1993: 64), who emphasizes that the political aspects of such a persuasion, and the choice to study politics, may serve conservative ideology. Habermas indicated that historiography has moved toward a narrative system of reference. These historians are not interested in developing a universal history, which Foucault also rejects. Rather they present an alternative concept, a theory of evolution, which "relies on supposed universal structures of consciousness and levels of ordered learning in accordance with the logic of development" (Habermas, 1991: 185).

A dominant idea is that globalization will ultimately destroy the national market, so national capitalism has become obsolete and the role of public powers are diminished (Ramonet, 1997). This is coupled with bewilderment in thinking that the nation-state is an anachronism and that capital crosses national borders with the eventual demolition of protective barriers between national economies (Petra, 1999, thinking of the largest banks and corporations in the United States, Europe, and Japan). Thus, local histories, which were so important in the 1960s-1970s, lose interest. Now that Toyota's business figures surpass the Gross National Product (GNP) of Norway, it seems obvious that large companies can finance research to invent their very own version of History if they desire, so they play their strongest hand in current historiography (Lobo, 1991: 217-237). As states cede their main duties and allow their sovereignty to be stripped away, this is not simply submitting to the social, economic, and political evaluation of private interests, but democratic space is being diminished. The states themselves
are becoming privatized in the international system. Thus we have the growing subordination of national sovereignties to the designs of transnational capital in this process of globalization.

All this has led historians to look to private initiatives, since the state has lost its role in History, with the dismantling of rights, loans, and social services, as well as its ability to study, train, and offer social assistance. The state has often come to defend the belief that the family unit functioned perfectly well in the past; it stresses the importance of public instruction in the development of its citizens' intellectual capacities; it defends individual learning through books; and it tends to see historical change as the product of the individual's mental change. We thus tend to think of culture as possessing an excessive capacity to determine historical processes and changes without taking into account its complete autonomy. The criteria for "scientific reason" and the concept of "objectivity" are considered by postmodern society as mere substitutes for religious and metaphysical images of the Old World by another "rhetoric of truth." Foucault (1981: 25) did not believe in the possibility of an absolute principle, nor in any criterion with a definitive base. Thus he did not consider establishing that any universal norms were positive. Each cultural form of Western civilization has had its system of interpretation, its techniques and methods, its own forms of detecting the language spoken beyond what was being uttered, and the ability to recognize that there are languages within language itself.

As L. Stone (1979/1981: 9-15) put it, referring to this new concept of culture, individual will and culture are significant causes and factors of change "as impersonal forces that resist and shape our actions and perceptions." E. Le Roy Ladurie is more forthright: "Change essentially takes place in the cultural world. A good day is the culture which puts everything away" (quoted by Dossé, 1988: 183).

In this crisis of historiography (in an etymological sense), I would propose to the scientific community some points for debate to foster interpretations for a more hopeful future.

To restore the role of the historian in today's world, History must be linked with a measure of social commitment so that through History we learn that we are free; we should be critical and change the concept of truth from evidence as it has been constructed at one concrete historical moment, and, thus, we should understand it relative to its creation and initial understanding.

Social Sciences have become another arm of power, with specialized methods of domination. They influence the philosophical framework of innovative ways of studying History. The sway of power should remain radically decentralized, making it omnipresent and permeable, so that power is seen as relations distributed asymmetrically throughout society, like dispersed constellations of unequal relations (Hernandez Sandoica, 1995: 175). From a Habermas-based perspective, a new, always critical Social Science must be defended. As Foucault puts it, modern science has become the ideological substrata that legitimizes the status quo in advanced capitalism. Whereas Habermas believed that there was always the possibility of History as a "reconstructive" and liberating science, Foucault sees only a possible delegitimizing action of the historian of ideas. The historian's role as critic is of paramount importance.

Much of what we take to be fixed and universal in our society is little more than the result of precise historical changes. We may perceive the arbitrary nature of institutions thus, What is the space of freedom still available to us, and what changes still need to be made? In this way, History would assume a legitimizing function. Thus, note the importance of the contextualization of the history of thought within a history of social structures: our thoughts are also social.

Power and knowledge are inseparably linked. Truth is not beyond power, nor is it powerless. So we must make history of the relationships that unite thought and truth, that is, the history of thought when referring to truth. Foucault (1990: 117) is clearly aware that the system of knowledge which developed in our society is tremendously complex, particularly when we take into account that it possesses sophisticated power structures.

It is this union of knowledge and power that will create human sciences, through vigilance, examining controls, and understanding the norms individuals act by throughout their existence. It would seem obvious then that both the subjects of knowledge as well as the relations of truth are formed in context characterized by economic and political conditions which give them meaning.

Truth does indeed exist. Foucault makes this affirmation in the face of knowledge systems that destabilize objectivity (insanity, power, sexuality). So we propose making History the study of the relations that unite thought and truth; in other words, the history of thought in the case of the notion of truth (Gabilondo, 1990: 182). This can be
done with no effort to respond to the laws of verification which govern History itself, without reducing itself merely to chronicle what happened, i.e., the event, but to study transformations. One of the aims proposed is to show that many of the things forming this landscape and which people consider universal are merely the product of precise historical changes in a larger picture.

Therefore, we should vindicate the validity of any interpretive analysis and defend the right to dissent in the face of monolithic systems which impose mechanically derived answers to questions about the past—or about the future. The history of humanity is not a perfect machine where every consequence has deliberate or even discernible cause, and no one can point to the when, how, or where the grand finale of this endless history might be found. We must be on guard about theories proclaiming the unquestionable triumph of current neoliberal economic positions, and challenge those who view doubt or negation as a sign of craziness, aberrance, or fanaticism. Economic phenomena are neutral and their effects ambivalent. We cannot give in to an ideology of resignation, or buy into a single-thought system.

Dissenting voices have called for a new model. The revolts in Chiapas provide a paradigmatic example when first, on January 1, 1994, old and new problems emerged and History began to be rewritten (Barrios, 1999: 29-52). Along with the historic social and economic exploitation that peasants and indigenous peoples suffered, and continue to suffer, recently neoliberal modernization further aggravated the situation in these communities. This process was marked more by the withdrawal of all state activities in the region, commercially opening the way for internationalization of the internal market in the framework of economic globalization. The economic restructuring that this included, i.e., a new land policy, has negatively affected the Mexican peasant. The region of Chiapas could be seen as a net loser in the globalization process and the application of neoliberal policies, particularly seen in terms of the per capita Gross Internal Product and the Index of Human Development, which have fallen sharply since 1980 (Prieto, 1996: 115-133).

It is crucial to remain critical of dogma, especially among those who hold power by means of its ideological apparatus. We call for a commitment which helps unify philosophical and theoretical approaches with empirical research that touches our everyday lives. We should avoid the too frequent detachment of theory and practice.

Once both are united, it is important to carry this experience to the classroom and share our critical temperament with students. In other words, unite philosophy, research, and teaching. As mass media struggle to keep us forever immobile in the present, unable to transcend the past or think about the future, we must encourage students to aspire to change things for the better, teach them how things fit into History, and help them to see they are capable of achieving change. Indeed, Gramsci’s thoughts still can encourage us to be realistic and demand the impossible. We must opt for solidarity, but not only with those in our immediate vicinity in time and place, but also with those who have yet to be born, and with those in the Third World.

A coherent ethical position should relate theory and practice with commitment in our research. All subjects belong to a fixed historical moment and to a larger History. Whereas others have carried their radical extremes beyond the academy for the reconstruction of History, they impact academic History in ways unforeseen: e.g., Marx, Gramsci, Bloch, Negri, and today Subcomandante Marcos of Chiapas.

Dispense with absolutes. One need not recklessly seek the liberating in the nonhistorical, because the very nonroutine, unpredictable, and multidirectional nature of History is itself emancipating. The most important aspect of the historian’s job is to defend values of solidarity and justice and, rather than to reach definitive conclusions, to keep searching.

NOTES

1. Habermas (1991) praises Lawrence Kohlberg’s attempt (1988) at developing a theory of moral competences in the Piagetian model, a theory that would be both evolutionary and universalist. We disagree with Habermas on this point and believe that just as we can develop a theory of society, we can also conceive of another for history, as indicated by Arısteıgüı (1995), p. 138.

2. Petra (1999) maintains, “Conventional wisdom concerning globalization tries to sell the public the advantages of this tehsis while eliminating the serious pitfalls. Global economic transformations which have taken place recently are highly complex and not to be taken lightly” (also according to Méndez del Valle, 1999).

3. A more current article by the same author is Chenssia, 1998: 13-33, where his comments on the stance of P. Hist and G. Thompson concerning “the myth of globalization” are particularly relevant and interesting (esp., pp. 15-16).

4. The translation of Blair’s book (1998) includes a prologue by the Spanish Socialist Party candidate J. Borrell. For an analysis of Blair’s thought, see Garr-
Monlirort (1999: 15). The most important book on this ideological stance is by Anthony Giddens (1994); cf. also his La tercera vía (1998).

For example, in a novel by Garavaglia and Fradkin (1992) which takes place in the eighteenth century and involves characters in events that never took place. They claim these are, if not true, realistic, and that they "fit into the thin line which separates realistic fiction from History" (p. 11). Garavaglia, formerly a professor in Italy, Mexico, and Argentina, is currently Director of Studies at the École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales in Paris.

Local history may be justified by finding local writings, the direct quantitative sources, and even minutes of town council meetings, legal proceedings, etc., which enable historians to understand regional, provincial, and local levels of human affairs. To construct Social History, it is crucial to formulate a synthesis of these regional studies which shows the points of greatest significance, so the scientific rigor of the "larger history" will be properly reinforced.

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